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ABSTRACT 
After the problems experienced by Enron, WorldCom and other companies in various 
financial crises, the monitoring function of Directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance has 
been discussed more frequently. Given this tendency, discussions of this issue have 
become more popular in Taiwan. This research analyzes the role of D&O insurance in 
corporate governance in Taiwan. The monitoring hypothesis suggests that firms with 
weak corporate governance have a greater incentive to purchase D&O insurance. D&O 
insurance and other monitoring mechanisms are substitutes for each other. Firms which 
have better corporate governance have less demand for D&O insurance. Information 
about insured firms’ corporate governance can be conveyed by D&O insurance. In 
contrast, this study proposes an alternative hypothesis to the monitoring hypothesis. It 
argues that D&O insurance has a positive signal effect to the market. Accordingly, the 
signal effect is an important consideration in D&O insurance purchases. 
This research empirically analyzes the purchase of D&O insurance of around 4,000 listed 
firms in Taiwan from 2008 to 2010. A variety of econometric and statistical methods are 
applied. Empirical evidence shows that the monitoring function of D&O insurance is 
rejected and the signal effect of D&O insurance is supported. The positive signal effect of 
D&O insurance is a more important consideration than the monitoring function or 
indemnification for insured firms. This study also finds that there is no evidence 
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supporting the existences of moral hazard and adverse selection. Thus, the findings 
regarding the rejection of the monitoring hypothesis and support for the signal hypothesis 
will not be affected. In conclusion, this dissertation analyzes the association among D&O 
insurance and corporate governance by comparative law and empirical methods. It 
concludes that the D&O insurance may signal the information of insured firms’ corporate 
governance, but the mandatory insurance rule is not recommended. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Structure of inquiry 
1.1.1 Research background  
About the Enron case, John C. Coffee commented that: “Enron is more about gatekeeper 
failure than board failure”.1  The “gatekeepers” are reputational intermediaries who 
provide verification and certification services to investors, including lawyers, accountants, 
investment bankers, auditors and debt rating agencies.2 In general, major opinions 
attribute the reason for failure of corporate governance to the failure of gatekeepers.3 In 
this line of reasoning, one important gatekeeper is discussed more and more in recent 
years, which is Directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurer.  
Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance is an agreement to indemnify corporate 
directors and officers against judgments, settlements, and fines arising from negligence 
suits, shareholder actions, and other business-related lawsuits.4 Like other insurance, 
                                                            
1 John C. Coffee, Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid", 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1419 
(2002). 
2 Id. at 1405. 
3 See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 492 (2001). See John C. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B. U. L. REV. 301, 349 (2004). 
4 See Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). In fact, directors’ and officers’ liabilities could be managed in 
two main ways: indemnification and D&O liability insurance. Indemnification is a protection provided by 
companies for employees against suits. See also VonFeldt v. Stifel Financial Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 
1998). These two both can indemnify the losses but they are different. The main difference between 
indemnification and D&O liability insurance is that the former transfers risk to the company, whereas the 
latter transfers risk to the third party insurer. Also, risks for events which have already occurred or known 
risks are usually covered by company compensation, but not by D&O liability insurance. Dir. & Off. Liab § 
4:2. 
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D&O insurance has the fundamental function of indemnification. In addition to 
corporations themselves,5  D&O insurance can provide protection for directors and 
officers,6 and thus let them concentrate on management without worrying about potential 
liability or fearing the risk associated with becoming a director or officer of a 
corporation.7 Also, based on the risk management nature of the insurer, the insurer will 
decrease the loss as much as possible, and thus protect the interests of the stakeholders.8 
In other words, this is not only because insurers assume responsibility for losses but also 
because this assumption of responsibility makes them more credible providers of 
loss-prevention services than alternative governance institutions. 9  The underwriting 
information is helpful for the market to understand the status of corporate governance. 
For example, when underwriting is in progress, insurers may examine the financial status 
of insured companies, which will thus allow outside investors to understand more about 
                                                            
5 In general, D&O policy can be classified as three types with separate functions. First, coverage A (Side A 
coverage), or the individual side coverage, reimburses officers and directors for losses that they have 
suffered as a result of their wrongful acts for which they are not indemnified by the company. Secondly, 
coverage B (Side B coverage), or company reimbursement coverage, reimburses the company for the 
expense of indemnifying its directors and officers as a result of claims made against them. Third, coverage 
C (Side C coverage), or entity coverage, provides coverage for a corporation's losses which separates from 
the losses of directors and officers. Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 1988). See Tom Baker 
& Sean Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors' and Officers' Liability 
Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1842 (2007). Hence, under the coverage B and C, the loss of company will be 
compensated. 
6 However, because D&O liability insurance is paid by shareholders to protect directors, some consider 
D&O liability insurance a means to protect the shareholders’ wealth more than the directors’. See M. 
Martin Boyer, Directors' and Officers' Insurance and Shareholder Protection 8-9 (2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=886504. 
7 See IAN YOUNGMAN, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY INSURANCE: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL 
PRACTICE 3 (2d 1999). Hence, the most commonly cited reason for the purchase of D&O insurance is the 
recruitment and retention of qualified officers and directors. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting 
Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 487, 502 (2007). For more discussion about the development of the market for directors' and 
officers' liability insurance, see Dan L. Goldwasser, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance 1994, 692 
PLI/COMM 9, 12-3 (1994). 
8 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1796. 
9 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 7, at 491. 
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the financial situation of company. D&O insurance can both transfer risk and offer 
incentives for insured companies to improve their corporate governance. In addition, 
insurers will force poor quality corporations to pay higher D&O premiums than high 
quality corporations; and the insured corporations will endeavor to improve corporate 
governance to decrease insurance premiums.10 Hence, it is usually believed that D&O 
insurance has a positive effect on corporate governance. In other words, D&O insurance 
is a type of liability insurance of which the primary purpose is to compensate for the 
losses experienced by directors and officers when specific legal liabilities arise. D&O 
insurance may also serve the function of monitoring the governance of companies. 
After the problems experienced by Enron, WorldCom and other companies in various 
financial crises, the monitoring function of D&O insurance has been discussed more 
frequently, particularly in common law. In the United States, Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The act focuses on improving corporate governance by 
protecting shareholders and resulted in increased litigation and more fines and penalties.11 
This also increases the demand of D&O insurance.12 Delaware General Corporation Law 
regulates that a corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on 
behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the 
                                                            
10 Id., at 489. 
11 See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). According to a 2002 survey, 19% of firms had at least 
one lawsuit brought against their directors in the previous ten years. See M. Martin Boyer, Three Insights 
from the Canadian D&O Insurance Market: Inertia, Information and Insiders, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 75, 76 
(2007). 
12 This positive impact is generally recognized. More detailed discussion and examination, see Anna Oh, 
Insuring against Another Enron: The Role of Cross-listing Status of Canadian Firms on the Purchase of 
Directors' and Officers' Insurance in the aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 20-1 (2009), 
http://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/1813/14231/2/AnnaOhFinalThesis1.pdf. 
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corporation.13 So far, the majority of listed corporations in the United States have 
purchased D&O insurance.14  Given this tendency, 15  discussions of this issue have 
become more popular in Taiwan.16  
Taiwan is an island south of China. It is 36,000 square kilometers in area, has a 
population of 22.8 million people and 420.7 US$ billion GDP in 2009.17 The reasons for 
researching Taiwan include its special background and relationship to the D&O insurance 
issue. Taiwan primarily follows a civil law tradition,18 but private laws of it are also 
affected by common law.19 D&O insurance originated in, and was developed in, common 
law countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. Most 
companies in the US purchase D&O insurance. This research will examine the function 
of D&O insurance in corporate governance in the context of civil law countries.   
The general development of the insurance industry in Taiwan is also significant. The first 
                                                            
13 See 8 Del.C. § 145 (g). 
14 After the advent of coverage C in 1996, D&O liability insurance protects not only the individual's assets 
but also those of the corporation. This increases the popularity of D&O liability insurance. In the United 
States, over 90% of the D&O insured reported having entity coverage as of 2002. See John C. Coffee, 
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1534, 1570 (2006).  
15 After Enron and WorldCom scandals, reforms of the Sarbanes-Oxley and New York Stock Exchange 
Listing standards, the 1997-98 financial crisis in Asia had a similar effect on Taiwan. See Ronald J. Gilson 
& Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 343, 343  (2005). For more discussion about financial crisis in Taiwan, see Lawrence L. C. 
Lee, Taiwan's Current Banking Development Strategy: Preparing for Internationalization by Preventing 
Insider Lending, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 206 (Fall 1999/Spring 2000).  
16 This can be found by prospering relevant researches, such as: Jui-I Chang, Essays on Directors’ and 
Officers’ Liability Insurance and Firm Behavior, (Jnu.23, 2010) (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, National 
Chengchi University). Tsai-Jyh Chen & Chia-Hui Pang, An Analysis of Determinants of the Corporate 
Demand for Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 18:2 NTU MGMT. REV. 171, 178 (2008).  
17 See The Non-Life Insurance Association of the R.O.C., NON-LIFE INSURANCE BUSINESS IN TAIWAN, 2 
(2009). This can be obtained via http://www.nlia.org.tw/modules/smartsection/item.php?itemid=325 (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
18 See Michael M. Hickman, Protecting Intellectual Property in Taiwan — Non-Recognized United States 
Corporations and Their Treaty Right of Access to Courts, 60 WASH. L. REV. 117, 119 (1984). 
19 See Andrew Jen-Guang Lin, Common Law Influences in Private Law - Taiwan's Experiences Related to 
Corporate Law, 4 NAT'L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 107, 132 (2009).  
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D&O insurance policy was issued in 1997, and the percentage of listed companies that 
purchase D&O insurance is approximately 50% to date. The D&O insurance industry 
developed in a stable manner in Taiwan. The first issued D&O insurance policies were 
issued in Taiwan in 1997 and 47.5%20 of listed companies are currently insured by D&O. 
This is lower than in the United States, Canada and United Kingdom, but higher than 
China.21 In Taiwan, according to the articles of incorporation or resolution adopted in the 
shareholders' meeting, a TSEC/GTSM listed corporation may take out liability insurance 
for directors with respect to their liabilities resulting from exercising their duties during 
their terms of occupancy.22 It is important to observe the development of D&O insurance 
and its monitoring function with respect to the background of Taiwan. 
While the importance of D&O insurance has been noticed, more and more recent 
researchers have expressed opposing opinions. Some empirical studies indicate that in the 
vast majority of instances, insurers do not provide corporate governance.23 What is more, 
because of the differences from the United States, such as the short history of D&O 
insurance, immature litigation systems, and defects in relevant regulations, how is the 
impact of D&O insurance on corporate governance in Taiwan? What role does D&O 
insurance play in corporate governance in Taiwan? Is the purchase of D&O insurance 
positively related to corporate governance? Is the monitoring function of D&O insurance 
                                                            
20 Please refer to the empirical analysis below.   
21  This can be obtained in the website of Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission, 
http://www.fscey.gov.tw/Layout/main_en/AllInOne_Show.aspx?path=1871&guid=5da0af18-fb31-4ffb-8df
c-05c37d3d0d0e&lang=en-us (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
22 Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies art. 39 (2006).   
23 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1808. 
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sustainable in Taiwan? Is it necessary for Taiwan to compulsorily disclose the 
information about insured corporations, or even to regulate D&O insurance as 
compulsory for listed corporations? All these issues are not only worth more academic 
studies, but they are also significant for practice in Taiwan. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to refine the test on the impact of D&O insurance on 
corporate governance in the background of Taiwan. This dissertation will distinguish the 
differences in backgrounds of the United States and Taiwan, and try to find optimal 
solutions for Taiwan. Empirical methods will be employed to test the hypotheses in this 
dissertation. In conclusion, this research is supposed to contribute suggestions for the 
United States, Taiwan, and even other countries which are considering this issue.  
 
1.1.2 Hypothesis development 
This study attempts to analyze the role of D&O insurance in corporate governance in 
Taiwan. What will be discussed here includes the monitoring hypothesis, signal 
hypothesis, the attributes and problems of corporate governance in Taiwan, the 
differences between common law and civil law, and the function that D&O insurance 
serves in Taiwan. This dissertation proposes that the purchase of D&O insurance is 
roughly and positively related to the corporate governance of insured companies in 
Taiwan. Even given that the industry is not as well developed as is the case the United 
States, the positive relationship still can be observed. Conversely, the reason why a 
difference exists between Taiwan and the United States can be explained by the attributes 
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of the conditions in Taiwan, such as the design of corporate governance structures, the 
prevalence of D&O insurance, the development of the litigation system and so on. In 
addition to the rejection of monitoring hypothesis, the signal hypothesis that D&O 
insurance can emit positive signal is proposed and tested in this dissertation. By a series 
of empirical tests, sufficient evidence will be offered to establish signal theory.  
 
1.1.3 Methodology 
In addition to basic science research methodology, induction and deduction,24 three legal 
research methodologies will be applied in this study.  
    
1.1.3.1 Qualitative methodology25 
Based on a detailed review of literature, this research will explore theories and structures 
of D&O insurance and corporate governance system in the United States and Taiwan 
completely. This study not only analyzes the existing data but also searches for the 
direction for further study in the future. 
    
1.1.3.2  Comparative methodology26 
                                                            
24 See Anita Schnee, Logical Reasoning “Obviously”, 3 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 105, 117 
(1997). 
25  There are at least three types of qualitative analytical properties: (1) analysis-based, (2) 
coordination-based, and (3) decision-based properties. See James E. Holloway, A Primer on the Theory, 
Practice, and Pedagogy: Underpinning a School of Thought on Law and Business, 38 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 587, 616 (2005). For further discussion about the legal methodology of American law, See Richard 
B. Cappalli, The Disappearance of Legal Method, 70 TEMPLE L. REV. 393, 399-400 (1997). 
26 On the eve of the 21st Century, the comparative method is emphasized as an indispensable tool of legal 
science, law reform, and international conflict resolution and unification. See Hiram E. Chodosh, 
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This dissertation not only analyzes D&O insurance and corporate governance system in 
the United States, but also has a detailed analysis on Taiwan. What is more, some 
regulations and policies in Taiwan were derived from those in the United States, but they 
ignored the idiosyncrasies of the economic and social environments in their jurisdictions, 
which caused some conflict. Hence, it is important to recognize the similarities and 
differences among different jurisdictions and thus explore different optimal solutions for 
different situations.  
   
1.1.3.3 Empirical methodology27 
This dissertation will collect empirical data of D&O insurance and corporate governance 
in Taiwan, and test the proposed hypotheses by empirical methods. The data used in this 
study is obtained from databases or websites below: Taiwan Economic Journal,28 Taiwan 
Stock Exchange Corp., 29  Market Observation Post System, 30  Financial Supervisory 
Commission, Executive Yuan, R.O.C.,31 Taiwan Insurance Institute,32 and Securities and 
Futures Investors Protection Center.33 This study will empirically analyze the purchase of 
D&O insurance by public companies in Taiwan during 2008 to 2010. Data about all 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1999). 
27 For further discussion, see Thomas S. Ulen, Empirical and Experimental Methods of Law: A Nobel Prize 
in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 875, 880 (2002).  
28 Taiwan Economic Journal, http://www.finasia.biz/ensite/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
29 Taiwan Stock Exchange Corp., http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/index.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
30 Market Observation Post System, http://emops.tse.com.tw/emops_all.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
31 Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan, 
http://www.fscey.gov.tw/Layout/main_ch/index.aspx?frame=1 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
32 Taiwan Insurance Institute, http://www.tii.org.tw/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
33  Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center, http://www.sfipc.org.tw/english/main.asp (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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public companies will be collected. Relevant arguments discussed in this research include 
whether or not the purchase of D&O insurance is positively related to the corporate 
governance of the insured companies, and whether D&O insurance have monitoring or 
signaling effect or not. A series of empirical works will be processed to test these 
hypotheses. Finally, this dissertation will synthesize the results of these methods and 
propose suggestions.  
 
1.1.4 Research process  
In Chapter 1, this study begins with an introduction of the research background, 
hypothesis development, and methodology. Afterwards, rival theories regarding the 
purpose of director and officer insurance are introduced and discussed. Previous literature 
concerning D&O insurance and corporate governance will be completely reviewed, and 
arguments for and against it will be presented. Then, this dissertation will develop an 
alternative hypothesis to the monitoring hypothesis, which is a signal hypothesis. The 
monitoring hypothesis and the signal hypothesis are two main arguments which will be 
tested in this study. Then, the framework of D&O insurance development will be 
introduced. This provides the background for the following hypothesis development and 
empirical tests within Chapter 2 and 3. 
In Chapter 2 and 3, a series of empirical tests will be carried out to examine the 
monitoring hypothesis and the signal hypothesis, and whether or not these hypotheses are 
affected by exogenous factors. Because the monitoring function of D&O insurance may 
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be affected by moral hazard and asymmetric information, this study will clarify these two 
concerns prior to the test for the monitoring hypothesis. This research proposes that there 
is no moral hazard problem in the Taiwanese market. Hence, D&O insurance does not 
imply the problem of opportunism and moral hazard, and the reasoning of the monitoring 
function would not be affected. Similarly, this study also hypothesizes that transaction 
bargaining and underwriting function well, there is no problem of asymmetric 
information or adverse selection, and the market is close to being homogenous.  
In terms of the tests for the monitoring hypothesis and the signal hypothesis, this 
dissertation proposes that D&O insurance is an index for corporate governance and can 
emit positive signals to the market. Firms in Taiwan could purchase D&O insurance to 
increase their reputation and even attract more investment. However, D&O insurance 
does not have a monitoring function and the quality of corporate governance is not 
inversely related to the demand for D&O insurance. Thus, the monitoring hypothesis is 
rejected and the signal hypothesis is supported.  
In conclusion, this study will explore theories of D&O insurance and structures of 
corporate governance in Taiwan in detail. The monitoring and signal hypotheses will be 
developed by examining the differences between the United States and Taiwan, reviewing 
relevant literature and conducting analyses using a comparative viewpoint. Then, this 
study will test the proposed hypotheses by theoretical and empirical methods, and 
propose optimal suggestions for D&O insurance and corporate governance systems in 
Taiwan.   
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1.2 Rival Theories of the Purpose of Director & Officer Insurance 
1.2.1 Monitoring Hypothesis: positive arguments 
1.2.1.1 Analysis of literature  
In 1990, Clifford G. Holderness pioneered research on D&O insurance and corporate 
governance. He has several important findings and arguments. First, ownership structure 
of a corporation has an impact on its performance and corporate governance. Because of 
more significant segregation between ownership and management, there are fewer 
agency conflicts for those corporations which have D&O insurance.34 He proposed that 
insurers provide an external monitoring function of boards of directors and officers. This 
so-called “monitoring hypothesis” is supported by the results of his empirical research.35 
This monitoring hypothesis significantly affected many subsequent studies.  
In sum, Clifford G. Holderness proposes that the monitoring function of D&O insurance 
has three dimensions.36 First, before a policy is issued, the insurer will investigate the 
factors which affect exposure. This information is critical for the determination of 
premiums. Corporate governance issues of the insured affect both the potential legal risks 
of the insured and the indemnification liability of the insurer. In addition, the monitoring 
function is also revealed in policy coverage, and the conditions and duration of 
                                                            
34 See Clifford G. Holderness, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 115, 127 
(1990).  
35 Id., 129 (1990). 
36 Id., at 118-20. 
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litigation.37 Given the possibility of being forced to pay compensation, insurers have 
substantial incentives to monitor the status of the insured and prevent the occurrence of 
losses. Therefore, the corporate governance of the insured will be monitored. 
In addition, the duties of directors38 are always emphasized and proper risk management 
method for directors should not be ignored. 39  Otherwise, directors might manage 
businesses in a conservative way to avoid potential liability, or even be afraid to take the 
position. D&O insurance can both relieve the risks faced by boards of directors and 
encourage them to manage corporations in an active manner. Moreover, good corporate 
governance contributes to lowering the premiums needed to maintain D&O insurance.40 
D&O insurance can provide incentive for good corporate governance. George Kalchev 
confirms that insurance can mitigate the risk of bankruptcy, and firms with higher returns 
have demand less insurance.41 M. Martin Boyer even suggests that D&O insurance 
protects the wealth of shareholders to a greater extent than is the case for boards of 
directors.42 
The monitoring hypothesis has also discussed and tested in jurisdictions other than the 
United States. In 1997, Noel O'Sullivan empirically tested Holderness’ monitoring 
                                                            
37 Id., at 119-20. 
38 Fiduciary duty can be divided in to two main branches - the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The 
duty of loyalty is primarily a negative duty not to harm the principal. The duty of care is positive - a duty to 
promote the ends of the principal. See Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary 
Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 78 (2004). For more discussion, see Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the 
Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (1989).  
39 See IAN YOUNGMAN, supra note 7, at 3. 
40 See Joshua Gold, Director and Officer Insurance Personal and Advertising Injury Liability, 32662 
NBI-CLE 99, 118 (2006). 
41 See George Kalchev, The Demand for Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance by US Public 
Companies 53 (2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=565183. 
42 See M. Martin Boyer, supra note 6, at 8. 
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hypothesis in the United Kingdom. Noel O'Sullivan sampled 366 companies. He 
examined the relationship between purchases of D&O insurance and board composition, 
managerial ownership, and external shareholder control. His research supported the 
monitoring hypothesis.43 John E. Core gathered data from Canadian firms, and examined 
the factors that determine firms' demand for D&O insurance. He found that companies 
that face greater litigation risks are more likely to purchase insurance and to carry higher 
limits and deductibles.44 Confirmatory evidence was provided that the D&O insurance 
premium reflects the quality of the firm's corporate governance.45 The overall results 
suggest that D&O premiums contain useful information about the quality of firms' 
governance. In Taiwan, Tsai-Jyh Chen and Chia-Hui Pang surveyed 105 of the largest 
500 enterprises in 2008. Their research found that the potential demand for D&O 
insurance is related to overseas investments and the stock holdings of inside directors. In 
other words, purchases of D&O insurance is significantly related to corporate 
governance.46 
    
1.2.1.2 How the monitoring function works 
1.2.1.2.1 Incentive of insurers  
                                                            
43 See Noel O'Sullivan, Insuring the Agents: The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in Corporate 
Governance, 64 J. RISK & INS. 545, 554 (1997). 
44 See John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Director’ and Officers’ Insurance, 64 J. RISK & INS. 63, 
63 (1997).  
45 The other research of John E. Core supports this conclusion as well. See John E. Core, The Directors’ 
and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 449, 450 (2000). 
46 See Tsai-Jyh Chen & Chia-Hui Pang, supra note 16, at 171. 
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The difference between other outside monitors, such as credit rating agencies and 
auditors, is that insurers will suffer from the insured loss directly if the damage occurs. 
Hence, insurers have more incentive than other monitors to watch out for the quality of 
insured companies.47 Similarly, because D&O insurance is quite competitive, insurers 
have to more carefully and seriously scrutinize the insured firms. 48 Based on his 
knowledge for the insured people, insurers can educate the insureds to decrease or even 
avoid risks.49 In addition, insurers can use insurance clauses, obligations of disclosure 
and exclusions to control the insured risk and encourage the insured to mitigate risk.50 In 
other words, insurers in Taiwan can use the regulations in Insurance Law to increase 
monitoring function. After considering the proposal of Clifford G. Holderness, in which 
the monitoring function of D&O insurance has three dimensions, the monitoring function 
of D&O insurance in Taiwan is analyzed in the following paragraphs.  
    
1.2.1.2.2 Premiums   
The insurance premium, the price that a company pays for D&O insurance, will convey 
important information about the quality of corporate governance of the insured 
corporations.51 Generally, the firms with higher risk and poor governance have to pay 
                                                            
47 See Lea H. Stern & M. Martin Boyer, Is Corporate Governance Risk Valued? Evidence from Directors’ 
and Officers’ Insurance 29 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571752. 
48 Id.  
49 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral 
Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 210 (2012). 
50 See Wallace Wang, The Relationship between the Deterrence Effect of D&O Insurance and Corporate 
Governance, 156 TAIWAN L. REV. 141, 150-1 (2008). 
51 See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details 
concerning Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1024 (2006). 
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more in insurance premiums.52 Differentiated premium provides people the “price” 
which results from their behavior, and incentives to change their activities.53 Furthermore, 
experience rating is a mechanism which is usually used to control moral hazard.54 Insurer 
will adjust premium according to the record of the insured.55 Thus, great loss will result 
in higher insurance premium.56 On the other hand, experience rating provides the insured 
to optimize his activity and then to decrease loss.57 In such circumstance, premium can 
reflect the risk of the insured, and thus the disclosure of insurance premium is helpful for 
investors to evaluate the quality of the insured firms. 
 
1.2.1.2.3 Amounts  
In addition to premiums, the amount of D&O insurance, including the policy’s retentions 
and limits, can also provide information about the corporate governance of the insured 
companies.58 Also, deductible and copayment provide the insured incentives to control 
loss, because he has to share the loss if that happens.59 The information about insurance 
                                                            
52 Id. at 1185. 
53 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, supra note 49, at 207-8. 
54 Id., at 199. Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 
479 (1997). Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1890 (1991). 
55 Experience rate is still prospective, because insurer considers the record of the insured in the previous 
period and then decides the rate in the next period. In contrast, retrospective rate is to consider loss data in 
the period when insurance policy is still in effect. See John J. Koresko, V & Jennifer S. Martin, Vebas, 
Welfare Plans, and Sec. 419a(F)(6): Is The IRS Trying to Regulate or Spread Propaganda?, 32 SW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (2003).  
56 See Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 86 (2001). 
57 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 
950 (1988).  
58 See Sean J. Griffith, supra note 51, at 1185. 
59 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, supra note 49, at 208-9. 
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amount demonstrates what insurers are willing to pay and reflects insurers’ evaluation for 
the insureds’ qualities and risks. Additionally, this is helpful to make the comparison 
between different companies more meaningful.60  
 
1.2.1.2.4 Type of coverage  
The amount of side A coverage can convey the signal about the confidence of the 
managers concerning the liability risk they might face.61 Side B and C overage provides 
information regarding the extent to which managers use corporate capital to enhance their 
personal compensation packages.62 
 
1.2.1.2.5 Identity of Insurers  
Different insurers may have different reputations for screening governance risk.63 The 
investors may draw different conclusions from whether the insurer is a market leader, 
unknown or cute-rate insurer.64  
 
1.2.1.2.6 Exclusions  
Exclusions in D&O insurance policies are also important for monitoring function. Moral 
hazard is typically referred to the tendency to reduce incentives to protect against loss or 
                                                            
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1024-5. 
63 Id. at 1025. 
64 Id. In order to win more market share, the cut-rate insurer may lower the premium and thus lessen the 
concern for corporate governance of insured firms. Hence, the D&O insurance information should be 
considered more diligently if contracted with such insurer. 
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to minimize the cost of a loss.65 In order to mitigate moral hazard66 and control risk, 
there are exclusion clauses in insurance policies to exclude uninsured risk. As the same as 
general insurance policies, there are exclusions in almost all D&O insurance policies. The 
most common exclusions include personal injury exclusions, personal conduct exclusions, 
insured v. insured exclusions, and pollution exclusions.67 Claims for personal injury or 
bodily injury are excluded by most D&O policies.68 These losses are covered by other 
types of insurances, such as commercial general liability ("CGL"). Insured v. insured 
exclusions indicate that the insurer is not liable for the damage which is brought by one 
insured against another insured.69  The purpose is to avoid conflictions among the 
insured.70 Essentially, in order to avoid unpredictable risk, damages caused by pollutions 
or catastrophes are also usually excluded.  
Among these exclusions, what is more related with corporate governance is conduct 
exclusions.71 Usually, the insurer is not liable for the intentional behavior of the insured. 
                                                            
65 See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (2d ed. 2008).  
66 For more discussion about moral hazard in insurance, see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral 
Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 247 (1996). 
67 See Travis S. Hunter, Ambiguity in the Air: Why Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Policy Terms 
Should Force Insurance Companies to Pay for Global Warming Litigation, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 267, 275 
(2008).  
68 See Joseph P. Monteleone & Emy Poulad Grotell, Symposium: Coverage for Employment Practices 
Liability under Various Policies: Commercial General Liability, Homeowners', Umbrella, Workers' 
Compensation, and Directors' and Officers' Liability Policies, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 249 (1999). 
69 National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 662 F. Supp. 36, 38 (WD Wash. 1986). Foster v. 
Kentucky Hous. Corp., 850 F. Supp. 558, 561 (ED Ky. 1994). 
70 There is no use for this exclusion when derivative actions are brought by shareholders against directors 
and officers or actions are brought by a receiver or bankruptcy trustee. This is because these entities are 
deemed to act for the benefit of the corporation's creditors but not for the corporations. See Robert D. 
Chesler & Cindy R. Tzvi, D&O Insurance: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 13:6 METROPOLITAN CORP. 
COUNS. 38, 38 (2005), available at 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/5509/project-corporate-counsel-law-firms-do-insurance-now-yo
u-see-it-now-you-dont. 
71 See Wallace Wang, supra note 50, at 156. 
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In other words, if the insured cause the occurrence of the insured accidence intentionally, 
the insurer is not liable for indemnification. The substance of insurance is to protect 
unpredictable risk, and the occurrence of accidence caused by intentional behavior is 
obvious not unpredictable. Indemnification to such accident is contrary to the substance 
of insurance which is also contrary to public policy. In addition, in order to decrease 
moral hazard, it is also necessary to decline the indemnification for the fraud or 
intentional behavior. In D&O insurance, cases of fraud and gross negligence are usually 
excluded as well.72 Hence, if the insured commits the exclusions above, he or she will 
not get compensation from his or her D&O insurer. This can create deterring effect and 
thus secure corporate governance of the insured companies.  
 
1.2.1.2.7 Summary 
From the analysis above, it is illustrated that the D&O insurance is beneficial to corporate 
governance. Because of the potential compensation liability, insurers should have strong 
incentives to securitize insured corporations and thus decide premiums. Insurers will 
charge more against insured corporations which have higher litigation risk, and charge 
less against insured corporations which have lower litigation risk. In order to decrease 
premiums, corporations will strive to decrease litigation risk, and thus corporate 
governance will be improved. This argument positively evaluates D&O insurance’s 
                                                            
72  See http://www.generali.com/Generali-Group/Governance/corporate-bodies/D-and-O-Policy/ (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013).  
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impact on corporate governance. However, compared with the number of studies in the 
United States, there are fewer relevant studies in Taiwan. Therefore, this proposal aims to 
test this hypothesis in the backgrounds of Taiwan. 
 
1.2.2 Missing monitor: opponent arguments 
By contrast, some researchers argue against the monitoring hypothesis and the positive 
relationship between the purchase of D&O insurance and corporate governance. Tom 
Baker and Sean J. Griffith examine how liability insurers transmit and transform the 
content of corporate and securities law. This article discusses how D&O insurers evaluate 
risk in order to arrive at that premium number. It found that, in addition to financial 
analysis of corporations, underwriters focus primarily on the corporate governance of the 
prospective insured, especially “deep governance” variables such as culture and 
character.73 In other words, D&O insurers do not offer loss prevention services to their 
insured corporations, and they do no monitor the corporate governance of their insured 
corporations.74  
In addition, moral hazard is a significant concern in liability insurance. D&O insurance 
may considerably nullify the deterrence effects of litigation against directors, causing 
directors to be less attentive to their duties to shareholders.75 Some countries such as 
                                                            
73 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 7, at 543. 
74 See DIR. & OFF. LIAB § 4:27. See also Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' 
and Officers' Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 831 (2009). 
75 See Clifford G. Holderness, supra note 34, at 115. 
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Germany prohibit D&O insurance because of the problem of moral hazard.76 The 
underwriting cycle also plays an important role77. In a difficult market, underwriters 
become more selective, more interested in higher attachment points, less willing to offer 
high limits, less willing to negotiate contract terms, and able to command dramatically 
higher prices for what amounts to less coverage.78 Hence, premiums are not always 
related to litigation risk of insured corporations. This provides a different viewpoint from 
previous studies.  
The similar perspective is further provided by Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith. They 
indicate again that in the vast majority of instances, insurers do not provide corporate 
governance.79 Usually insurers might be expected to provide loss prevention functions. 
For, example, insurers might provide discounts to encourage corporations to improve 
corporate governance and thus decrease litigation risks. However, according to empirical 
results, insurers do not do this. Sometimes insurers give advice to corporations, but that is 
usually ignored by the corporations. In the end, D&O insurers do not provide loss 
prevention function.80 
Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith conducted in-depth interviews with underwriters, 
                                                            
76 See María Gutiérrez, An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 34(3) RAND J. 
ECON.516, 517 (2003). 
77 See Joshua Dobiac, I Came, I Saw, I Underwrote: D & O Liability Insurance's Past Underwriting 
Practices and Potential Future Directions, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 487, 495 (2008). 
78 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 7, at 507. 
79 As one of their interviewees stated: “You had asked me on the phone whether companies ... changed 
their behavior... for the benefit of the D&O insurers. I don't think they are. I think the brokers sometimes 
can put lipstick on the pig, but that is a marketing feature. And it seems to me that however high D&O 
premiums climb, they are not going to climb high enough to get the companies to really, really pay 
attention.” Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1808. 
80
 Id, at 1808-12. 
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actuaries, brokers, lawyers and corporate risk managers. They found that what 
underwriters are concerned about are “deep governance” variables such as culture and 
character, variables which are not confined to the financial analysis of the insured 
companies.81 Moreover, the advice given by insurers is usually ignored by insured 
companies.82 
Moreover, Joshua Dobiac evaluates how corporate governance may be a compelling 
factor in individualized underwriting. In conclusion, he has a similar opinion as Baker 
and Sean J. Griffith: the governance role of D&O insurance is minor and whatever effect 
poor governance has on pricing is not adequate to change corporate behavior.83 Boyer 
and Delvaux-Derome’s conclude that firms with weak governance systems facilitate 
opportunistic behavior and are consequently to buy D&O insurance.84 This implies that 
the positive relationship between the purchase of D&O insurance and corporate 
governance of the insured companies is questionable. From this point of view, the 
purchase of D&O insurance is not necessary for the purposes of corporate governance 
and risk management. This is also the reason this proposal intends to reexamine the 
relationship between D&O insurance and corporate governance in Taiwan.  
From the analysis of literature above, it could be found that D&O insurance’s impact on 
corporate governance is highly controversial. There are two main opposing arguments 
                                                            
81 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 7, at 543. 
82 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1808-12. 
83 See Joshua Dobiac, supra note 77, at 508. 
84 See M. Martin Boyer & Mathieu Delvaux-Derome, The Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance 
in Canada 14 (2002), http://ideas.repec.org/p/cir/cirwor/2002s-72.html. 
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about this issue. One opinion argues that D&O insurance plays an important corporate 
governance role. This is mainly based on the monitoring hypothesis in which an insurer 
will thoroughly scrutinize the insured. On the other way, opponents argue that there is no 
relationship between the purchase of D&O insurance and corporate governance. D&O 
insurance does not always play an important role in corporate governance. Moreover, 
moral hazard might cause more negative effects. In the situation that D&O insurance is 
purchased out of managerial opportunism, it is more impractical to believe D&O 
insurance’s positive impact on corporate governance. The purpose of this research is to 
examine the monitoring hypothesis in Taiwan. Because of many differences between the 
United States and Taiwan, there are many problems waiting to be solved. The hypotheses 
can be developed after the analysis of corporate governance and development of D&O 
insurance in Taiwan. 
 
1.2.3 Proposal of signal hypothesis 
Analysis above demonstrates different argument about monitoring hypothesis and the 
monitoring function of D&O insurance. Even though they have different argument and 
reasoning about the monitoring function of S&O insurance, but most of them admit that 
D&O insurance can convey certain signal. In other words, even though D&O insurance 
cannot play a role of spur to urge firms optimize their corporate governance, it may be an 
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important signal to the market.85 From the details of insurance package and premiums, 
insurers’ assessment for the insured firms would convey to the investors. If D&O 
insurance enhances the protection of directors and implies the concern of corporate 
governance of firms, then D&O insurance shall imply good signal. In contrast, if D&O 
insurance would induce moral hazard, opportunistic behavior and problem of asymmetric 
information, this implies damages would happen. As a result, D&O insurance would 
convey negative signal.  
The signal effect of D&O insurance can also be found by the attitude of the insured firms. 
Jinyoung Park tests D&O insurance and voluntary disclosure of Canadian firms. He finds 
that an association exists between D&O insurance coverage, disclosure frequency and 
precision.86 The more insurance coverage, the more optimistic information is disclosed. 
That information would also be more precise and timely.87 Then, significantly favorable 
response to this information will be given by market.88 This implies the signal effect of 
D&O insurance, and the favorable response from market gives firms more intensives to 
purchase D&O insurance. 
Because D&O insurance will emit some signal to the market, the decision of D&O 
insurance purchase might not be a pure consideration of insurance purchase. If D&O 
insurance can bring positive effect, firms with good corporate governance might purchase 
                                                            
85 See Sean J. Griffith, Unleashing a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details 
Concerning Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Policies (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=728442. 
86 See Jinyoung Park, The Effect of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Indemnification on 
Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Canadian Firms 4 (2005), 
http://som.umflint.edu/research/docs/20052006/200506_JP_I.pdf. (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
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D&O insurance to demonstrate their emphasis on corporate governance and attract more 
investors. For the firms with bad corporate governance, it is also possible for them to 
purchase D&O insurance to establish their reputation.89 In contrast, if D&O insurance 
can bring negative effect, every firm will avoid purchasing D&O insurance because this 
may signalize that there are some problems in companies.90 In the end, what firms cares 
is not only the indemnification function of D&O insurance, but also how to create the 
signal they desired.  
Followed by previous literature review, this dissertation proposes the alternative 
hypothesis to monitoring hypothesis, which is signal hypothesis. This hypothesis argues 
that D&O insurance has significant effect in signal transmission. In addition to 
indemnification, the signal effect is another important consideration in insurance 
purchase. Except signal effect, other additional function of D&O insurance is disputable, 
especially monitoring function. D&O insurance is not a component of monitoring 
mechanism for firms, and its monitoring function is limited. In consequence, the 
argument of monitor hypothesis that the firms with poor corporate governance will have 
more demand for D&O insurance is not sustainable.  
A series of empirical tests will be conducted in this study. The monitoring and signal 
effect of D&O insurance will be tested. The concerns about asymmetric information and 
adverse selection will also be tested to make sure the previous results will not be 
                                                            
89 See M. Martin Boyer, supra note 19, at 8-9. 
90 Id. 
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influenced.  
 
1.3 D&O Insurance in Taiwan 
1.3.1  Demand for D&O insurance 
Taiwan has adopted the traditions of civil law countries by adopting a two-tier board 
system, directors and supervisors, in Taiwanese corporate governance structures.91 The 
primary purpose of supervisory boards is to monitor the board of directors, including 
activities such as reviewing transactions that involve potential conflicts of interest, 
financial reporting processes and internal controls. In sharp contrast to certain European 
countries, supervisory boards in Taiwan do not include representatives of labor or other 
stakeholders.92 Taiwanese supervisory boards actually work much like outside directors 
in common law countries.93   
In addition to the existing two-tier board system, Taiwan has also followed common law 
countries by enacting mandatory board reforms, including independent directors for 
publicly-traded companies.94 In 2007, Taiwan reformed the Securities and Exchange Act 
and formally adopted the institution of independent director.95 However, this confers 
minority status on independent directors, and requires that there be a clear line of 
demarcation with respect to potential overlaps of power between supervisors and 
                                                            
91 See Christopher John Gulinello, The Revision of Taiwan's Company Law: The Struggle Toward A 
Shareholder-Oriented Model In One Corner of East Asia, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 75, 95 (2003). 
92 Id.  
93 See Nancy L. Wong, Easing Down the Merit-Disclosure Continuum: A Case Study of Malaysia and 
Taiwan, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 49, 94, FN 209 (1996). 
94 See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 15, at 343 (2005).  
95 Securities and Exchange Act Art. 14-2. 
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independent directors.96 Regarding the factors affecting D&O insurance purchases in 
Taiwan, these factors may be observed from following perspectives.   
 
1.3.1.1 Statutes  
The fundamental statues which spell out the potential liability of directors and officers are 
as follows:97 
A. Civil Code Art. 544 The mandatory shall be liable to the principal for 
any injury resulting from his negligence in the execution of the affairs 
commissioned or from such acts as are beyond his authority.   
B. Company Act Art. 23 The responsible person of a company shall have 
the loyalty and shall exercise the due care of a good administrator in 
conducting the business operation of the company; and if he/she has 
acted contrary to this provision, shall be liable for the damages to be 
sustained by the company there-from. If the responsible person of a 
company has, in the course of conducting the business operations, 
violated any provision of the applicable laws and/or regulations and 
thus caused damage to any other person, he/she shall be liable, jointly 
and severally, for the damage to such other person.   
C. Company Act Art. 28 Any and all public announcements to be made by 
                                                            
96 See Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Carol Yuan-Chi Pang, Minority Controlling Shareholders: An Analytical 
Framework and Its Application to Taiwan, 2 NAT'L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 81, 103 (2007).  
97 This information can be obtained in Law bank, http://www.lawbank.com.tw/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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a company shall be published in a conspicuous place on a daily news 
dissertation circulating in the municipality or county (city) wherein the 
company is located, except for the public offering companies subject to 
the provisions otherwise stipulated by the securities and exchange 
control authority.  
D. Company Act Art. 226 In case supervisor is liable to compensate the 
company or a third party and a director is also liable, such supervisor 
and director shall be joint debtors.   
 
These statues are a primary foundation of the liabilities for directors and officers. In order 
to clarify the duties of directors, Taiwan has decided to follow the framework of common 
law with respect to fiduciary duties.98 In 2009, Taiwan modified the original Article 23 of 
the Company Act, and further clarified the responsibilities, duties and loyalties of 
directors. This is believed to have increased the legal risks faced by directors.  
 
1.3.1.2 Collective action  
Class action lawsuits are a major source of directors’ liabilities. In Taiwan, the Securities 
and Futures Investors Protection Center (SFIPC) was established to protect investors and 
                                                            
98 Fiduciary duty can be divided into two main branches - the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The duty 
of loyalty is primarily a negative duty not to harm the principal. The duty of care is positive - a duty to 
promote the principal. See Arthur B. Laby, supra note 38, at 78. For more discussion, see Alan R. Palmiter 
supra note 38, at 1353.  
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help them file collective action lawsuits.99 After the SFIPC has been empowered by a 
minimum of 20 securities investors or futures traders, the SFIPC can file an arbitration or 
class action lawsuit as the representative of securities investors or futures traders.100 From 
1998 to 2010, the SFIPC has processed about 80 class action lawsuits. The development 
of class action lawsuits has increased the legal risks faced by directors and subsequently 
increased the incentive to purchase D&O insurance.  
 
1.3.1.3 Promotion of D&O insurance 
The purchase of D&O insurance is encouraged by government authorities in Taiwan for 
the purpose of improving risk management and corporate governance. This tendency 
extends beyond symbolic gestures and includes regulations.101 The purchase of D&O 
                                                            
99 In Taiwan, the Securities Investors and Futures Traders Protection Act took effect on January 1, 2003, 
authorizing the government to establish an institution for the purpose of investor protection. Hence, the 
Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center was established with court approval in 2003. See 
http://www.sfipc.org.tw/english/about/02.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). Detailed introduction to SFIPC, 
see Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Jian-Lin Chen, Reforming China's Securities Civil Actions: Lessons from 
Pslra Reform in the U.S. and Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit Enforcement in Taiwan, 21 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 115, 143-8 (2008).  
100 Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act Art.28 Sec.1: “For protection of the public interest, 
within the scope of this Act and its articles of incorporation, the protection institution may submit a matter 
to arbitration or institute an action in its own name with respect to a securities or futures matter arising from 
a single cause that is injurious to multiple securities investors or futures traders, after having been so 
empowered by not less than 20 securities investors or futures traders. The securities investors or futures 
traders may withdraw the empowerment to submit a matter to arbitration or institute an action prior to the 
conclusion of oral arguments or examination of witnesses and shall provide notice to the arbitral tribunal or 
court.” This information can be obtained in http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT0202.asp (last visited Jan. 
15, 2013). It is believed that this improves the litigation system and gradually benefits the development of 
D&O liability insurance. See WALLACE WEN-YEU WANG, CORPORATION LAW 548 (3d ed. 2006). Actually, 
this is affected by the class action in the United States. For more discussion about the effect of class action 
in the United States on other countries, see Stefano M. Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe: 
U.S.-Style Securities Class Actions and the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 281, 
293-99 (2006). 
101  Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TWSE/GTSM Listed Companies Art. 39: 
“According to the articles of incorporation or resolution adopted in the shareholders' meeting, a 
TWSE/GTSM listed company may take out liability insurance for directors with respect to their liabilities 
resulting from exercising their duties during their terms of occupancy so as to reduce and spread the risk of 
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insurance is regarded as a factor in the evaluation of corporate governance according to 
the government’s website.102 This presumably has increased demand for D&O insurance. 
 
1.3.2 Overview of D&O insurance policies and clauses  
In addition to the basic function of indemnification, D&O insurance has some 
characteristics worth more attention. First, D&O insurance has the function of advancing 
defense expenses. The reason is that, if defense expenses, such as attorney fees and 
litigation fees, are paid only after cases are settled, the protection offered by litigation 
would arrive late and have little meaning. Hence, typical D&O insurance offers to pay 
defense expenses in advance, prior to the complete settlement of claims. Most D&O 
insurance policies have such clauses, but the conditions may differ.  
Second, in D&O insurance, the insurer usually expands the protection offered to the 
insured by widening the definition of who is insured. For example, “the insured” may not 
only include directors, officers, staff members involved in conducting the company’s 
management function in the past, present and future, and their legal spouses, heirs, 
trustees and legal agents.103 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
material harm to the company and shareholders arising from the wrongdoings or negligence of a director.” 
Art 49: “According to the articles of incorporation or resolution adopted in a shareholders' meeting, a 
TWSE/GTSM listed company may take out liability insurance for supervisors with respect to their 
liabilities resulting from exercising their duties during their terms of occupancy so as to reduce and spread 
the risk of material harm to the company and shareholders arising from the wrongdoings or negligence of a 
supervisor.” This information can be obtained in the website of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation 
(TWSE), http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/listed/governance/cg_02.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
102 See Market Observation Post System, http://emops.twse.com.tw/emops_all.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 
2013). 
103 See AIG General Insurance Management Liability Protection for You & Your Business: Non-US 
Securities. 
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D&O insurance also has special characteristic during the discovery period. In general, 
there are two bases for liability insurance. The “claims made” basis provides coverage for 
claims made during the period of insurance, regardless of when the cause occurs. By 
contrast, “occurrence” basis insurance provides coverage which occurs in the period of 
insurance, regardless of when the claim is made.104 The “occurrence” basis means that 
insurers must provide coverage for events which may have occurred long ago. This 
creates a long period (“tail”) of exposure for insurers.105 Hence, D&O insurance is 
customarily offered on a “claims made” basis rather than on an “occurrence” basis.106 
The problem is that, in a “claims made” basis, if the timing of cause occurs close to the 
end of the policy period, insured parties might have insufficient time to report losses. In 
order to solve this problem, the insurer usually provides “discovery periods” or “extended 
reporting periods” during which insured parties could report losses and obtain 
compensation. In this manner, a long and free discovery period is beneficial to the 
insured. In D&O insurance, some insurers provide discovery periods free of charge,107 
but some insurers charge for discovery periods. Some insurers provide free basic 
discovery periods and charge for extensions.108 
                                                            
104 See Michael D. Sousa, Making Sense of the Bramble-Filled Thicket: The “Insured vs. Insured” 
Exclusion in the Bankruptcy Context, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 379 (2007). 
105 See Armen Shahinian & Scott D. Baron, The Notice Defense to Financial Institution Bond Claims 
Dissected: No Showing of Prejudice from Late Notice Should Be Required, 2 FIDELITY L. ASS'N J. 1, 13 
(1996). 
106 See Michael D. Sousa, supra note 104, at 378. 
107 See http://www.chartisinsurance.com.tw/BusinessContent.aspx?InsID=22501050000 (last visited Jan. 
15, 2013). 
108 For example, the South China Insurance Company provides a 90-day discovery period for free, and 
charges to extend it. 
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Similarly, the “retrospective date” will solve another issue under the “claim made” basis. 
Under the “claims made” basis, even though claims are usually made during the policy 
period, the occurrence sometimes may happen prior to the policy period. This increases 
the uncertainty of liability for insurers. Hence, D&O insurers usually set up 
“retrospective dates,” which means that the insured could only obtain the compensation 
when occurrences take place after the retrospective date.109 This is done in order to 
reduce the liability. However, some D&O insurers have no such limitations.110 
  
1.3.3 Relevant regulations and policies 
As mentioned above, the operation of the monitoring function may base on the incentives 
of insurers, for instance, premiums, amounts, type of coverage, and exclusions. There are 
more regulations about exclusion and misrepresentation in Taiwanese insurance law and 
the operation of the monitoring function of D&O insurance may be affected.  
 
1.3.3.1 Exclusions 
Under the argument of the monitoring hypothesis, exclusions of D&O insurance policies 
can stimulate the insured to watch out the quality of corporate governance and deter 
intentional acts. In Taiwan, The general regulation about the exclusion for fraud and 
intentional behavior is shown in insurance law art.29:  
                                                            
109 See, e.g., the policy of Taian Insurance Company has such limitation. 
110 See, e.g., the policy of Federal Insurance Company. 
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An insurer is liable to indemnify for damage caused by unforeseeable events or 
force majeure. However, this requirement is not applicable when limitations are 
expressly stated in the insurance contract. 
An insurer is liable to indemnify for damage caused by the fault of the proposer 
or insured. However, this rule is not applicable to loss caused by a willful act of the 
proposer or insured. 
 
Hence, if the damage is caused by the proposer or insured intentionally, apparently this is 
not unforeseeable for the insurer. In addition, this damage is caused by a willful act of the 
proposer or insured, and thus the insurer is not liable for this damage. Some examples are 
making the company be a shareholder of unlimited liability in another company or a 
partner of a partnership enterprise,111  lending the capital of the company to other 
shareholders or people,112 acting as a guarantor of other people,113 redeeming or buying 
back any of its outstanding shares,114 short-swing transacting115 and insider trading.116 
These acts all are intentional and D&O insurers are not liable for damages caused by 
these acts. Almost all D&O insurance policies in Taiwan contain the clauses of 
exclusions.117  Hence, if the insured directors or officers behave intentionally, then 
insurers cannot indemnify the damages. By this way, the insured directors or officers will 
                                                            
111 Taiwanese Company Act Art. 13 Sec1. 
112 Taiwanese Company Act Art. 15. 
113 Taiwanese Company Act Art. 16. 
114 Taiwanese Company Act Art. 167 Sec1. 
115 Taiwanese Securities and Exchange Act Art. 157 Sec1. 
116 Taiwanese Securities and Exchange Act Art. 157-1 Sec1. 
117 See, e.g., the Directors, Officers and Company Liability Insurance Policy of Zurich Insurance Taiwan.  
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have less incentive to cause damages, and the companies will have more incentives to 
monitor and decrease the intentional behavior of the insured directors or officers.  
It is true that if the proposer or the insured want to get indemnification they have to avoid 
willful behavior. However, is this reasoning always reliable? It may be doubtful. For 
example, short-swing transacting and insider trading usually bring large benefit for the 
actors. If the proposer or the insured decide to act something illegal intentionally, 
knowing that this act may cause the insured to loss D&O insurance compensation, this 
may mean that the proposer or the insured can get more benefit from these acts than the 
loss of insurance compensation. In other words, facing the great benefit of intentional 
behavior, it is not surprise for the proposer and insured not to consider insurance 
compensation. Hence, more evidence is needed to prove that exclusions are helpful in the 
monitoring function of D&O insurance to corporate governance.  
 
1.3.3.2 Misrepresentation  
In the insurance law in Taiwan, the regulation of misrepresentation of the proposer or 
insured contains three parts: 1. the obligation of disclosure at the time contract is made; 2. 
the obligation of disclosure at the time when risk is increasing; and 3. the obligation of 
notification at the time when accident happens. In the circumstance of D&O insurance, 
the quality of corporate governance of the insured companies can be monitored by these 
mechanisms.  
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A. First, the obligation of disclosure at the time contract is made is shown 
in Taiwanese insurance law art.64:118  
At the time a contract is entered into, the proposer shall make truthful 
representations in response to the written inquiries of the insurer. 
If the proposer has made any willful concealment, nondisclosure through its own 
fault, or misrepresentation, and such concealment, nondisclosure, or 
misrepresentation is sufficient to alter or diminish the insurer's estimation of the risk 
to be undertaken, the insurer may rescind the contract; the same shall apply after the 
risk has occurred, provided that this provision does not apply where the proposer 
proves that the occurrence of the risk was not based upon any fact that it did or did 
not represent. 
The right to rescind as stated in the preceding paragraph shall be extinguished if 
not exercised within one month of the time the insurer knows of the cause for 
rescission. Once two years have elapsed after the contract is entered into, the 
contract may not be rescinded even if cause for rescission exists. 
 
In the circumstance of D&O insurance, the insured companies should make truthful 
representations in response to the written inquiries of the insurer. In order to assess the 
risk which insured companies may encounter, insurer will endeavor the quality of the 
                                                            
118 This can be obtained in Law Bank, http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0201.asp (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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insured companies. Thus, the insurers will inquiry important details which may cause 
potential litigation risk. For example, Federal Insurance Company in Taiwan requests that 
the insured provide information including: 119  ownership structure, 120  any material 
changes,121 accounting practices,122 the conduct of business in other jurisdictions, outside 
directors, employee practices,123 the details of prior insurance and prior knowledge.124 
Facing the writing inquiry of insurers and insurance law art.64, the insured companies 
have to make truthful representations, or otherwise the contract may be rescinded by 
insurers. By doing this, the information about the quality of corporate governance of the 
insured companies can be conveyed.  
 
B. Similarly, after the insurance is made, if the insured risk has changed, 
the insured has the duty to notice the insurer and let insurer have a 
chance to reassess the risk. This is shown in Taiwanese insurance law 
art.59:125  
                                                            
119 See the application of D&O insurance of Federal Insurance Company. This information can be obtained 
in the database of Taiwan Insurance Institute, http://insprod.tii.org.tw/database/insurance/index.asp (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
120 Id. “the name and ownership percentage of any shareholder directly or beneficially owning 5% or more 
of the issued shares of any applicant”.  
121 Id. “any acquisitions of, tender offers for or mergers with any other organization”.  
122 Id. “the question that has the applicant changed or is it considering changes to its revenue recognition or 
other accounting practices?” 
123 Id. “the question that has the applicant undertaken any staff retrenchments or reductions during the last 
6 years or does it anticipate making any staff retrenchments or reductions in the next 12months?” 
124 Id. “the question that has the applicant or any person proposed for coverage given notice under the 
provisions of any prior or current directors’ & officers’ liability and company reimbursement insurance 
policy, management liability policy, employment practices liability policy or similar insurance of facts or 
circumstances which might give rise to a claim being made against any such person?” 
125 This can be obtained in Law Bank, http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0201.asp (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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A proposer required to serve notice of circumstances that increase risk as stated 
in the insurance contract shall notify the insurer upon becoming aware of the 
circumstances. 
If the increase in risk is caused by an act of the proposer or the insured, and the 
risk is increased to the extent that the premium should be increased or the contract 
terminated, the proposer or the insured shall serve prior notice to the insurer. 
If the increase in risk is not caused by an act of the proposer or the insured, the 
proposer or the insured shall notify the insurer within 10 days of becoming aware of 
the increase in risk. 
When risk is diminished, the insured may request the insurer to adjust the 
premium.  
 
If the proposer fails to notice, different regulations will be applied depending on different 
situations. If the increase in risk is caused by an act of the proposer or the insured, the 
insurer can acclaim to rescind the contract according to art. 57.126 If the increase in risk is 
not caused by an act of the proposer or the insured, the insurer cannot acclaim to rescind 
the contract according to art. 57, but can acclaim compensation according to art.63.127  
When making insurance contract, the insurer will assess the status of the insured 
companies and their corporate governance, and then decide the premiums, limits, 
                                                            
126 Taiwanese insurance law art. 57. 
127 Taiwanese insurance law art. 63. 
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retentions and other conditions of the policies. However, if the risk has changed, the 
insured companies have to notify insurers to avoid the rescinding of contract or 
compensation. Thus, the change of the quality of corporate governance of the insured 
companies will be demonstrated. The monitoring or signal function of D&O insurance 
can thus be exerted. Moreover, if the insured companies fail to do so, the consequence 
depends on whether the increase of risk is caused by an act of the proposer or the insured 
or not.  
In the circumstance of D&O insurance, the insured companies and insurers may have 
conflicting interests. From the perspective of the insurers, they will endeavor to prove 
that the risk is caused by an act of the proposer or the insured. For example, the directors 
are negligent, not diligent, and not protected by business judgment rule and so on. In 
contrast, the insured will endeavor to counter this claim, and prove that the proposer or 
the insured is not blamable. Thus, the insurer will argue that the policy should not be 
rescinded, but only compensation is sufficient. No matter which side is more persuasive, 
this dispute itself is helpful to signal the quality of governance of the insured companies 
and increase the transparency.  
 
C. Third, when the insured accident occurs, proposers, the insured, or 
beneficiaries should notify the insurers to get indemnification. This is 
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shown in Taiwanese insurance law art.58:128 
When a proposer, insured, or beneficiary experiences an event for which 
the insurer bears insurance liability, such party shall notify the insurer 
within five days from becoming aware of the occurrence, except where 
otherwise provided in this Act or stipulated in the contract.  
 
In the circumstance of D&O insurance, when proposers, the insured, or beneficiaries 
request indemnification, certainly the occurrence of claims, litigations and judgments will 
be disclosed. If they fail to do so, Taiwanese insurance law art. 63 will be applied here as 
well. They shall be liable for loss suffered by the insurer as a result. In order to request 
indemnification and avoid potential compensation, proposers, the insured, or 
beneficiaries will notify the insurers when accidents happen. Thus, the status of insured 
companies will be disclosed at this time.  
Summing up, the obligations of disclosure of the proposer or insured in Taiwanese 
insurance law will secure and improve the monitoring function of D&O insurance on 
corporate governance. Proposers and insured companies should make truthful 
representations, notify insurers when risks changed and accidents occur. In order to 
follow these regulations and avoid rescinding of contract, proposers and insured 
companies have to notify insurers.  
  
                                                            
128 This can be obtained in Law Bank, http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0201.asp (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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Figure 1.2 Illustrations for issues and methods 
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Figure 1.3 Organization of Research 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1
•Introduction 
•Structure of inquiry
•Rival Theories of the Purpose of Director 
& Officer Insurance
•Director & Officer Insurance in Taiwan
Chapter 2
•Test of Monitoring hypothesis 
•Test of moral hazard of the D&O insurance in the 
Taiwanese market
•Test of asymmetric information of the D&O insurance in 
the Taiwanese market
•Test of monitoring function of D&O insurance 
Chapter 3
•Test of Signal Hypothesis
•Test of signal effect of D&O insurance  
•Discussions
Chapter 4
•Implications and findings 
•Discussion about empirical findings 
•Recommendations
•Concluding remarks
42 
 
 
CHAPTER 2  
MONITORING HYPOTHESIS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will test the issues about adverse selection, moral hazard and monitoring 
functions of D&O insurance in Taiwanese market. Adverse selection and moral hazard 
are classic problems in insurance.129 Adverse selection means a tendency that low risk 
insureds avoid insurance purchase but high risk insureds stay in insurance pool,130 and 
moral hazard indicates that the incentive of insureds changes because of being offered 
insurance coverage.131 Adverse selection and moral hazard are also understood as types 
of agency costs, when interests of the principal and agent diverge.132 In D&O insurance, 
insurers are in the position of principals, and the insured are in the positions of agents.133 
Adverse selection is caused by hidden precontractual information not disclosed in 
contract, and moral hazard is caused by postcontractual conduct.134 Therefore, moral 
hazard can be realized as an example of asymmetric information.135 
                                                            
129 See Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An Insurance 
Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1686-87 (1994).  
130 See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 
CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 378 (2003). 
131 Id. 
132 See Kenneth S. Abraham, supra note 57, at 947. 
133 Id.  
134 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 
327-8 (1994). 
135 See Kenneth S. Abraham, supra note 57, at 946.  
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Such problems may affect the function of D&O insurance.136 Regarding moral hazard, 
since D&O insurance provides the protection against the financial impact of liability for 
the insured firms and directors,137 then insured firms and their directors may have less 
incentive to act properly and loss may be caused.138 
Also, such financial protection may induce directors to conduct more risky investment to 
procure abnormal return. In contrast, this may also cause abnormal loss. Thus, suppose 
D&O insurance has monitoring function and thus improve the value of insured firms, this 
may be canceled out by damage caused by moral hazard. As for the problem about 
adverse selection, it may affect the monitoring function of D&O insurance, which 
majorly relies on insurers’ assessment. Adverse selection implies insurer cannot evaluate 
the quality and risk of the insured firms precisely, and this would be less possible for 
insurer to watch out or even change the act of insured firms but base on such inaccurate 
information. Hence, if there is a problem of adverse selection exists in the market, then 
monitoring ability of insurers would be doubtable.  
Considering such effects of adverse selection and moral hazard, it could be better to 
clarify such concerns before the test of the monitoring hypothesis. If there are no such 
problems in Taiwan, then the test of the monitoring hypothesis and the alternative 
signaling hypothesis would be more reliable. Thus, this chapter begins with the test of 
                                                            
136 Id.  
137 However, insurer does not have effective mechanism to control moral hazard. See TOM BAKER & SEAN 
J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 60-2, 220 (2011). 
138 Id.  
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moral hazard of D&O insurance, then moves on to the test of adverse selection, and 
finally analyzes the monitoring function of D&O insurance.  
 
2.2 Test of moral hazard of the D&O insurance in the Taiwanese market  
 
2.2.1 Introduction  
This section tests if the moral hazard problem happens in Taiwanese D&O insurance 
market, and thus affects the function of D&O insurance. In literature review, previous 
researches concerning moral hazard in insurance, especially in D&O insurance, will be 
introduced and hypotheses will be developed. By hypothesizing that D&O insurance will 
not increase insured firms’ volatility of returns and short term investments, this research 
will test whether D&O insurance induces more risky behavior of insured firms. In the end, 
the empirical results and relevant discussion will be presented. This dissertation will 
conclude whether D&O insurance produces moral hazard and thus affect insurers’ 
monitoring function. 
 
2.2.2 Literature review  
Regarding the effect of D&O insurance, there are mainly two opposite arguments. A 
previous discussion in Chapter 1, monitoring hypothesis propose that insurer can monitor 
insured firms and even improve their corporate governance. In contrast, opponents argue 
that D&O insurance weaken managerial control device such as litigation.139 Many recent 
                                                            
139 See Jinyoung Park, supra note 86, at 6. 
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researches find that managerial opportunism is one factor of D&O insurance purchase.140 
The reason of managerial opportunism might come from the positive signal effect of 
D&O insurance. Jinyoung Park finds that there is a positive association between 
insurance coverage and forecast frequency and precision.141 Also, market will give 
positive response to such information.142 This implies the positive signal effect of D&O 
insurance. Because of the positive effect and response from the market, opportunism 
exists in firms’ voluntary disclosure. Thus, managers might intend to report earnings 
aggressively to increase their compensation.143 To response this, auditors intend to charge 
higher fees to the firms of which the managers have higher opportunistic risk in 
Canada.144 On the other hand, M. Martin Boyer and Hanon Amandine have different 
finding about the impact of accounting discretion on D&O insurance purchase. By testing 
Canadian market, they find that the positivity of discretionary accruals have no 
significant impact on D&O insurance purchase.145 This implies moral hazard does not 
affect the financial disclosure.146  
In addition to accounting opportunism,147 firms might carry more opportunistic behavior. 
                                                            
140 Id, at 6. 
141 Id, at 4.  
142 Id. 
143 See Hyeesoo H. Chung & Jinyoung P. Wynn, Managerial Legal Liability Coverage and Earnings 
Conservatism, 46 J. ACCT. & ECON. 135, 135 (2008). 
144 See Hyeesoo H. Chung, Jinyoung P. Wynn & Han Yi, Managerial Opportunism Legal Liability Rule 
and Audit Pricing 28 (2008), http://aaahq.org/meetings/AUD2009/ManagerialOpportunism.pdf. 
145 See M. Martin Boyer & Hanon Amandine, Protecting Directors and Officers from Liability Arising from 
Aggressive Earnings Management 11 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1504208. 
146 Id. 
147 In addition to D&O insurance, Robert M. Bowen, Shivaram Rajgopal and Mohan Venkatachalam 
further confirm previous literature and the association between poor corporate governance and accounting 
discretion. See Robert M. Bowen, Shivaram Rajgopal & Mohan Venkatachalam, Accounting Discretion, 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 30 (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=367940. 
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Irene Y. Kim tests Canadian market and confirms the hypothesis that opportunism in 
financial reporting can be predicted by excess D&O insurance coverage.148 Litigation risk, 
corporate governance quality, high-tech industry, and leverage are inversely related to 
D&O insurance coverage.149 In consequence, opportunistic behavior is implied. Narjess 
Boubakri and Nabil Ghalleb again test Canadian market and have more negative 
conclusion. D&O insurance indeed induces opportunistic behavior and has negative 
impact on firms’ performance in the future.150 In addition, their findings show that 
insurer cannot distinguish opportunistic risk and mandatory reporting is not so helpful.151 
Under such circumstance where asymmetric information and moral hazard are obvious, 
regulation and limitation are recommended.152  
Chen Lin, Micah S. Officer, Rui Wang and Hong Zou test Canada D&O insurance 
market and find that there is an association between D&O insurance coverage and higher 
as-issue bond yields, higher loan spreads, and higher risk taking. This result demonstrates 
that debt holder percepts that higher D&O insurance coverage implies higher risk.153 The 
concerns about moral hazard and asymmetric information are also implied. Chen Lin, 
Micah S. Office and Hong Zou again test the association between D&O insurance and 
                                                            
148 See Irene Y. Kim, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Opportunism in Accounting Choice 21 (2005), 
http://www.efmaefm.org/efma2006/papers/764024_full.pdf.  
149 Id. 
150 See Narjess Boubakri & Nabil Ghalleb, Does Mandatory Disclosure of Directors’ and Officers’ 
Liability Insurance Curb Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from the Canadian Secondary Market 29-30 
(2008), 
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Reno/Papers/Does_Mandatory_Disclosure_Curb_Managerial_Opportunism.p
df. 
151 Id, at 30. 
152 Id. 
153 See Chen Lin, Micah S. Officer, Rui Wang & Hong Zou, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance 
and the Cost of Debt 20-1 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1865679. 
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acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CARs). They find there is an 
inverse association. This means acquirers with higher D&O insurance coverage have less 
acquisition synergies and pay more premiums.154 This implies D&O insurance might 
induce moral hazard.155  
John M. R. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann, Jarrad Harford find there is an inverse association 
between D&O insurance coverage and the performance of 3-year stock price.156 And 
managers who have high D&O insurance coverage have poor performance in the 
future.157 Narjess Boubakri, Martin Boyer, and Nabil Ghalleb further confirm this result. 
They find managers purchase D&O insurance for opportunistic earnings, and insurers 
would charge more premiums for those who have higher opportunistic risk.158 By testing 
Canadian market, Boyer finds that there is a moral hazard problem for managers because 
D&O insurance reduces their ability to increase cash flow. 159  Peter Egger, Doina 
Radulescu, and Ray Rees find that if senior executives have some incentives to make 
                                                            
154 See Chen Lin, Micah S. Officer & Hong Zou, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and 
Acquisition Outcomes 26-7 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641645.   
155 Id, at 27. In addition, moral hazard is a significant concern in liability insurance. D&O liability 
insurance may considerably nullify the deterrence effects of litigation against directors, causing directors to 
be less attentive to their duties to shareholders. See Clifford G. Holderness, supra note 34, at 115. 
156 See John M. R. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann & Jarrad Harford, Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from 
Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases, 57.2 J. FIN. 609, 633 (2002).They provide two interpretations 
for the use of D&O insurance. First, managers use insurance to solidify their ability to exploit inside 
information. Secondly, D&O insurance is used to protect the assets of managers and firms from litigations. 
Even though these two interpretations are not exclusive, their evidence implies that the former is more 
important. Id. 
157 Id. 
158 See Narjess Boubakri, Martin Boyer & Nabil Ghalleb, Managerial Opportunism in Accounting Choice: 
Evidence from Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Purchases 29-30 (2008), 
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2008-athens/GHAL
LEB.pdf. 
159 See M. Martin Boyer, supra note 11, at 103.  
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short run gains, they must be insured to prevent the adverse consequences.160  
Generally speaking, majority of previous literature support the hypothesis that D&O 
insurance might induce moral hazard or opportunistic behavior. If this conclusion is also 
true in the Taiwanese market, then D&O insurance itself is no longer good news. D&O 
insurance represent not only the cover of litigation risk, but also the trigger of moral 
hazard and opportunistic behavior. 
 
2.2.3 Hypothesis development  
As mentioned above, there is much literature discussing D&O insurance, opportunistic 
behavior and accounting discretion. Moral hazard is tested in this section. Due to D&O 
insurance shielding litigation risk, insured firms may engage in more risky behaviors. If 
the insured directors, managers and firms behave opportunistically for an extended period 
of time, this is easy to be found by insurers. Insurers will adjust premium or even 
discontinue contract in response to risky behavior. In addition to long term performance, 
attention should be paid to short term performance after the purchase of D&O insurance. 
This study diverges from the previous literature on shareholder wealth and long term 
performance by focusing on short term performance. 
In short term performance, D&O insurance purchase might cause volatility of returns. 
The protection of insurance, allows directors and officers assurances to limit concern 
                                                            
160  See Peter Egger, Doina Radulescu & Ray Rees, D&O Insurance, Corporate Governance and 
Managerial Incentives 22 (2011), http://www.sgvs.ch/congress11/upload/p_115-420219.pdf. 
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regarding litigation risk, expect intentional behavior. In order to maximize their benefit, 
rational directors and officers might do a highly volatile investment which has higher risk 
and higher return, as long as this is not excluded by policy exclusions. They will not do 
this in the long term, because insurers will discover opportunistic behavior and raise the 
rates. So after D&O insurance purchase, directors and officers might increase 
opportunistic investment, but not to the extent that is excluded by policies or in the long 
term to avoid exposure.  
The null hypothesis is developed as follows: in Taiwan, D&O insurance would not 
increase the firms’ volatility of returns and short term investments. In other words, D&O 
insurance would not cause opportunistic behavior and moral hazard of firms. As a result, 
the theory regarding the positive signal effect of D&O insurance will not be influenced 
by these concerns. The hypothesis may be named “neutral hypothesis” and is as follows:  
H1: D&O insurance would not increase the firms’ volatility of returns and short 
term investments 
 
This study uses the standard deviation of ROE as dependent variable, and the standard 
deviation ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short term investment of firms for robustness 
check. If there is no moral hazard and opportunistic behavior in the Taiwanese market, 
the purchase of D&O insurance and its coverage shall be not significantly related to these 
dependent variables. This leads to the fowling sub-hypotheses:  
H1a: The purchase of D&O insurance is not related to the standard deviation of 
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ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short term investment of firms. 
H1b: The coverage of D&O insurance is not related to the standard deviation of 
ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short term investment of firms. 
 
In addition to the proxy variable of D&O insurance, the quality of the corporate 
governance of firms is used as control variables. In general, firms having better corporate 
governance might have less volatility in returns.161 Hence, this dissertation hypothesizes 
that the quality of corporate governance is negatively related to the volatility in returns, 
which contains the standard deviation of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short term 
investment of firms. This hypothesis may be called “corporate governance hypothesis” 
and is as follows: 
H2: The quality of corporate governance of firms is inversely related to the standard 
deviation of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short term investment of firms. 
 
2.2.4 Data, variables, methods and research design 
2.2.4.1 Data  
                                                            
161 Firms with poor corporate governance usually have poor performance, poor profit and higher volatility. 
See Dr. Laurence J. Stybel & Maryanne Peabody, A New Balance Of Power Means New Boardroom 
Opportunity for General Counsel, 23 NO. 5 OF COUNSEL 9, 9 (2004). In addition, CalPERS' stated goal is 
also to “join in the dialogue of corporate governance and reduce volatility and increase long-term share 
values.” See Deborah J. Martin, The Public Piggy Bank Goes to Market: Public Pension Fund Investment 
in Common Stock and Fund Trustees' Social Agenda, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 45 (1992). Moreover, 
problems of corporate governance would cause market volatility. See Yuwa Wei, Volatility of China's 
Securities Markets and Corporate Governance, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 207, 208 (2006). In 
emerging markets like Brazil, firms satisfying better corporate governance standards are less sensitive to 
changes in market and have less volatility in stock prices. See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & 
Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the 
United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 501 (2011). 
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The data used in this section is collected from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ)162 and 
Market Observation Post System (MOPS).163 Most of the listed companies in Taiwan 
Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE)164 and GreTai Securities Market (GTSM)165 were 
collected. The dataset excluded some companies for which information was not available 
from the database. There are 1,217 observations in 2008, 1,286 observations in 2009, and 
597 observations in 2010. 
 
2.2.4.2 Variables  
Regarding the evaluation of opportunism, the standard deviation of revenues is usually 
used as proxy variables. When testing managerial opportunism caused by D&O insurance, 
John M. R. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann and Jarrad Harford use standard deviation of 
revenues and operating income as proxy variables.166 Jens Hagendorff, Ignacio Hernando, 
Maria J. J. Nieto and Larry D. Wall use the standard deviation of ROE as a proxy variable 
of riskiness.167 Michael Bradley and Dong Chen, similarly, use standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns as a dependent variable in assessing corporate risk-taking.168 In 
measuring the volatility of firms’ accounting performance, Seunghan Nam uses the 
                                                            
162 http://www.tej.com.tw/twsite/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
163 http://emops.twse.com.tw/emops_all.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
164 http://www.twse.com.tw/en/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
165 http://www.gretai.org.tw/en/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). Unless indicated otherwise, empirical works in 
this paper include firms in both markets.  
166 See John M. R. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann & Jarrad Harford, supra note 156, at 625.  
167 See Jens Hagendorff, Ignacio Hernando, Maria J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, What Do Premiums Paid for 
Bank M&As Reflect? The Case of the European Union 21 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592887.  
168 See Michael Bradley & Dong Chen, Corporate Governance and the Cost of debt: Evidence from 
Director Limited Liability and Indemnification Provisions, 17 J. Corp. Fin. 83, 92 (2011).  
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standard deviation of ROE to test its volatility.169 The reason is that ROE is a more 
relevant measure from the viewpoint of shareholder, and other proxy variables such as 
ROA, EPS and growth of EPS also have similar results. This study follows previous 
literature and uses the standard deviation of ROE as the proxy variable of opportunistic 
behavior.170 They are used as the dependent variables of regressions. For a test of 
robustness, this dissertation uses standard deviation of ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and 
short term investment as dependent variables in different panels. Regarding independent 
variables, the dummy variable, purchased insurance or not, and the amount of coverage 
are used as the proxy variables for D&O insurance. The variables about corporate 
governance are applied as control variables,171 including capital of firms, remuneration 
for directors, the number of directors, the number of independent directors, the number of 
controlled directors, shares owned by director and major shareholder, duality of CEO and 
COB, internal risk and prior significant litigation. The definitions of variables are 
presented in Table 2.1.  
 
2.2.4.3 Methods and research design 
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used in this research. For considering 
                                                            
169  See Seunghan Nam, The Impact of Non-audit Services on Capital Markets 18 (2006), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=693422. 
170 Similarly, Standard deviation of ROE is also often used as a proxy variable for the risk of insurers. See J. 
David Cummins & Gregory P. Nini, Optimal Capital Utilization by Financial Firms: Evidence from the 
Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 21. 1-2 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 15, 23 (2002). 
171 For detailed descriptions of control variables, please refer to 2.4.3.2.2. 
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robustness, this research reports the results after White's heteroscedasticity correction172 
and bootstrap.173 Regarding the test of opportunistic behavior, the proxy variables of 
opportunistic behavior are used as dependent variables, and D&O insurance and other 
control variables are used as independent variables. This research uses standard deviation 
of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short term investment as dependent variables to 
carry out different regressions. The statistical software packages used are SPSS and 
STATA.174  
 
2.2.5 Empirical result and analysis 
2.2.5.1 Descriptive analysis  
The volatilities of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short term investment are 
represented by their standard deviation respectively. The results show that the insured 
firms usually have higher average and variation of volatility. In 2008, except ROE, 
insured firms are higher than uninsured firms in means and variations of ROA, EPS, 
debt-asset ratio and short term investment. In 2009, insured firms are almost higher than 
                                                            
172 White's heteroscedasticity correction is helpful in fixing the problem about heteroscedasticity. See 
JANET M. BOX-STEFFENSMEIER, HENRY E. BRADY & DAVID COLLIER, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL METHODOLOGY 607 (2008). 
173 Bootstrap, proposed by Efron (1979), is a very useful data resampling procedure when the parameter is 
unknown. See ALLAN D. R. MCQUARRIE & CHIH-LING TSAI, REGRESSION AND TIME SERIES MODEL 
SELECTION 261 (1998). Put simply, bootstrap treats the sample like a true population distribution. 
Repeatedly resampling the current sample generates a “new” sample to construe a point estimate of 
parameter. See ALAN AGRESTIC & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE 132 (4th 
ed. 2008). Bootstrap is not required to follow the assumptions of linear regression, and thus it is useful 
when the adequacy of regression is uncertain. See GEOF H. GIVENS & JENNIFER ANN HOETING, 
COMPUTATIONAL STATISTICS 418 (2005). 
174 Unless otherwise mentioned, all empirical works in this dissertation are conducted by these two 
software packages. 
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uninsured firms in all proxy variables, except the variation of short-term investment is 
much less. The results in 2010 are more diversified, insured firms have lower means in 
volatility of ROE and debt-asset ratio, but higher in ROA, EPS and short-term investment. 
Regarding variation, except EPS, insured firms have less variation in the volatility of 
ROE, ROA, debt-asset ratio and short-term investment. Generally speaking, it is 
suspicious that insured firms have more volatility in returns and investments. The result 
of descriptive analysis is reported in Table 2.2. 
For more precision, independent sample tests are carried out to test whether the 
differences of the means of volatility between insured and uninsured firms are significant. 
The results are presented in Table 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. In 2008, volatility of EPS and 
short-term investment are significant at 5% level. This indicates insured firms indeed 
have higher volatility than uninsured firms in EPS and short-term investment. In 2009, 
only short-term investment is significant, and this indicates that insured firms have higher 
volatility than uninsured firms in short-term investment. The result of 2010 is similar to 
2008. Volatility of EPS and short-term investment are significant and insured firms have 
higher volatility than uninsured firms in these variables.  
The result of independent sample test indicates insured firms have significantly higher 
volatility than uninsured firms in EPS and short-term investment. This implies firms 
might have more opportunistic behavior in EPS and short-term investment after D&O 
purchase.  
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2.2.5.2 Regression analysis  
2.2.5.2.1 2008 
Binary variable insurance purchase is used in the first panel, and numeric variable nature 
logarithm of coverage is used in the second penal. Standard deviations of ROE, ROA, 
EPS, debt-asset ratio and short-term investment are used as dependent variables in 
respective regressions. In the first panel, D&O insurance purchase is not significant in 
these regressions except when dependent variable is standard deviation oh short-term 
investment. This implies no statistically significant evidence proving that the purchase of 
D&O insurance will increase opportunistic behavior. In the second panel, insurance 
coverage is positively significant when dependent variable is standard deviation of ROA, 
but not significant in other specifications. Generally, it does not support the concern that 
firms with more coverage may have some intention to conduct opportunistic behavior. 
Also, the test results of corporate governance hypothesis are discrepant. For independent 
director, it is positively significant when dependent variable is standard deviation of EPS. 
This implies the firms which have more independent directors may have more 
opportunistic behavior, especially for EPS. However, the firms which have identical 
people serving CEO and COB may have less deviation in debt-asset ratio. The bootstrap 
of previous OLS regressions demonstrates highly similar results.    
 
2.2.5.2.2 2009 and 2010 
In 2009, D&O insurance purchase is only positively significant when dependent variable 
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is standard deviation of short-term investment, and insurance coverage is only positively 
significant with standard deviation of debt-asset ratio. In 2010, the purchase of D&O 
insurance is only positively significant when dependent variables are standard deviations 
of ROE and ROA. However, the coverage of insurance is insignificant in all 
specifications. All these results demonstrate that the D&O increase purchase and 
coverage is not generally and significantly correlated to the variance in earnings and 
investment behavior. In other words, no consistent evidence is found to prove a positive 
correlation between D&O insurance and the opportunistic behavior and moral hazard of 
firms. The detailed results are reported from Table 2.6 through 2.17. 
 
2.2.6 Conclusions  
In this section, this study empirically tests whether D&O insurance is correlated to 
opportunistic behavior and moral hazard. Empirical evidence shows that the purchase of 
D&O insurance and its coverage are not generally significantly and consistently 
correlated to variances of earnings and investments. In consequence, even though some 
scholars argue that insurance may cause opportunistic behavior and moral hazard or even 
damage firms eventually, the empirical work does not find such significant evidence. 
Hence, the following tests about the monitoring and signal effect of D&O insurance may 
not be affected by opportunistic behavior and moral hazard in Taiwan. 
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2.3 Test of adverse selection of the D&O insurance in the Taiwanese market 
2.3.1 Introduction  
An insurance contract is equilibrium of losses, premiums and coverage qualities. Any 
distortion about these will unsettle the equilibrium.175 Needless to say, the assumptions 
about the monitoring hypothesis will be affected. If there is adverse selection in this 
market, the equilibrium of demand and supply of D&O insurance will be different from 
every cluster, and then, the test for the monitoring hypothesis of D&O insurance in the 
whole market will be affected.  
Asymmetric information or even adverse selection demonstrates that insurers have no 
ability to screen insurance applicants, and then offer proper insurance policy, proper 
conditions, and proper price. When the underwriting is not based on the quality of the 
insured firms, or is based on the incomplete information from the insured firms, then the 
offer of insurance and coverage will have no positive meaning. This is because D&O 
insurance and coverage are not based on insurers’ assessment, but just on the insured 
firms’ incomplete or even untrue information. In this way, the argument of the monitoring 
function of insurers would be more unreliable.  
In contrast, if there is no adverse selection problem in this market, the selection of insurer 
and insured firms would be close to random with no obvious tendency toward similar 
firms or qualities matching. For example, firms with bad performance, bad corporate 
                                                            
175 See James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60-AUT LAW & 
CONTEMP. Probs. 1, 30 (1997). 
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governance, and higher risk, get contracts with bad insurers, and firms with good 
performance, good corporate governance and lower risk, get contracts with good insurers. 
Or insured firms with good quality more easily get coverage. Therefore, the monitoring 
function of D&O insurance would not be affected. Before testing the monitoring 
hypothesis of D&O insurance, the concern about adverse selection should be clarified.   
In order to analyze the problem of underwriting, asymmetric information, and adverse 
selection, several empirical tests are conducted in this section. This dissertation will test 
all D&O insurance contracts in Taiwan in the recent three years, examine if insurers’ 
underwriting work well or not, and whether symmetric information, as well as adverse 
selection exists in the Taiwanese market or not.  
 
2.3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.3.2.1 Asymmetric information, adverse selection and insurance 
Information is a commodity which is different from others. For example, when 
information exchanged, one loses nothing except the exclusivity.176 In 1970’s, the Nobel 
Prize winner George Akerlof, A. Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz laid the 
foundation for information economy.177 Akerlof' takes used car market as an illustration 
in his classic dissertation: The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
                                                            
176 See Kathleen Taradash, Preventing a Market for “Lemons”: A Voluntary Disclosure Model as an 
Alternative to the Prohibition of Genetic Discrimination and the Distortion of Allocative Efficiency, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 1353, 1383 (2002). 
177 Id, at 1385. 
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Mechanism.178 He assumes there are four types of cars in the market. There are new car 
and used car, good car and bad car.179 New car and used car are both possible to be good 
car or bad car.180 And the bad car is known as “lemons”.181 The Individuals intend to get 
good cars instead of lemons, but they as buyers have no information about the qualities of 
cars.182 In contrast, the sellers have more information about this. Because of the period of 
possession, the sellers easily would have more knowledge about the qualities of cars.183 
The situation of asymmetric information develops. Because the buyers have no 
information to distinguish the good and bad cars, the prices of them will be the same.184 
Then, Akerlof completes Gresham's Law, arguing that good cars will be driven out of 
market by lemons.185 The phrase “adverse selection” originally indicates the process 
where the insured utilize their private knowledge and then decide to buy or forgo 
insurance.186 Thus, adverse selection is a critical problem to insurance and dominates its 
function.187 In Akerlof’s classic paper, he borrows this term from insurance literature to 
generalize this concept to other common economic phenomena. Currently, adverse 
                                                            
178 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Q. 
J. ECON. 488 (1970). See also George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1384 (1987). 
179 See George A. Akerlof, supra note 178, at 489. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 
1223, 1223 (2004). 
187 See George L. Priest, supra note 160, at 1540-1.  
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selection has become the critical part of information economy, which is not limited to 
insurance.188 
The deterioration in the quality of goods proposed by Akerlof's Lemons Model can be 
analogous to insurance market. In other words, the problem of adverse selection 
potentially exists in all lines of insurance.189 The insurer in the insurance market is in the 
position which is similar to the used car buyers in Akerlof's Lemons Model.190 Insurance 
applicants have more information than insurers about the risks that they incur.191 Low 
risk individuals drop out of insurance pools and, as a result, insurance pools contain high 
percentages of high risk individuals.192 Adverse selection is even considered as one 
reason of liability insurance crisis in the mid-1980.193 Roberta Romano also uses the 
reasoning of adverse selection to explain the reason of D&O insurance crisis.194 
Of course, there is different viewpoint about adverse selection in insurance market. Alma 
Cohen and Peter Siegelman completely review relevant literature in recent years. 
                                                            
188 See Peter Siegelman, supra note 186, at 1223. 
189 See George A. Akerlof, supra note 178, at 493. 
190 Similar example, see Michael Pereira, Risk Management for the age of Information—The New 
Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 715, 754 (2004). 
191 See Kenneth S. Abraham, supra note 57, at 946. 
192 See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 
CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373 (2002/2003). 
193 The crisis of liability insurance happened in the mid-1980’s, and it was essentially a crisis for 
consumers. In order to avoid loss, insurers hugely increased premiums, and consumer could not afford such 
skyrocketed premiums. See Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to Jury 
Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN.L.REV. 1043, 1062 (1994). 
For more discussion about the cause of the crisis of liability insurance, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Making 
Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 399 (1987). See Gregg A. Scoggins, 
Legislation without Representation: How Veterinary Medicine Has Slipped through the Cracks of Tort 
Reform, 1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. 953, 958 (1990). Regarding tax-based explanation, see Kyle D. Logue, Toward 
a Tax-Based Explanation of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 82 VA. L. REV. 895, 914 (1996). See also George 
L. Priest, supra note 160, at 1583-7. 
194 See Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 27-8 (1989). 
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Regarding the assumption that the insured who purchase more coverage tend to be riskier, 
they argue that this correlation varies in different group of insurance commodities.195 
However, they do not touch the issue of D&O insurance deeply. Narjess Boubakri and 
Nabil Ghalleb test Canadian market and have more pessimistic conclusion. They find that 
D&O insurance indeed induces opportunistic behavior and has negative impact on firms’ 
performance in the future. 196  In addition, insurers do not or cannot distinguish 
opportunistic risk. Moreover, insurers do not charge more premiums to the insured firms 
who exploit private information or abnormally increase D&O insurance purchase.197 This 
implies that moral hazard exists and underwriting does not function well. To sum up, by 
the analysis of previous literature, the concern of adverse selection of D&O insurance is 
highly suspect.  
 
2.3.2.2 D&O insurance market, equilibrium and market segment 
Concerns about the adverse selection of D&O insurance can be found in the literature. 
Directors who intend to breach their duties are more likely to purchase D&O insurance, 
which will lead to more derivative suits.198 The equilibrium of the supply and demand for 
D&O insurance will also affected by adverse selection. Under adverse selection 
circumstances, the insurance pool contains more high risk individuals than low risk 
                                                            
195 See Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets 77:1 J. RISK & 
INS. 39, 43-4 (2010), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01337.x/pdf. 
196 See Narjess Boubakri & Nabil Ghalleb, supra note 150, at 29-30. 
197 Id, at 30. 
198 See Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 
NW. U. L. REV. 1436, 1502 (1994). 
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individuals who pay the same premium. This will damage insurers and cause insurers to 
raise their premiums. The consequence is that the equilibrium will change.199 The more 
severe the adverse selection is, the more equilibrium will be affected.200 In addition, 
another byproduct of asymmetric information is market segments.201 If the pool contains 
large numbers of high-risk individuals charged as low risk ones, this pool tends to 
become segmented202 or even decayed.203 If this is true, the previous test regarding the 
signal effect of D&O insurance is that the entire market will be influenced. As regards the 
reliability of the previously discussed signal hypothesis, this dissertation will test and 
determine whether or not adverse selection exists in the Taiwanese D&O insurance 
market.  
Adverse selection may exist in D&O insurance, and may lead to malfunctions of 
insurance and market segments. All of these factors will influence the hypothesis 
regarding the signal effect with respect to D&O insurance. The less the adverse selection, 
the less the signal hypothesis will be affected. This research assumes null hypothesis to 
the effect that there is no adverse selection in the Taiwanese D&O insurance market.  
 
2.3.2.3 Hypothesis development  
                                                            
199 More detailed discussion, see Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive 
Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 488-9 (1988).  
200 Id.   
201 See Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit: Examining the Structural Inequities of Subprime 
Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 233, 262 (2006). 
202 This implies that the equilibrium of different segments is different from each other. Id.   
203 See Anthony S. Chen & Margaret Weir, The Long Shadow of the Past: Risk Pooling and the Political 
Development of Health Care Reform in the States, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 679, 687 (2009). 
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Adverse selection possibly exists in D&O insurance, and cause malfunction of insurance 
and market segment. All these will damage the proposal of monitoring effect of D&O 
insurance. The lesser the adverse selection, the lesser the monitoring hypothesis is 
affected. Thus, this research assumes the null hypothesis that there is no adverse selection 
in the Taiwanese D&O insurance market. If the following empirical test does not reject 
this hypothesis, this assumption will not be rejected. And monitoring hypothesis will not 
be affected. The first hypothesis is as follows:  
H1: There is no adverse selection in the Taiwanese D&O insurance market.  
 
Adverse selection will cause market segmentation and affect the equilibrium of supply 
and demand. However, if market segments are complementary, the insurance mechanism 
will not be influenced. For example, insurers can contract with applicants they 
complementary to work with and vice versa. Under such circumstances, even though 
market segments exist, different premiums will be charged in accordance with different 
risk classifications. Therefore the insurance pool will not be harmed.204 Rational insurers 
will attempt to contract with low risk applicants. Empirical research has shown that 
scandal-based events directly impact insurer pricing behavior.205 The ability of insurers to 
distinguish between low risk and high risk applicants is important, or else adverse 
                                                            
204 This is also the reason why sufficient risk classification is often considered as a measure for mitigating 
adverse risk. See Peter Siegelman, supra note 186, at 1279. Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will 
Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 135 (2011). 
205 See Stephen G. Fier Fier, Kathleen A. McCullough, Joan T. A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The 
Directors and Officers Insurance Marketplace: An Empirical Examination of Supply and Demand in 
Uncertain Times 31 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524063. 
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selection will occur.206 If the process of underwriting works properly, insurers can 
distinguish between the risks of different applicants and filter out high-risk applicants. 
This study hypothesizes that D&O insurance underwriting functions properly in the 
Taiwanese market. In other words, insurers can filter out applicants they do not want.  
H2: insurance underwriting functions well in Taiwan D&O insurance market. 
Insurers can filter out the applicants they do not desire 
 
Insurance applicants similarly seek to contract with low-risk insurers. In the absence of 
asymmetric information, applicants should also have complete information regarding 
insurers and can contract with any insurers they deserve. Just as in case of the reasoning 
about insurers, this research also hypothesizes that insurance applicants can filter out 
insurers they do not desire. 
H3: Insurance applicants can filter out the insurer they do not desire 
 
2.3.3 Data, variables, methods and research design  
2.3.3.1 Data  
As stated in previous chapters, the data of insured firms is collected from TEJ and MOPS. 
The data of insurers is collected from TEJ, Taiwan Insurance Institute,207 and their 
websites. From 2008 to 2010, there were 2485 D&O insurance transactions. In order to 
                                                            
206 Detailed explanation, see Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination 
Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 544-5 (1996-1997). 
207 http://insprod.tii.org.tw/database/insurance/index.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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arrive at reliable estimations of canonical roots, Barcikowski and Stevens (1975) suggest, 
based on a Monte Carlo study, to include 40 to 60 times as many observations as 
variables.208 In this research, there are 10 variables for covariates and 8 variables for 
dependent variables, amounting to 18 variables in total. Then, 2485 observations are 
around 138 times of variables. Therefore, the data is sufficient to arrive at a reliable result 
of canonical analysis.  
   
2.3.3.2 Variables  
This section is to exam the qualities of insurers and the insured firms, and explore 
whether insurers’ underwriting functions well, and whether asymmetric information and 
adverse selection exist or not. In addition to using insurance coverage as connecting 
factor between insurers and the insured firms, several proxy variables will be used to 
represent the qualities of insured firms.  
 
  2.3.3.2.1 Insured firms  
Insurance underwriting is the method that insurers use to assess the risk of the insured 
firms. 209  In brief, insurance underwriting “is the process of accepting or rejecting 
risks.”210 D&O insurance underwriting usually contains three parts. The first thing is the 
                                                            
208 See THOMAS HILL & PAWEL LEWICKI, STATISTICS: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE 
REFERENCE FOR SCIENCE, INDUSTRY, AND DATA MINING 75 (2006). 
209 See James D. Cox, supra note 175, at 31. 
210 See Joshua Dobiac, supra note 77, at 499. 
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application and questionnaire of the insured firms.211 Secondly, insurers will investigate 
all public data of applicants. Third, insurers will also try to acquire private information as 
much as possible.212 However, the ability of D&O insurance underwriting is subjective213 
and hard to develop. 214  It requires a sense and ability of business, finance and 
management. 215  In addition to the qualities of insured firms and traditional risks, 
underwriting considerations also contains risk of bankruptcy and risk of 
non-indemnifiable actions.216 As firms aiming to maximize their wealth, insurers should 
contract with the insurance applicants that have less risk. This dissertation uses the 
following proxy variables to represent the qualities of insured firms which are 
emphasized in underwriting.  
First of all, general characteristic such as size is important for underwriting.217 The 
variable LNcapital which is the natural logarithm of capital is used to indicate the size of 
insured firms. Almost all D&O insurance policies contain “personal profit exclusion”, 
which excludes claims “based upon, arising from, or in consequence of such Insured 
Person having gained in fact any personal profit, remuneration or advantage to with such 
Insured Person was not entitled.”218 In addition, monitor hypothesis argues that D&O 
                                                            
211 Id.  
212 Id.  
213 See Peter R. Taffae, Applying for D&O Insurance in a Tight Market, 215, 217 (PLI Commercial Law 
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4379, 1992).  
214 See Anthony J. Falkowski, Directors' and Officers' Reinsurance, at 543 (PLI Commercial Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4223, 1988). 
215 Id.  
216 See William A. Cotter, The D&O Industry in 2003: Insuring the Risks of Being a Director, SH095 
ALI-ABA 325 (2003).  
217 See James D. Cox, supra note 175, at 31. 
218 Federal Insurance Company v. Kozlowski, 792 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1st Dep't 2005) 
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insurance and remuneration are both in the compensation packages,219 and they are 
substitutes for each other. Thus it is important to test its effect in underwriting. LNRemu 
is used to represent the natural logarithm of remuneration for directors. D&O insurance 
claims often arise from poor financial performance, and firms’ return on equity (ROE) is 
often used to be a proxy variable of financial performance.220 Then ROE is used to 
indicate the profiting ability of firms. Enterprise of professional experts is a principal 
consideration in underwriting.221 Thus this research uses Director and IDirector to 
indicate the number of directors and independent directors. Ctrldirector means the 
number of directors who are nominated by controlling firms. Insured firms’ ownership 
structure is also an important consideration in insurance underwriting.222 SD and SMH 
indicate the percentage of shares held by directors and major shareholders, representing 
the proxy variables for ownership structure. Financial ratio and volatility are important 
and initial factors of risk assessment for insurance applicants.223 In fact, insuring firms 
which have lower volatility are reasonably safer for insurers.224 Rational insurers will 
contract with firms which have financial stability and less volatility. The two variables 
are used to denote the financial risk and volatility of insured firms. The variable DAratio 
indicates the debt-asset ratio of firms, and StdDevROA specifies the standard deviation of 
                                                            
219 See M. Martin Boyer & Mathieu Delvaux-Derome, supra note 84, at 2. 
220 See John E. Core, supra note 45, at 462. 
221 See Lawrence A. Rogers, Protecting Directors and Trustees, 548 PLI/CORP 863, 870 (1987). 
222 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 7, at 522. 
223 Id., at 514-5. 
224 See Joshua Dobiac, supra note 77, at 518. 
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ROA.225 
 
  2.3.3.2.2 Insurers 
In contrast, the qualities of insurers are also important to the insured firms. Insured firms 
rely on the insurances to mitigate risks. Such protection will be damaged if insurers 
cannot indemnify properly and on time. Risks imply potential damage for firms’ value. 
As firms aiming to maximize their value, insurance applicants would like to find insurers 
that can mitigate those risks most. The quality of insurers is not only a concern regarding 
the ability and efficiency of indemnification, but also reputation and signal. Every insurer 
may have a different reputation and screening function.226 If insured firms can get 
insurance offers from some insurers, this may imply these insurers would accept the 
quality of insured firms and assume their risk. As discussed before, if signal effect of 
D&O insurance exists, insurance applicants anticipate to contract with good insurers to 
emit more positive signals. Thus, insurance applicants will try to contract with insurers 
that have superior quality and reputation.  
Several proxy variables will be used here to represent the qualities and reputation of 
insurers. Generally, this research will follow the criteria of Taiwan insurance institute and 
other international and local criteria to select variables which can be most representative 
for insurers’ qualities. Taiwan insurance institute is an important institute engaging the 
                                                            
225 Standard deviation of ROA is often used to as proxy variable assessing financial volatility, see, e.g., 
Richard D. Gritta, Edward J. Freed & Garland Chow, Measuring the Degrees of Operating, Financial and 
Combined Leverage For The Major U.S. Air Carriers: 1979-1995, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 51, 67 (1998). 
226 See Sean J. Griffith, supra note 51, at 1025. 
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research of insurance regulation to assist the authority’s policy-making. 227  It also 
manages the largest and most complete dataset about the Taiwanese insurance market.228 
Its “finance and business Index of non-life insurance companies” coordinate statistics of 
business and the ratings result of insurers given by important local and international 
rating firms, such as Taiwan Ratings, Standard & Poor's Rating and Moody’s.229 This 
study also refers the standard of A. M. Best,230 Insurance Regulatory Information System 
(IRIS)231 and Financial Analysis and Solvency Tracking System (FAST)232 of National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).233 
Generally, insurers are evaluated through four perspectives, capital structure, profiting 
ability, potential risk and reputation. This primarily follows the approach of Taiwan 
Insurance Institutes.234 First of all, the variable LNcapital2 which is the natural logarithm 
of capital is used to indicate the size of insurers. In addition to pay-out rate, insurance 
                                                            
227 http://www.tii.org.tw/econtent/about/about01.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
228 http://www.tii.org.tw/econtent/statistics/statistics01.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
229  http://www.tii.org.tw/fcontent/information/information03_01.asp?P2b_sn=17 (last visited Jan. 15, 
2013). 
230 http://www.ambest.com/ratings/guide.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
231 Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) is administrated by NAIC to detect insurers with 
potential solvency problems. See 1 Reg. of Invest. Mgmt. & Fiduciary Serv. § 7:17. It is an early warning to 
test insurers regarding the last five years. See Bertil Lundqvist, Managing and Directing the Legal Due 
Diligence Process,1146 PLI/CORP 29, 50 (1999). It contains two parts. The first one is a statistical test 
about 11 financial tests. The second part is for those insurers outside acceptable ranges; regulatory 
attentions ranging from “no action” to “immediate regulatory attention” will be recommended. See Robert 
D. Haase, Gregory C. Krohm, The Ailing Health Insurance Industry, 20-WTR BRIEF 15, 17 (1991). 
However, the effect of IRIS is suspected. See Broome, Lissa L. & Markham, Jerry W., Banking and 
Insurance: Before and after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 729 (2000). More criticisms 
against IRIS, see Adam Hodkin, Insurer Insolvency: Problems & Solutions, 20 HOFSTRA L.REV. 727, 742 
(1992). 
232 More introduction about FAST, see BRADLY J. CONDON, JOYCE C. SADKA & TAPENSINHA, INSURANCE 
REGULATION IN NORTH AMERICA: INTEGRATING AMERICAN, CANADIAN, AND MEXICAN MARKETS 79 (2003). 
233 See NAIC, http://www.naic.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
234  http://www.tii.org.tw/fcontent/information/information03_01.asp?P2b_sn=17 (last visited Jan. 15, 
2013). 
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carriers’ profitability also relies on the return of investment.235 Profiting ability and 
investment both are critical for insurers. ROE2 indicates the earning on equities of 
insurers to represent insurers’ overall profiting ability. Investment also specifies the return 
of investment of insurers to indicate their investment ability.236 When evaluating D&O 
insurance carriers, their coverage, financial security and reinsurance are all important.237 
The variable LN_s_coverage indicates the total D&O insurance coverage offered by 
specific insurers. Alternatively, the variable DAratio2 which means the debt-asset ratio 
indicates financial security of insurers. Retention represents the underwriting retention 
kept by insurance companies instead of pooling to other reinsurers. As discussed in 
chapter 1, the distributions of all non-life insurance market and D&O insurance market 
are extremely different. This implies D&O insurance applicants have different a 
consideration for general non-life insurance products. The variable Marketshare indicates 
the total market share of individual insurer, and DOmarketshare means the market share 
of D&O insurance of individual insurer. The definitions of variables are presented in 
Table 2.18.  
This study ranks insurers by their D&O insurance market share, and code them by that 
ranking number. From the first skimming, the attribute of qualities of insurers seems 
fairly scattered. In addition, the overall market share and D&O insurance market share 
are quite different. For example, Insurer 1 has the largest D&O insurance market share, 
                                                            
235 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 74, at 818. 
236 Investment is also critical for the financial power of insurance companies. See Taiwan Ratings, 
http://www.taiwanratings.com/tw/E/non_life_insure.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
237 See Lawrence A. Rogers, supra note 205, at 871. 
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around 34%. It just occupies less than 1% in overall insurance market. The descriptive 
analyses of data are presented in Table 2.19 and 2.20.  
 
2.3.3.3 Methods and research design 
To analyze the possible problem of asymmetric information and adverse selection, this 
dissertation scrutinizes all available D&O insurance transactions from 2008 to 2010. One 
complete D&O insurance transaction signifies the mutual consent of insured firms and 
insurers. Insurers may have known the situation of the insured, such as corporate 
governance, litigation record and potential risk, and profiting ability, and then decide to 
give insured firms coverage. Insured firms may understand the insurers’ reputation in 
D&O insurance, capital and ability of indemnification, and then decide to purchase 
insurance with that insurer. Then the details of D&O insurance agreements, such as 
coverage, premium, and deductible, are the results of negotiation.  
As for those firms without D&O insurance, one explanation is that they do not want 
insurance at all, but another explanation may be that they cannot get insurance in their 
condition. Actually, if some insurer would like to offer insurance coverage with a very 
low premium, a rational person will not reject this. Of course some firm maybe rejects 
insurance even though it is totally free, but this is not the way a rational person acts. Thus, 
this research assumes that the reason why some firms have no insurance is that they and 
insurer cannot reach agreements which are acceptable for both parties. 
Accordingly, this dissertation argues that the situation of D&O insurance transactions 
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among all listed firms in Taiwan reveals the situation of information in the Taiwanese 
D&O insurance market. Excluding the firms which do not purchase D&O insurance and 
missing data, there are 2,485 firms which purchase D&O insurance from 2008 to 2010. 
This means that within these three years there were 2,485 D&O insurance contracts in 
total.  The details of every D&O insurance contract act as a connector between insured 
firms and insurers. By surveying every transaction, the association between the quality of 
insured firms and the quality of insurers can be found. Furthermore, multivariate analysis 
of variance (MANOVA) is applied to assess the association between the characteristics of 
insurers and the insured firms, and then to analyze whether the problems of asymmetric 
information and adverse selection exist or not. In terms of software packages, SPSS is 
used to conduct canonical analysis, Pearson’s correlation, cluster analysis and 
discriminant analysis, and STATA is used to compile data and carry out stepwise 
regression. Detailed methods and processes are presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
2.3.3.3.1 Canonical correlation analysis 
First of all, this study will apply canonical correlation analysis, to find out the association 
between the characteristics of insurers and insured firms. It is well known that the 
relationship and magnitude between two variables can be explored by Pearson correlation 
analysis. The relationship and magnitude between one variable (y) and another set of 
variables (x) can be explored by regression analysis. As for exploring the association 
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between two sets of variables, canonical correlation analysis (CCA) can be applied.238 
Canonical correlation analysis is originally developed by Hotelling (1935) to identify 
possible links between two sets of variables.239 This method locates a canonical variable, 
which is a linear combination from each set, meanwhile maximizing the correlation 
between canonical variables from each set.240 
Thus, as mentioned in the previous section, several variables are established to represent 
the quality of insurers and insured firms. Then, the CCA is carried out to determine 
canonical variables. This approach demonstrates whether insured firms with certain 
characteristics intend to contract with insurers with certain characteristics, whether 
insurers’ underwriting functions well enough to mitigate the asymmetric information, and 
whether adverse selection, where firms with poor quality but contract with good insurers, 
indeed exists in the Taiwanese market.   
 
2.3.3.3.2 Pearson’s correlation 
After previous CCA, it is found that some association exists between certain 
characteristics of insurers and insured firms. Such results will be retested by Pearson’s 
correlation analysis of variables.  
 
                                                            
238 See GEORGE A. MARCOULIDES, MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL METHODS: A FIRST COURSE 133 (1997). 
See BRUCE THOMPSON, CANONICAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS: USES AND INTERPRETATION 14 (1984). 
239 See WOLFGANG HÄRDLE & LÉOPOLD SIMAR, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 321-4 
(2007). 
240 See SAS PUBLISHING, SAS STAT STUDIO 3.11: USER'S GUIDE 389 (2009). 
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2.3.3.3.3 Stepwise regression 
In contrast to traditional methods, the variables are entered into the regression one at a 
time in stepwise regression.241 The first independent variable which enters the model is 
the one which explains the greatest amount of variance in the dependent variable.242 Then, 
the next variable is the one which can explain the greatest remaining variance in the 
dependent variable.243 Stepwise regression is useful for narrowing down many possible 
variables in a set of variables which are meaningful in explaining the dependent 
variable.244 
In this section, stepwise regression is conducted by using the proxy variables of the 
qualities of insured firms as independent variables, and the proxy variables of the 
qualities of insurers as dependent variables. By doing so, this research further tests the 
possibility to use the qualities of the insured firms to explain and predict the qualities of 
insurers they contracted. This is helpful to find any tendency in the Taiwanese D&O 
insurance market or any problems of asymmetric information and adverse selection. 
 
2.3.3.3.4 Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis is the statistical method to group individuals and variables to a limited 
number of clusters.245 The specific clusters are not decided in advance but found during 
                                                            
241 See RONALD M. WEIERS, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS STATISTICS, 670 (2010). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 See S. CHRISTIAN ALBRIGHT, WAYNE L. WINSTON & CHRISTOPHER ZAPPE, DATA ANALYSIS AND 
DECISION MAKING 625 (2008).  
245 See STÉPHANE TUFFÉRY, DATA MINING AND STATISTICS FOR DECISION MAKING 235 (2011). 
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this operation. This is different from following discriminant analysis.246 The clusters are 
the combinations of objects having similar characteristics, and different from outside 
objects which have different characteristics.247 All 2,485 D&O insurance contracts are 
used as samples to conduct cluster analysis. The result demonstrates whether these D&O 
insurance transactions could be classified into clusters according to the characteristics of 
insurers and insured firms. If there is some tendency, such as insured firms with poor 
quality intend to contract with good insurers, then malfunctioning of underwriting and 
adverse selection are implied. In contrast, if there is no obvious cluster, or insured firms 
with good quality intend to contract with good insurers, this would imply no adverse 
selection in the Taiwanese market. With 2,485 observations, this research satisfies the 
requirement for large samples which are needed for the k-means clustering procedure.248 
 
2.3.3.3.5 Discriminant analysis and multinomial logistic regression 
Discriminant analysis is useful for describing major differences among groups in 
multivariate analysis of variance249 and predicts the affiliation of new elements.250 After 
previous cluster analysis, 2,485 observations can be classified into three clusters. Then, 
                                                            
246 Id.  
247 Id.  
248 See D. Wishart,, K-Means Clustering with Outlier Detection, Mixed Variables and Missing Values, in 
EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR KLASSIFIKATION E.V., at 216 (University of Munich, 2001). 
249 See JAMES STEVENS, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 285 (2002). For 
more discussion for design in discriminant analysis, see CARL J. HUBERTY AND STEPHEN OLEJNIK, APPLIED 
MANOVA AND DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 9 (2006).  
250 See STEFANIE LEIMEISTER, IT OUTSOURCING GOVERNANCE: CLIENT TYPES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGIES 99 (2010). 
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discriminate analysis is carried out to test the difference between these three clusters. If 
the result matches with the result of the cluster analysis, these classifications will be more 
persuasive. Then, the evidence which rejects asymmetric information and adverse 
selection will be more reliable. For further robustness, multinomial logistic regression 
will be applied to reexamine the result of discriminant analysis.  
   
2.3.4 Empirical result and analysis 
2.3.4.1 Canonical correlation analysis 
In canonical correlation analysis, the number of canonical variables should be equivalent 
to, or less than, the minimum of the number of x variables and the number of y 
variables.251 There are 10 covariates and 8 dependent variables that are used in this 
research, and thus the number of canonical variables is equal to, or less than, 8.  
The figures of path diagram of canonical analysis are presented in Figure 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 
and 2.5. The canonical correlations of these eight canonical variables are 0.61543, 
0.21424, 0.12490, 0.07047, 0.04318, 0.04079, 0.03414 and 0.02673. Only x1 and x2 are 
significant (p-value < 0.05), but can still explain 96.1616% of all of the variance. It 
should be noted that the first canonical variable x1 alone can explain 89.12897% of all of 
the variance. The following discussion is based on these two canonical variables.  
First, the empirical evidence shows that 4.96822% of the variance in the set of x can be 
                                                            
251  See ABDELMONEM A. AFIFI, VIRGINIA CLARK, SUSANNE MAY, COMPUTER-AIDED MULTIVARIATE 
analysis 239 (2004). See W. J. DIXON, BMDP STATISTICAL SOFTWARE MANUAL: TO ACCOMPANY BMDP 
RELEASE 7, 925 (1992).  
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explained by the opposite canonical variable η1, and 13.11728% of the variance in the set 
of x can be explained by its canonical variable x1.In addition, 0.37423% of the variance in 
the set of x can be explained by the opposite canonical variable η2 and 8.15357% of the 
variance in the set of x can be explained by its canonical variable x2. In contrast, 
16.22262% of the variance in the set of y can be explained by its canonical variable η1, 
and 6.14438 % of the variance in the set of y can be explained by the opposite canonical 
variable x1. Finally, 11.85339% of the variance in the set of y can be explained by its 
canonical variable η2, and 0.54404% of the variance in the set of y can be explained by 
the opposite canonical variable x2.  
When evaluating canonical correlations, the relationship of variables lower than 0.3 is 
usually is regarded as being insufficient to affect canonical variables.252 This study 
excludes variables whose canonical loading is less than 0.3. In the first set of canonical 
variables, ρ2 is 0.37875, which indicates that x1 can explain 0.37875% of the variance of 
η1. In addition, the capital of insured firms (-.922651) and remuneration of directors 
(.66596) affects insurers’ debt-asset ratios (.33814), ROE (-.86634), retention (.37841) 
and overall market shares (-.39758) by x1 and η1. This implies that the capital and 
remuneration of insured firms, debt-asset ratios, ROE, retention and overall market share 
of insurers are important concerns when D&O insurance is contracted. In the second set 
of canonical variables, ρ2 is .04590, which indicates that x1 can explain .04590 % of the 
variance of η1. Similarly, the capital (.31435), remuneration (.51005), numbers of 
                                                            
252 See WENDY CURRIE, VALUE CREATION FROM E-BUSINESS MODELS 197 (2004). 
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independent directors (-.31695) and debt-asset ratios (.36303) of insured firms do indeed 
affect insurance coverage (.87945) and D&O insurance market share (-.36359) of 
insurers by x2 and η2.  
In addition, the cumulative redundancy indexes are 5.34245% and 6.68842%. This means 
that the qualities of insurers can be explained or predicted to be around 6% using the 
qualities of insured firms, and vice versa. This result has two implications. On one hand, 
it is usually the case (90% plus) that the identities of insurers who offer D&O insurance 
cannot be predicted using the qualities of insured firms. Neither can the identities of 
insured firms be predicted using the qualities of insurers. If there are some asymmetric 
information problems and adverse selection problems in the Taiwanese D&O market, 
certain symptoms such as market tendencies should be easy to find.  
However, the empirical evidence does not provide such proof. It may be reasonable to 
infer that the Taiwanese market does not have significant market segments. Additional 
tests are carried out in the following stepwise regression. Under these circumstances, 
obvious asymmetric information and adverse selection do not exist, and the signal effect 
with respect to D&O insurance is not influenced.  
On the other hand, about 6% of the variance of the qualities of insurers and insured firms 
can be predicted using the qualities of the insured firms and insurers. This indicates that 
there exist relationships between certain characteristics of insured firms and certain 
characteristics of insurer with whom they contract. However, this is not equal to 
asymmetric information and adverse selection. If insured firms contract with the insurers 
79 
 
which have similar qualities of governance, this result may be fairly reasonable. 
Accordingly, asymmetric information and adverse selection still do not exist and the 
signal effect of D&O insurance will not be influenced by adverse selection. The 
summarized result of canonical analysis is presented in Table 2.21. 
 
2.3.4.2 Pearson’s correlation 
In order to further test the canonical analysis results, Pearson’s correlation analysis is 
carried out to test covariates and independent variables. It is found that the capital of 
insured firms is significantly associated with debt-asset ratios, ROE, retention and the 
overall market share of insurers. This confirms the results of canonical analysis to the 
effect that these variables are associated with two canonical variables x1 and η1. Similarly, 
insurance coverage is significantly related to the capital, remuneration of directors, the 
numbers of independent directors and debt-asset ratios of insured firms. However, the 
D&O insurance market share of insurers is not significantly related to the number of 
independent directors and the debt-asset ratios of the insured firms. The results regarding 
canonical variables x2 and η2 is partially supported by Pearson’s correlation analysis. In 
general, the results of canonical analysis can be confirmed using Pearson’s correlation 
analysis, particularly the first set of canonical variables, which explain 89.12897% of the 
variance, is fully supported by the empirical evidence. The conclusion in the previous test 
to the effect that there is a relationship between certain characteristics of insurers and 
insured firms is confirmed. The detailed result can be found in Table 2.22. 
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2.3.4.3 Stepwise regression 
In this section, the proxy variables of qualities of insured firms are used as independent 
variables, and the proxy variables of qualities of insurers are used as dependent variables 
in stepwise regression. The results after White's heteroscedasticity correction will be 
reported. This is done in to explore the qualities of insured firms and the qualities of 
insurers with whom they contract. Such associations and magnitudes are helpful for 
assessing the functions and criteria of insurers’ underwriting, and whether or not adverse 
selection exists. The detailed result is presented in Table 2.23. 
When the dependent variable is insurance coverage, the insured firms’ capital, 
remuneration and debt-asset ratios are positively significant, whereas the number of 
independent directors and controlled directors, and the percentage of shares owned by 
directors, are negatively significant. This indicates that insured firms with more capital, 
remuneration and better debt-asset ratio intend to purchase more coverage, or obtain 
more coverage from insurers. In terms of insured firms with more independent directors, 
controlled directors and greater percentage of shares owned by directors, such companies 
intend to purchase less coverage, or obtain fewer coverage from insurers. Several 
inferences can be made from these findings. First, the finding that positive relationships 
exist between remuneration and insurance coverage rejects the argument that they are 
substitutes. In addition, firms with smaller percentage of shares being owned by directors 
and controlled directors have more insurance coverage. This confirms the argument that 
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Taiwanese firms with better qualities have greater demand for D&O insurance. This also 
implies that the underwriting of insurers function properly and can avoid offering 
redundant coverage to firms with higher internal risks. Although the coefficient of 
debt-asset ratios is positive, its magnitude is comparatively small. The information about 
debt-asset ratios is also disclosed, and everyone including insurers can access that easily.  
This is insufficient to prove the malfunction of underwriting or adverse selection. A more 
reasonable explanation is that firms with higher debt-asset ratios experience greater 
demand for insurance coverage. When the dependent variable is the insurers’ debt-asset 
ratios, then the insured firms’ capital and the percentage of shares owned by directors are 
negatively significant, and the number of directors is positively significant. This indicates 
that insured firms with lower capital and fewer shares being owned by directors are 
companies that intend to contract with insurers who have higher debt-asset ratios, and 
insured firms with more directors also intend to contract with insurers who have higher 
debt-asset ratios. When the dependent variable is the insurers’ D&O market share, it 
shows that insured firms with greater numbers of independent directors, and insured 
firms with less capital, intend to contract with insurers who have large shares of the D&O 
insurance market. 
When the dependent variable is insurers’ return on investments, this indicates that insured 
firms with more capital and insured firms with fewer directors intend to contract with 
insurers who experience greater returns on their investments. When the dependent 
variable is insurers’ market shares, this shows that insured firms with greater amounts of 
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capital intend to contract with insurers with greater overall market share. In contrast, 
insured firms with high debt-asset ratios, numerous directors, and independent directors 
intend to contract with insurers with less overall market share. Again, insured firms with 
less capital intend to purchase insurance from insurers with higher retention rates. In 
contrast, insured firms with low debt-asset rations intend to contract with insurers with 
lower retention rates. As regards the ROE of insurers, insured firms with greater amounts 
of capital and greater percentage of shares being owned by directors intend to contract 
with insurers with higher ROEs. However, insured firms which offer greater 
remuneration for directors and which have higher debt-asset ratios intend to contract with 
insurers with lower ROEs. 
Certain associations between the qualities of insured firms and insurers and the attributes 
of D&O insurance transactions can be found in these results. Still, there is no obvious 
evidence that shows that there is any form of malfunction of underwriting and adverse 
selection, such as consistently negative associations between the qualities of insured 
firms and insurers, or situations where insured firms with poor qualities can obtain 
contracts from insurers with good reputations or large market shares. Except or the ROE 
of insurers, the R-square scores of other regressions are around, or less than, 5%. This 
implies that generally such associations between the qualities of insured firms and 
insurers are quite weak, and adverse selection occurs where insured firms with poor 
qualities contract with good insurers. 
In addition, significant variables cannot be found using stepwise regression when the 
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dependent variable is the capital of insurers. This implies that there is a rare relationship 
between the qualities of insured firms and the capital of insurers. D&O insurance 
applicants may not be excessively concerned about the capital of insurers. This matches 
with previous analysis of the Taiwanese D&O insurance market and descriptive analysis. 
The amounts of capital held by D&O insurers in Taiwan are quite similar among 
insurance firms and this does not influence D&O insurance sales. 
Also, because the data in this research is cross-sectional time-series data, panel data253 is 
also conducted to re-exam the previous empirical results. Generally, panel data test 
demonstrates similar results with the previous OLS regressions. Among the significant 
results, the qualities of insured firms are generally positively correlated to the qualities of 
insurers. Thus, the concern about adverse selection is still not supported by the results of 
panel data. In conclusion, there is some reasonable association between the qualities of 
insured firms and the qualities of insurers with whom they contract. This confirms the 
previous results of canonical and Pearson correlation analysis. The detailed result is 
presented in Table 2.24.  
 
2.3.4.4 Cluster analysis 
The proxy variables of qualities of insurers and the insured firms are used as criteria for 
attempting to classify 2,485 D&O insurance contracts. The purpose of this analysis is to 
determine whether some clusters of each of the components are similar to each other and 
                                                            
253 See CHRISTOPHER DOUGHERTY, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 408-9 (2007). 
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different than other observations of other clusters. If so, some tendencies of D&O 
markets might be revealed. Given the number of observations in each cluster, the 
magnitude of such tendencies can be observed. In addition, the association between the 
qualities of insurers and insured firms is also helpful for examining concerns about 
adverse selection.  
As regards clarification and convenience, the default number of clusters is set as 3.254 As 
regards the results, regardless of which variable is used as criteria, the result of 
classification and the centers of clusters are identical. There are 86 observations in cluster 
1, 2,393 observations in cluster 2, and 6 observations in cluster 3. These empirical results 
can be interpreted from two perspectives. On one hand, if the majority of observations 
were classified into one group, then it can be inferred that most transactions are similar 
and no adverse selection exists.  
On the other hand, given that all of the observations can be classified into several groups, 
this is not equivalent to that market being problematic. If good insured firms are matched 
with good insurers by means of insurance contracts, or bad insured firms are match with 
bad insurers, then it can be inferred that underwriting functions properly, insured firms 
and insurers can filter the proper counterparties, and no asymmetric information and 
adverse selection exist. The result is reported in Table 2.25. 
As regards the previous results of canonical analysis, Pearson analysis and stepwise 
                                                            
254 This study attempts to classified all observations into more than 3 clusters, but the results are quite 
similar. For example, the tendencies of these tests are similar, and cluster 2 in them always contains more 
than 90% of the observations.  
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regression will also be confirmed. First, empirical results show that there are 3 clusters 
for which the observations have significant differences. In cluster 1, insured firms have 
the highest amount of capital, larger ROE, numbers of directors and independent 
directors. They also have the smallest numbers of controlled directors, the smallest 
percentage of shares owned by directors, the smallest percentage of shares owned by 
major shareholders, and highest debt-asset ratio. The comparatively low standard 
deviations of ROA show that these firms are less opportunistic. In comparison with other 
groups, insured firms in cluster 1 have the best qualities among the three groups. Insurers 
in cluster 1 have the smallest amounts of capital, investment returns and D&O market 
shares, medium retention rates, and the highest levels of ROE. In comparison with other 
groups, the insurers in cluster 1 are small scale and have high profitability. This result 
implies that insured firms and insurers in this cluster both have better qualities. 
Transaction negotiation and insurance underwriting should function properly, and 
consequently better-insured firms obtain offers from better insurers. This is quite 
reasonable and fair, and no clue about information asymmetries and adverse selections 
are revealed.  
Cluster 2 contains 2,393 observations, about 96% of all 2,485 observations. Even though 
different proxy variables of qualities of insurers and insured firms are used as criteria, the 
number of observations and the centers of the clusters are the same. The observations in 
cluster 2 should be similar to each other and different than observations for other groups. 
Because 96% of the observations are classified into an identical group where the 
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components are similar, the entire Taiwanese D&O insurance market is almost 
homogeneous and market segmentation is limited. This result is further confirmed by the 
robustness check. Even when using different variables as criteria, the result remains 
consistent. Even though this study attempts to classify all of the observations into more 
than 3 groups, cluster 2 consistently contains more than 90% of all of the observations. 
The majority of insurance transactions are homogeneous, and there is no evidence of 
asymmetric information and adverse selection.  
On the other hand, if the focus moves to the qualities of the firms that are in cluster 2, the 
concerns about asymmetric information and adverse selection are still rejected. In 
comparison, the insured firms in cluster 2 have intermediate qualities. They have medium 
amounts of capital, ROEs, shares of directors, standard deviations of ROA and 
remuneration for directors. Their insurers also have medium amounts capital, ROEs and 
D&O insurance market shares. Insured firms and insurers find and contract counterparties 
they deserve. The same result emerged: no evidence of asymmetric information and 
adverse selection was found. 
Cluster 3 contains bad insured firms and insurers. As regards insured firms, they have the 
lowest amounts of capital and ROEs. In addition, they also have highest percentage of 
shares that are owned by directors and major directors, and high debt-asset ratios. They 
have the highest standard deviation of ROAs, which implies that these firms intend to 
engage in opportunistic behavior. Insurers in cluster 3 have the highest retention rates and 
the lowest ROEs. Although these insured firms get the greatest amounts of coverage, the 
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qualities of the insurers are comparatively low. This implies that bad insured firms cannot 
obtain large amount of coverage from good insurers. This result is reasonable and the 
problem of asymmetric information and adverse selection does not appear. One possible 
explanation for high coverage is they require more insurance, because they actually do 
have poor qualities and experience the highest possible level of risk. This is also why 
they cannot obtain offers from better insurers, and they must purchase insurance from 
other insurers.  
In conclusion, there cluster analysis above leads to two important findings. First, the 
majority of the observations can be classified into a single group whose components 
should be similar. Most of the market is homogenous. Second, given the 3 clusters in the 
results, insurers contract with insured firms according to their status. This shows that no 
party obtained any advantages in negotiation or insurance underwriting, and that 
asymmetric information and adverse selection did not exist. Hence, the equilibrium of the 
Taiwanese D&O insurance market is close to being homogenous and asymmetric 
information and adverse selection did not occur. Thus, the following tests about the effect 
of D&O insurance may not be influenced by adverse selection. Final cluster centers of 
cluster analysis are reported in Table 2.26.  
 
2.3.4.5 Discriminant analysis and multinomial logistic regression 
According to previous cluster analyses, all D&O insurance contracts can be classified 
into three categories. Discriminant analysis is used to determine whether such 
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classifications are proper or not. The result shows that 99.9% of original grouped cases 
are correctly classified. As regards the figure of canonical discriminant functions, it is 
found that the three clusters are separately scattered. The result is that the classification of 
cluster analysis is confirmed. The result of discriminant analysis is demonstrated in 
Figure 2.6.  
Among the two canonical Discriminant Functions here, the first can explain 97.8% of all 
of the variance, and the second one can explain about 2.2% of the variance. Both of their 
Wilks' Lambdas are significant. Two sets of Standardized Canonical Discriminant 
Function Coefficients are presented below:  
 
y1=.001LN_s_coverage-.027LNcapital2+.000DAratio2+.059ROE2-.017investment+.036
retention+.026marketshare+.035DOmarketshare-.065LNcapital-.072ROE-.021LNRemu-
.020Director+.037IDirector+.045Ctrldirector-.063SD-.075SMH+1.011DAratio+.060Std
DevROA…………(1) 
  
y2=.033LN_s_coverage+.065LNcapital2-.100DAratio2-.039ROE2-.051investment+.096r
etention-.133marketshare-.101DOmarketshare+.327LNcapital+.778ROE-.045LNRemu+
.406Director+.132IDirector-.242Ctrldirector-.086SD-.044SMH+.001DAratio-.225StdDe
vROA…………….(2) 
  
It should be noted that discriminant analysis assumes that the variance of discriminant 
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variables are homogenous across groups.255 This is done to ensure that the groups from 
the same parameter.256 The test score of Box’s test is 0.000, which is less than 0.05. The 
null hypothesis of equal population covariance matrices is rejected. This nevertheless 
does not mean this result is not reliable. First, Box’s test is quite sensitive to the sample 
size.257 The larger the sample size, the more easily the covariance assumption is violated. 
Given a large sample, a violation of this assumption is not significant.258 Moreover, 
discriminant analysis is robust with respect to violations of the assumption of 
covariance.259 All of the observations come from the Taiwanese public market and thus 
are certainly from the same parameter. Given the large sample of 2,485 observations in 
this study, and the similarities of the result of cluster analysis, this violation should not be 
critical. 
Furthermore, logistic regression is usually applied when the assumptions of discriminant 
analysis are violated.260 As regards the robustness check, multinomial logistic regression 
is conducted with the second cluster as base group. The result shows that the model is 
significant and exhibits goodness-of-fit. This indicates that the classification based on 
cluster analysis is confirmed. The qualities of insurers and insured firms may lead to 
some different characteristics in D&O insurance contracts, but such characteristics are 
                                                            
255 See NEIL J. SALKIND, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RESEARCH DESIGN 350 (2010). 
256 Id.  
257 Id.  
258 See DENNIS R. JONES, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKING CONDITIONS AND MUSCULOSKELETAL 
DISORDERS IN AN ASSEMBLY FACILITY 179 (2006). 
259 See Neil J. Salkind, supra note 255, at 350. See also LAWRENCE S. MEYERS & GLENN GAMST, A. J. 
GUARINO, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE RESEARCH: DESIGN AND INTERPRETATION 270 (2006). 
260 See Neil J. Salkind, Id, at 350. 
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quite limited. Most of the observations are in cluster 2, which implies that the Taiwan 
D&O market is close to being homogenous. The differences between the three clusters 
are significant and the characteristics provide no evidence of adverse selection. The result 
of multinomial logistic regression is reported in Table 2.27.  
 
2.3.5 Conclusions  
The problems of adverse selection and insurance underwriting are tested in this section. If 
these problems occur, the equilibrium of demand and supply may be influenced, insurers 
would not be able to screen the insured firms sufficiently and thus the signal effect of 
D&O insurance will not be reliable. The results of canonical analysis, Pearson analysis, 
stepwise regression, cluster analysis, discriminant analysis and multinomial logistic 
regression lead to three important findings. First of all, there is some association between 
the qualities of insurers and insured firms. This implies that certain characteristic of 
insured firms and insurers are emphasized in negotiations and underwriting. Second, 
when using different methods of classification, the majority of D&O insurance contracts 
are still belong in a single group. This implies that the Taiwanese D&O insurance market 
is close to being homogenous. Third, there was no evidence that proved that there was 
unfairness in the associations between the qualities of insured firms and the insurers with 
whom they contracted. Insured firms with poor qualities intend to contract with insurers 
whose qualities are not very good, and vice versa. This shows that the majority of the 
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market is homogenous, and the risk classification in the Taiwan D&O insurance market is 
also good and sufficient. No significant evidence of asymmetric information and adverse 
selection can be found. This dissertation concludes that insurance underwriting, the 
homogeneity of the Taiwanese market, and the following tests about the effect of D&O 
insurance will not be affected.  
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2.4 Test of monitoring function of D&O insurance 
2.4.1 Introduction  
In the previous two sections, this dissertation has clarified that there is no moral hazard or 
adverse selection problem in the Taiwanese D&O insurance market. Under this 
circumstance, the test of monitoring hypothesis should be more reliable. From this 
section, a series of empirical work will be conducted to test the monitoring hypothesis 
and the alternative hypothesis in the background of Taiwan. This will begin with the 
demand of D&O insurance on which previous researches focus. The traditional literature 
typically uses the purchase status of D&O insurance as a dependent variable and proxies 
of corporate governance as independent variables to conduct regression analysis.261 By 
following this approach, the monitoring hypothesis and the relationship between the 
demand of D&O insurance and corporate governance in Taiwan can be tested. Also, this 
research will add more proxy variables into regression to test the signal hypothesis. The 
discussion of empirical findings about signal hypothesis will be provided in Chapter 3. In 
short, this chapter not only explores issues mentioned above, but also lays the foundation 
for further analysis in following chapters. 
 
2.4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, under the assumption of the monitoring hypothesis, D&O 
                                                            
261 For example, Core uses insurance premium as the dependent variable and governance structure quality 
as well as business risk as independent variables in regression. See Core, John E., supra note 45, at 456. 
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insurance should be in a negative relationship with corporate governance mechanisms. 
Firms with better governance structure, more returns, and fewer losses intend to purchase 
less D&O insurance. In contrast, firms with worse governance structure, fewer returns 
and more losses intend to purchase more D&O insurance. For example, Lea H. Stern and 
M. Martin Boyer find that D&O insurance can provide an unbiased signal of firm’s 
risk.262 Based on following and previous literature reviews, the hypotheses about D&O 
insurance purchase will be developed. 
    
2.4.2.1 Business structure  
Business structure is the factor which affects both corporate governance and the demand 
for D&O insurance. Core proposed that the size of companies affects their demand for 
D&O insurance.263 Larger firms are expected to face greater litigation risks.264 However, 
larger firms generally have less demand for insurance coverage.265 Hence, the net effect 
of size on the demand of D&O insurance is expected to be ambiguous.266 However, 
David Mayers and Clifford W. Smith believe that larger companies are better able to 
self-insure themselves and thus have less need for real insurance.267 This dissertation will 
test the influence of this factor in D&O insurance purchase in Taiwan. The factor of the 
size of the insured companies will be represented by Ln_Capital which is the logarithm 
                                                            
262 See Lea H. Stern & M. Martin Boyer, supra note 47, at 1.  
263 See John E. Core, supra note 44, at 73. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 See David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 55:2 THE J. BUS. 
281, 294 (1982), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2352704.  
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of their capital.  
The industries within which companies operate might face different levels of risk which 
would affect the level of demand for D&O insurance. Irene Y. Kim tests the relationship 
between high-technology industry and D&O insurance in the United States market.268 
The development of the D&O insurance industry in Taiwan increases, but the insurance 
industry is not as well developed as is the case in the United States. As mentioned above, 
approximately 50% of companies in Taiwan purchased D&O insurance. It is usually 
argued that the industries that face higher potential risks, such as high technology,269 
biotechnology, the semiconductor industry and so on, have more incentives to purchase 
D&O insurance.270 In other words, various industries might have different risks. The 
dummy variable Industry is used to examine the relationship between the industries 
within which companies operate and their level of demand for D&O insurance. It equals 
1 if companies are high technology industry and 0 otherwise. 
   
2.4.2.2 Financial performance  
It is often the case that better financial structure is an indicator of better corporate 
governance and low level of need to purchase insurance. In the discussion of D&O 
insurance and corporate governance, return on equity (ROE) is often used as a proxy for 
                                                            
268 See Irene Y. Kim, supra note 148, at 21. 
269 See Shareholder Deriv. Actions L. & Prac. § 6:49 (2010).  
270 See Tsai-Jyh Chen & Chia-Hui Pang, supra note 16, at 178. 
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financial performance.271 Thus, following this approach, ROE is used as a proxy variable 
for financial performance. In addition, Core indicates that ROE is negatively related to 
litigation risk.272 Under this reasoning, ROE shall also be in inverse association with the 
demand for D&O insurance. In this research, financial performance is examined to 
determine whether or not this factor is negatively related to the demand of insured 
companies in Taiwan.  
 
2.4.2.3 Corporate governance  
Following the monitoring hypothesis, insurers are an outside monitoring mechanism with 
respect to corporate governance. Given the purpose of monitoring, D&O insurance is a 
substitute for other monitoring mechanisms, such as ownership and external and internal 
shareholders. 273  This reasoning leads to two possible assumptions. First, corporate 
governance is negatively related to the demand for D&O insurance. In other words, 
companies with better corporate governance have less demand for D&O insurance. 
Second, D&O insurance is negatively related to other mechanisms. Companies with more 
and better other monitoring mechanisms have less need for D&O insurance. However, it 
is possible to argue that because such companies emphasize corporate governance, they 
are more willing to purchase D&O insurance, either to improve their monitoring 
functions or their reputations. The aims of this dissertation are to clarify these issues. 
                                                            
271 See Christine Kang, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance: Ordinary Corporate Expense or Valuable 44 
(2011), http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Kang_HThesis2011.pdf. 
272 See John E. Core, supra note 45, at 466. 
273 See Noel O'Sullivan, supra note 43, at 547-8. 
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2.4.2.3.1 Ownership structure and internal risk  
Better ownership structure274 and less internal risk275 are usually indicators of better 
corporate governance. The latter results in less demand for D&O insurance. It can be 
hypothesized that D&O insurance is negatively related to ownership structure and 
internal risk. Hence, the shares of directors and shares of major shareholder are 
negatively related to the demand for D&O insurance. Having directors who are controlled 
by parent companies or controlling companies are also bad for corporate governance and 
increase the demand for D&O insurance. In terms of internal risk, the hypothesis is that 
the more directors and officers who are appointed by parent companies or controlling 
groups, the more likely it is that D&O insurance will be needed. 
In addition, whether the chief executive officer and chairman of the board are identical or 
not is important in the issues concerning D&O liability and corporate governance.276 The 
situation where one person holds both titles may reduce the board’s independence and the 
decisions of CEOs will be less monitored.277 Thus, the litigation risk will increase. In 
other words, the corporate governance is expected to be stronger when the board of 
                                                            
274 Regarding how ownership structure affects corporate governance in the viewpoint of path dependence, 
see Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 127, 141-2 (1999). 
275 Internal corporate governance aims to find optimal allocation of power. See Arthur R. Pinto, An 
Overview of United States Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 
264 (2010). 
276 See M. Martin Boyer & Mathieu Delvaux-Derome, supra note 84, at 10-1. 
277 Id.  
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directors is independent of CEOs.278 Whether the chief executive officer and chairman of 
the board are identical may be in positive relationship with litigation and the demand of 
D&O insurance. It is assumed that the chairman of the board of directors who also serves 
as CEO will increase risks and the demand for D&O insurance.  
   
2.4.2.3.2 The structure of boards of directors 
The structure of the board of directors is usually regarded as an important factor in 
corporate governance. 279  For instance, the number of directors may be critical in 
determining the effectiveness of corporate governance.280 In order to consider such 
factors in this empirical research, the number of internal and external directors will be 
considered in the models in this section.  
 
2.4.2.3.3 Remuneration 
Core proposes that remuneration packages and D&O insurance are both parts of offers 
made to directors.281 They will not serve on board until the package meets the reservation 
utility.282 In fact, compensation packages and D&O insurance are substitutes for each 
other.283 Reduced levels of D&O insurance leads to higher levels of compensation being 
                                                            
278 See John E. Core, supra note 45, at 460. 
279 See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 910-911 (2007). 
280 Id. 
281 See Jinyoung Park, supra note 86, at 3. 
282 See John E. Core, supra note 44, at 66. 
283 Id. Some literature proposes that D&O insurance is helpful for controlling executive compensation and 
thus benefits corporate governance. See Sharie-Ann J Campbell, Controlling Executive Compensation 
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance: A Proposed Solution to Inflated Pay 3 (2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1595091. 
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required in order to compensate directors for taking additional risks.284 Therefore, 
compensation is negatively related to the demand for D&O insurance. However, in 
contrast to personal coverage for directors, excessive compensation to directors might 
bring about the deterioration of a company’s financial structure and corporate governance. 
In that event, the demand for D&O insurance might increase. The variable 
Ln_Remuneration is logarithm of compensation package offered to directors which 
examines the relationship between compensation and the demand for D&O insurance. 
 
2.4.2.3.4 Litigation risk  
The number of shareholders is one indicator of the size of companies. Shareholder 
litigation is an important source of the litigation risk faced by directors; therefore, the 
number of shareholders is one indicator of the legal risk faced by the insured companies. 
The data were collected about all of the litigations, claims, and administrative penalties 
made against companies 2008 through 2010. When companies faced more disputes than 
during the previous year, the companies had an incentive to purchase D&O insurance. It 
is hypothesized that the number of litigations is positively related to the demand for D&O 
insurance. To test this, the variable litigation which is the number of disclosed significant 
litigation was used. Moreover, debt-asset ratio also indicates the risk of litigation and 
bankruptcy. Facing a high risk of litigation and bankruptcy may increase the demand for 
D&O insurance. The variable DAratio denotes the debt-asset ratio of firms.  
                                                            
284 Id. at 67.  
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2.4.2.4 Test for signal hypothesis: foreign investors 
Foreign investors are usually believed to care about the corporate governance of firms in 
which they invest. Although emerging markets are usually characterized by weak 
corporate governance, foreign investors still must deal with the criteria that control 
corporate governance in their home country.285 They will maintain their stricter criteria 
even in emerging markets, and avoid involvement with local firms that are riddled with 
scandals.286 In emerging markets, corporate governance has additional importance in 
terms of its role in attracting foreign investment.287 In addition to investment, foreign 
investors often bring in foreign expertise and monitoring, and improve the quality of 
corporate governance.288 Firms sometimes even improve their corporate governance in 
order to attract more foreign investors.289 Foreign investment is critical for the role it 
plays in stimulating the economies of developing countries.290  In addition, foreign 
investors are usually not familiar with local corporation laws, securities laws, and the 
                                                            
285 See Julien Chaisse, Corporate Governance and Financial Reform in China: Jing Leng, 40 HONG KONG 
L. J. 239, 239 (2010). 
286 Id.  
287 See Varun Bhat, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present, and Suggestions for the Future, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1431 (2007). 
288 See Terry E. Chang, The Gold Rush in the East: Recent Developments in Foreign Participation within 
China's Securities Markets as Compared to the Taiwanese Model, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279, 310 
(2005). 
289 Such as the Hyundai Heavy Industry in South Korea, see Craig Ehrlich Dae-Seob Kang, U.S. Style 
Corporate Governance in Korea's Largest Companies, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 56 (2000). Caslav 
Pejovic also proposes that Japanese corporate governance should be further adjusted to attract more foreign 
investors. Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN ST. INT'L L. 
REV. 483, 519 (2011). 
290 See Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: The 
Experience from Central And Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 1 (1995).  
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local corporate governance regime.291 This implies that they will tend to rely on signals 
conveyed by firms when they decide their investment strategies. If the corporate 
governance of firms is good, more foreign investors are attracted. This is emphasized in 
Taiwan. It is possible that the improvement of corporate governance in Taiwan in recent 
years is a result of influence exerted by foreign investors.292 
The literature emphasizes the positive effects of foreign investments on corporate 
governance. One result is that the shares held by foreign investors is used as the proxy 
variable for signal hypothesis in this research. If the percentage of shares held by foreign 
investors is positively correlated with the purchase of D&O insurance, this indicates that 
foreign investors really do care about D&O insurance. This also implies that D&O 
insurance does have a positive effect and foreign investors will be attracted, which 
supports the signal hypothesis about D&O insurance. On the other hand, if the 
relationship is not statistically significant or negative, this implies that foreign investors 
do not care D&O insurance to a significant degree. This implies that D&O insurance has 
no significant signal effect, and foreign investors will not be attracted. There is no 
evidence to support the signal hypothesis regarding D&O insurance in Taiwan. In order 
to thoroughly examine foreign investors, the shares held by foreign natural persons, 
foreign juristic persons and foreign financial juristic persons293 will be considered in this 
                                                            
291 See Ali Adnan Ibrahim, Developing Governance and Regulation for Emerging Capital and Securities 
Markets, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 154 (2007).  
292 See Terry E. Chang, supra note 288, at 310. However, the author provides another argument against this. 
Id, at 311. 
293 Institutional investors are also believed to have positive effect on corporate governance. See David P. 
Porter, Institutional Investors and Their Role in Corporate Governance: Reflections By a “Recovering” 
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empirical analysis. They are represented by FNP, FJP and FFJP respectively. 
Framework of hypotheses is presented in Figure 2.7.  
    
2.4.3 Research design 
2.4.3.1 Data 
The data on D&O insurance purchases made by listed companies in Taiwan was obtained 
from TEJ and MOPS. In addition to the websites of listed companies, basic information 
and financial data regarding them were obtained from the TEJ and Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Corporation (TSCE).294 This study proposes that the corporate governance of 
the insured companies affects their purchases of D&O insurance during the following 
year. Because of its availability, the data from 2008-2010 was used in this study. Total 
observations over the course of three years are 4,130. Following the assumption that the 
corporate governance of the previous year will affect the purchase of D&O insurance in 
the next year, this dissertation will use the data about corporate governance of listed firms 
in 2008 as the independent variables and the data about the purchase of D&O insurance 
in 2009 as the dependent variable, and so on.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Corporate Governance Lawyer, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627, 653-4 (2009). For more arguments about the 
role of institutional investors in corporate governance, see Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance after 
Enron and Global Crossing: Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L.J. 723, 740 
(2003). They usually have more interest in, and the ability to influence the behavior of companies. See 
David P. Porter, Id, at 654-81. In Taiwan, the majority of companies are owned by families and individual 
shareholders, and the role of institutional investors is more important. See Yin-Hua Yeh, Tsun-siou Lee & 
Tracie Woidtke, Family Control and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Taiwan, 2 INT'L REV FIN. 21 
(2001). Individual investors account for 70% of stock market transactions in Taiwan. See Yu-Hsin Lin, 
Modeling Securities Class Actions outside the United States: The Role of Nonprofits In The Case of Taiwan, 
4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 143 (2007). 
294 http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/listed/governance/cg_02.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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2.4.3.2 Variables 
2.4.3.2.1 Dependent variables  
The purpose of this research is to test whether or not there is a relationship between 
purchases of D&O insurance and the corporate governance of the insured companies. In 
this model, the dependent variable is whether or not the listed companies purchased D&O 
insurance. The variable Purchase is a dummy variable which denotes whether or not 
companies purchased D&O insurance. This equals 1 if companies purchased D&O 
insurance and 0 if they did not.  
The amount of D&O insurance coverage is the dependent variable for other panels. 
Insurance coverage indicates how much insurers must indemnify insured companies 
when losses take place. The variable Coverage denotes how much coverage a company 
purchased. Individual coverage of every firm is calculated respectively. If a company had 
more than one policy, the sum of all of that company’s coverage was calculated. If a 
company simultaneously purchased insurance for individual directors and the entire 
board of directors, all of that coverage was combined as well.  
 
2.4.3.2.2 Independent variables  
2.4.3.2.2.1 Business structure  
A company’s size and industry are important considerations in assessing its corporate 
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governance.295 As mentioned above, larger companies are expected to have higher 
litigation risk. 296  Size is usually considered an important factor for a company in 
determining the need for insurance.297 In the issue of D&O insurance, capital or asset is 
usually used to indicate the size of a company and as a proxy of corporate governance.298 
The size of a firm is usually believed to have a positive impact on D&O insurance 
coverage.299 Here, this dissertation follows this approach and lets the variable Capital 
denote the capital of the listed companies. The industry of a company may affect its 
tentative litigation risk. Especially in Taiwan, it is believed that high-technology 
companies have more litigation risk300 and have more demand for D&O insurance. Hence, 
the variable Industry is used to denote the industry group to which the companies belong. 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) sector groups can be found in Table 
2.28.  
Among these groups, this study defines “24.Semiconductor Industry,” “25.Computer and 
Peripheral Equipment Industry,” “26.Optoelectronic Industry,” “27.Communications and 
Internet Industry,” and “28.Electronic Parts/Components Industry” as high-technology 
companies and grant them the value “1.” Other groups, which are not high-technology 
companies, are defined with the value “0.” The variable Industry is a dummy variable. 
Moreover, in addition to classifying all industries into high-technology companies or not, 
                                                            
295 1849 PLI/CORP 453.  
296 See Core, John E., supra note 44, at 73. Core, John E., supra note 45, at 462. 
297 See M. Martin Boyer & Mathieu Delvaux-Derome, supra note 84, at 8. 
298 See Tsai-Jyh Chen & Chia-Hui Pang, supra note 16, at 179.  
299 See Peter Egger, Doina Radulescu & Ray Rees, supra note 160, at 18. 
300 Id., at 178. 
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this study also fixes the effect of industry and just uses separate dummy variables to 
denote all industries in Taiwan. In conclusion, this research uses the amount of capital 
and type of industry of the companies studied to represent their business structures.  
 
2.4.3.2.2.2 Financial performance  
Litigation risk of firms may be related to their financial performance. The firms with poor 
financial performance may have more demand for D&O insurance. Regarding this, a 
firm’s return of equity is usually used as proxy of financial performance.301 It is expected 
that this will be negatively related to the demand of D&O insurance.302 ROE is used in 
this dissertation to indicate the financial performance of the listed companies during 2008 
to 2010 in Taiwan. All of this information was obtained from the Taiwan Economic 
Journal (TEJ).303 
 
2.4.3.2.2.3 Corporate governance  
There are several variables used to indicate the quality of corporate governance. The 
importance of the shareholder in corporate governance cannot be emphasized any more. 
Regarding litigation risk, a shareholder is usually a major source of litigation against 
directors and officers.304 More shareholders imply more litigation risk, especially under 
                                                            
301 See Core, John E., supra note 45, 462. 
302 Id.  
303 http://www.tej.com.tw/twsite/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
304 In the United States, one half of D&O claims are brought by shareholders. See Core, John E supra note 
45, at 452. See also Clifford G. Holderness, supra note 34, at 120. 
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the duty of corporate officers and directors to manage forms for the purpose of 
maximizing the benefit of shareholders.305 This means that the number of shareholders is 
positively related to the demand of D&O insurance. As such, the variable SH is used to 
indicate the total number of shareholders and to evaluate its relations to the demand for 
D&O.  
Ownership structure and internal risk are important issues regarding corporate 
governance. When insiders’ control over firms increases, the preference of outside 
shareholders may be ignored and the demand for insurance may increase.306 Actually, 
D&O insurance applicants are typically asked to disclose the information about insider 
ownership and significant outside blockholdings.307 So four variables are set up to test 
this factor. The variables Sdirector and SMH indicate the percentage of shares held by 
directors and major shareholders. The variable Ctrldirector indicates the number of 
directors nominated or controlled by the parent company or the largest controlling group 
within the company, such as family members, relatives, or the parent company. Similarly, 
the variable Intrlrisk indicates the number of directors and officers appointed by a parent 
company or the controlling group. Again, if the chairman of the board, the CEO, the 
financial manager, or supervisory director is appointed by the parent company or the 
controlling group, the value will be 1; otherwise, it will be 0. The total ranges from 0 to 4. 
Also, this research considers another coding – just use four separate dummy variables to 
                                                            
305 See Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 177, 178 (2008).  
306 See John E. Core, supra note 44, at 68. 
307 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 7, at 522. 
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denote whether the previous mentioned people are appointed by the parent company or 
the controlling group or not. Both results will be compared. Institutional investors usually 
play important roles and lead the revolution of corporate governance, especially as they 
are major shareholders.308 Therefore, the number of institutional investors and foreign 
investors may positively contribute to corporate governance, and the need for insurance 
might decrease in such cases. In order to evaluate this factor, the variable Institution is 
used to indicate the number of total institutions and foreign shareholders from the list 
company in Taiwan. 
As mentioned above, D&O insurance may be considered an important part of 
compensation packages for managers309 and directors, especially for outside directors, as 
they often will not serve unless the package meets their reservation utility.310 By this 
reasoning, the compensation for directors and officers and D&O insurance are substitutes 
and are negatively related. However, there is an opposite argument, which proposes that 
the evidence to support this reasoning cannot be found.311 A different possible reasoning 
is that more compensation implies more liability for directors and officers, and thus there 
is more demand for D&O insurance.312 By this reasoning, compensation and D&O 
insurance are positively related. In order to clarify this problem, the variable 
Remuneration is be set to indicate the compensation package offered to the directors of 
                                                            
308 See Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap between Ownership and Control, 34 J. CORP. L. 409, 424 
(2009).  
309 See M. Martin Boyer & Mathieu Delvaux-Derome, supra note 84, at 10. 
310 See John E. Core, supra note 44, at 73. 
311 Id, at 84. 
312 See Tsai-Jyh Chen & Chia-Hui Pang, supra note 16, at 179. 
107 
 
each listed company during 2008-2010.  
An independent or outside director is usually viewed as an important mechanism for 
corporate governance. The more independent directors, the more closely the firms are 
overseen.313  Possible mistakes may be prevented via this mechanism. In this way, 
litigation risk will be decreased and thus the demand for D&O insurance will also 
decrease.314 The monitoring hypothesis can also suggest this reasoning. For the purpose 
of improving corporate governance, D&O insurance and other mechanisms, such as an 
independent director, are substitutes and therefore they are negatively related. However, 
M. Martin Boyer proposes a different argument, which is the risk aversion hypothesis. 
Compared to inside directors, independent directors receive less compensation and fewer 
benefits from firms, and, as such, they usually request more D&O insurance coverage.315 
The number of independent directors is positively associated with D&O insurance. In 
order to evaluate this factor, the variables Indptdirector is used to indicate the number of 
independent directors each listed company had during 2008-2010.  
Additionally, the numbers of directors does not only imply the size of firms but also the 
tentative D&O claims. The variable Directors indicates the number of directors each 
listed company had during 2008. The dummy variable Dual equals 1 if the chairman of 
the board of directors is also the CEO, and is otherwise 0.  
                                                            
313 See M. Martin Boyer & Mathieu Delvaux-Derome, supra note 84, at 10. However, the function of 
independent director is also arguable, cf. Victor Brudney, The Independent Director – Heavenly City or 
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 611 (1982).  
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315 See M. Martin Boyer, supra note 6, at 10. 
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2.4.3.2.2.4 Litigation risk  
The main purpose of D&O insurance is to cancel out litigation risk. A high number of 
prior litigations may indicate bad corporate governance of firms. Under this reasoning, 
prior litigation may cause D&O claim or negative reputational effect. This may be 
positively related with the demand for D&O insurance.316 The variable Litigation is to 
indicate the number of litigations that are significant and are disclosed by law.317 If the 
number of litigations is in a positive relationship with the demand of D&O insurance, 
then monitoring the hypothesis is supported; otherwise, it is not. 
Similarly, debt-asset ratio indicates firms’ tentative financial problems. Firms with higher 
debt-asset ratios are usually in worse financial situations and thus have more risk of 
litigation.318 Therefore, the variable DAratio indicates the debt-asset ratio of each listed 
company during 2008-2010. In sum, all of the variables and their descriptions are 
provided in Table 2.29.  
 
2.4.3.3 Method 
2.4.3.3.1 Descriptive analysis 
This dissertation follows Clifford G. Holderness’ approach in descriptive statistics.319 
This type of analysis is helpful in understanding the attributes of the types of companies 
                                                            
316 See John E. Core, supra note 45, at 462. 
317 Securities and Exchange Act (Amended 24. Sept. 2010) Article 36 section 2. 
318 See Chen, Tsai-Jyh and Pang, Chia-Hui, supra note 16, at 178. 
319 See Clifford G. Holderness, supra note 34, at 123-4. 
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that purchase D&O insurance and the companies that do not. Correlation analysis will be 
provided, as well.  
 
2.4.3.3.2 Logistic regression  
In recent literature about D&O insurance, the empirical methods frequently used are 
ordinary least square regression (OLS) and logistic regression. Many scholars such as 
O’Sullivan320, M. Martin Boyer321 and Core322 all adopt such approaches.323 They use 
OLS regressions when the dependent variable, which is numeric value, is the limit of 
policy, and use logistic, which is binary, when the dependent variable is whether D&O 
insurance was purchased or not. This approach is primarily followed in this research, and 
more econometrics are developed to examine the hypotheses regarding Taiwan. The 
general regression model used in this section is as follows:  
 
ܦ&ܱ௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ݈݊	ܿ ܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ௧ିଵ +ߚଶܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ + ߚଷܴܱܧ௧ିଵ + ߚସ݈݊	ݎ݁݉ݑ݊݁ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ +
+ߚହ݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ௧ିଵ + ߚ଺݅݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ௧ିଵ + ߚ଻ݏ݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ௧ିଵ + ߚ଼ܵܯܪ௧ିଵ +
ߚଽܿݐݎ݈݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ௧ିଵ + ߚଵ଴݀ݑ݈ܽ௧ିଵ + ߚଵଵ݅݊ݐݎ݈ݎ݅ݏ݇	௧ିଵ + ߚଵଶ݀ܽݎܽݐ݅݋௧ିଵ + ߚଵଷ݂݊݌	௧ିଵ +
ߚଵସ݂݆݌	௧ିଵ + ߚଵହ݂݂݆݌	௧ିଵ +ߚଵ଺݈݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ + ߝ………………...…………………….(1) 
 
                                                            
320 See Noel O'Sullivan, supra note 43, at 554. 
321 See M. Martin Boyer, Is the Demand for Corporate Insurance a Habit? Evidence of Organizational 
Inertia from Directors' and Officers' Insurance (2004), http://ideas.repec.org/p/cir/cirwor/2004s-33.html. 
322 See John E. Core, supra note 44, at 77. 
323 This approach is also used to test the association between D&O insurance and the enactment of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and whether this act influences D&O insurance transactions. See Anna Oh, supra note 
12, at 1. 
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In this section, a binominal variable D&O insurance purchase is used as the proxy 
variable of D&O insurance. This model is to test how D&O insurance purchase behavior 
relates to firms’ governance and whether D&O insurance purchase behavior is a signal 
for corporate governance and thus whether monitoring function can be exerted. 
Considering the dependent variable is binary, logistic regression is applied in this test.324 
Another problem is that many numerical variables are far from normally distributed. 
From the descriptive analysis below, it is found that these all are skewed to the right. For 
example, the variables capital, the total number of shareholders, shares held by directors, 
and shares held by major shareholders create the tendency for fewer firms to have larger 
values. Therefore, this study does logarithms for these variables to improve the 
distributions and get them closer to normal.325  
    
2.4.3.3.3 OLS and censored regression 
In the OLS regression model, insurance coverage, which is numerical variable, is used as 
the proxy variable of D&O insurance. Due to skew of insurance coverage, several 
approaches, including log transformation, Box-Cox transformation, and Tobit regression 
will be attempted to correct this problem. Then, this research will compare the results of 
different transformation and then find an optimal explanation.  
 
                                                            
324 See DAVID W. HOSMER &STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 1 (2000). 
325 See A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA 89-90 (1998). 
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2.4.3.3.4 Log transformation  
Considering insurance coverage is positive and skew to right, logarithm transformation is 
applied here to improve its distribution.326 In contrast to the previous OLS model where 
insurance coverage used as dependent variable without any transformation, this model is 
expected to provide more precise estimation.  
 
2.4.3.3.5 Box-cox transformation  
In addition to log transformation, Box-cox transformation is also useful and frequently 
used in regression analysis.327 The purpose of transformation is to simplify the relation, 
eliminate heteroscedasticity and normalize residuals. This is helpful to find the function 
form of the dependent variable with the largest likelihood of fitting a linear relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. 328  This is not only beneficial for 
linearization of relationship but also to fit the assumption of linear regression. If the data 
is heteroscedastic, standard errors are biased, and residuals are not normally distributed, 
the linear regression would be less precise in prediction.329 
In model 1.2.2, Box-Cox transformation will be applied to decide the optimal function 
form of dependent variable Y. After applying the Box-Cox transformation, it could be 
                                                            
326 See DAVID G. KLEINBAUM, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND OTHER MULTIVARIABLE METHODS 303 
(2007). 
327 See LUC ANSELIN, R. J. G. M. FLORAX, SERGIO & J. REY, ADVANCES IN SPATIAL ECONOMETRICS: 
METHODOLOGY, TOOLS AND APPLICATIONS 198 (2004). 
328 More introduction about Box-Cox transformation, see 
http://www.stat.uconn.edu/~studentjournal/index_files/pengfi_s05.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
329 See JACOB COHEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES 221 (2003). 
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found that the suitable exponent for Y in regression is λ. By such transformation, 
regression can fit closer to linear relation. All panels from 2008-2010 will be transformed 
individually, and λ for every year may be slightly different. Similarly, in order to loosen 
the assumptions for classical linear regression, bootstrapping330 is carried out to construe 
the true situation in parameter. The results of Box-Cox transformation regression and 
bootstrap will be compared to get optimal explanation.  
 
2.4.3.3.6 Censored and CLAD model  
2.4.3.3.6.1 Tobit model  
Analyzing the demands of D&O insurance, insurance coverage may only reflect partial 
parameter. Higher insurance coverage purchased reflects higher demand of insurance. But 
insurance coverage will not be less than 0. In other words, the variable coverage is 
censored at left and thus cannot reflect the parameter that is less than 0. Thus insurance 
coverage is a censored data and the estimation of OLS is inconsistent.331 In contrast, the 
Tobit model or censored regression is proper for censored data.332 This model is proposed 
                                                            
330  For more introductions about bootstrap, see N. Eugene Savin & Allan Wurtz, Testing the 
Semiparametric Box-cox Model with the Bootstrap 1 (2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=325981. 
331 See Martin Falk, Diffusion of Information Technology, Internet Use and the Demand for Heterogeneous 
Labor 7 (2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=372104.  
332 Censored data is the values of data clustered around some threshold, such as lower (left censored) or 
higher (right-censored) thresholds. See JEFFERY T. WALKER & SEAN MADDAN, STATISTICS IN CRIMINOLOGY 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 231 (2008). For example, Nalinaksha 
Bhattacharyya, Cameron K.J. Morrill and Amin Mawani employ Tobit regression in the analysis of 
dividend payout. Obviously, dividend payout is never less than 0. See Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya, Cameron 
K.J. Morrill & Amin Mawani, Dividend Payout and Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence (2003), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=326801. Again, Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric Bennett Rasmusen 
use Tobit because they do not observe all levels of taxes paid if they are below 10 million yen. See Minoru 
Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating 
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by James Tobin333 to describe the relationship between restricted dependent variable and 
independent variable. It uses maximum likelihood to estimate regression for all cases.334 
The Tobit model is often applied in literature concerning D&O insurance. For example, 
M. Martin Boyer and Hanon Amandine use the Tobit model to assess the association 
between D&O insurance limit and aggressive earning measure.335 Thus, this dissertation 
employs Tobit regression and compares these results to the results of OLS regression. The 
Tobit model is as follows:  
 
ݕ௜ = ൜
ݕ௜
∗		݂݅	ݕ௜
∗ > 0
0				݂݅	ݕ௜
∗ ≤ 0
 
ݕ௜
∗ = ߚݔ௜ + ߝ, ߝ~ܰ(0, б૛) 
 (4) 
2.4.3.3.6.2 Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) 
Classical Tobit model assumes a normal distribution for dependent variable with certain 
censoring point. Thus, even though Tobit model is useful for data which is censored, this 
method is subject to the assumptions of a normal error distribution and 
homoscedasticity.336 In order to avoid such assumptions, Powell (1984) proposed the 
Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD). Different from Tobit model, errors of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Levels and Determinants from Tax Records 6 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=950365. 
333 See James Tobin, Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables, 26:1 ECONOMETRICA 
24, 24 (1958). 
334 Id.  
335 See M. Martin Boyer & Hanon Amandine, supra note 145, at 11. 
336 Discussion about testing normality of Toblt model, see B. Caudilla & F. G. Mixon Jr.b, More on Testing 
the Normality Assumption in the Tobit Model, 36:12 J. APPLIED STATISTICS, 1345-52 (2009). 
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CLAD are not necessary to be homoskedastic or normally distributed,337 and thus CLAD 
is widely employed. 338  For more robustness to heteroscedasticity and other 
misspecification, this research will also carry out CLAD and compare its result with that 
of classical Tobit model.  
 
2.4.4 Descriptive statistics  
The result of descriptive analysis is reported in Table 2.30. In 2008, excluding 107 of the 
1,346 total observations due to missing data, 613 firms (49.4%) purchased D&O 
insurance and 626 (50.5%) did not. In 2009, excluding 68 of the 1,395 total observations 
due to missing data, 674 firms (50.8%) purchased D&O insurance and 653 (49.2%) did 
not. In 2010, excluding 86 of the 1,327 total observations due to missing data, 705 firms 
(56.8%) purchased D&O insurance and 536 (43.1%) did not. The insured rate increased 
gradually. This indicates that more and more listed firms in Taiwan began to purchase 
D&O insurance. For testing the significance of the difference between firms that 
purchased D&O insurance and firms without D&O insurance, an independent samples 
test is carried out in this section. The results of independent samples test are presented in 
Table 2.31, 2.32 and 2.33.  
For 2008, it is found that insured companies have better performance, corporate 
governance and larger scale than uninsured companies. Regarding size scale, insured 
                                                            
337 See James L. Powell, Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares Estimation for Tobit Models, 54:6 
ECONOMETRICA 1435, 1435 (1986). 
338 See also Dirk Czarnitzki & Kornelius Kraft, Management Control and Innovative Activity, 24:1 REV.  
INDUS. ORG. 1, 1-24 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=639133.  
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companies are larger in size in terms of capital. Intuitively, companies with larger size 
have more tentative litigation risk. This satisfies the hypothesis that larger companies 
experience greater demand for D&O insurance. Similarly, regarding the number of 
directors, which may imply the scale of a company, companies with insurance also have 
more directors than companies without insurance. These differences are significant at 1%. 
Even though the prior litigation of insured companies is greater than that of uninsured 
companies, this may not mean that insured companies have more problems, because 
tentative litigation may be caused by large business scale rather than by bad performance. 
Moreover, the difference regarding the number of prior litigations is not significant. 
Therefore, more analysis concerning the difference of corporate governance between 
insured and uninsured companies is needed.  
Regarding profiting ability, companies that purchase D&O insurance have better ROEs as 
part of their financial performance. This does not support the hypothesis that the 
companies that have better financial performance have less need for D&O insurance. 
However, this is not significant at 5%. The percentage of remuneration all paid to 
directors of companies with D&O insurance is also higher than among companies that do 
not purchase D&O insurance. This means that companies that pay out more remuneration 
to company directors have greater demand for D&O insurance. This does not support the 
hypothesis that remuneration and D&O insurance are substitutes for each other and are 
negatively related. In addition, companies that purchase D&O insurance also have better 
performance in corporate governance proxies. They have more independent directors, 
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smaller percentages of company stock being held by major shareholders, fewer controlled 
directors, and fewer managers and officers who have been appointed by the controlling 
company or parent group. This means that companies with better corporate governance 
and monitoring mechanisms purchase more D&O insurance. This is contrary to the 
previous monitoring hypothesis that monitoring mechanisms and D&O insurance are 
substitutes and are negatively related. 
Similar situations also happened in 2009 and 2010. Companies with larger capital and 
more directors purchase D&O insurance. Regarding prior significant litigation, it is not 
statistically significant either for 2009 or 2010. Insured companies have more 
independent directors, fewer shares held by directors and major shareholders, fewer 
directors who are controlled, and fewer internal risks. This rejects the theory of 
monitoring hypothesis, which states that companies with poor corporate governance have 
more demand for D&O insurance and vice versa. No matter whether in 2009 or 2010, the 
same companies with insurance have higher remuneration for directors, and this is very 
significant (<0.001). The theory that D&O insurance and remuneration are substitutes is 
not supported. As for proxies of signal hypothesis, shares of foreign natural persons are 
slightly higher for uninsured companies than those that are insured, but this is not 
statistically significant. In contrast, firms with D&O insurance have more shares held by 
foreign juristic persons and financial persons than firms without D&O insurance, and this 
is very significant statistically (<0.001). This shows that foreign juristic person and 
financial person who care about corporate governance and signal also care about the 
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purchase of D&O insurance. This implies that signal hypothesis is supported.  
 
2.4.5 Model 1: logistic regression: The demand of D&O insurance and its 
relationship with corporate governance  
2.4.5.1 Panel A: 2008  
The variable concerning whether or not listed companies purchased D&O insurance is 
used as the dependent variable. The result is shown below. Regarding the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Test, Chi-square is 7.624 and p-value is 0.471. The null hypothesis that the 
model is a good fit is not rejected. The Omnibus Test is also significant and thus 
explaining the ability of this model is significant. The results of logistic regression 
approximately match the results of descriptive statistics. The variables industry, lnremu, 
director, idirector, ctrldirector, intrlrisk, fjp and ffjp are significant at 5%. The variable 
industry339 of the companies is positively related to their demand for D&O insurance. 
This supports the hypothesis developed from a review of the previous literature in that 
high technology industry in Taiwan has a greater need for D&O insurance. Additionally, 
lnremu, director and idirector are positively related to the purchase of D&O insurance. 
Ctrldirector and intrlrisk340 are negatively related to the purchase of D&O insurance. 
                                                            
339 If the effect of all industries is fixed by using separate dummy variables, the results are similar. 
Generally, the coefficient of companies which are not high-tech industries are negatively significant, like 
textile industry, electric machinery industry, paper and pulp industry, automobile industry, building material 
and construction industry, tourism industry, chemical industry, composite oil, gas and electricity industry. 
Similar results also happen in 2009, 2010 and the following tests in 2.4.  
340 If the internal risk is coded as four dummy variables respectively denoting whether chairman of the 
board, CEO, financial manager and supervisory director is appointed by a parent or controlling group, the 
internalization of supervisory director is negatively significant. 
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These results are quite similar to the results of previous descriptive analyses, implying 
that the companies with better corporate governance have more demand for D&O 
insurance. In other words, the purchase of D&O insurance in Taiwan is related to the 
quality of corporate governance, but how corporate governance affects purchases of 
D&O insurance in Taiwan is contrary to the assumption of the monitoring hypothesis. 
The variable litigation is not significant, and, therefore, no evidence could support the 
assumption that prior litigation will cause the demand for insurance. As a result, the 
theory of monitoring hypothesis cannot be supported. The result can be found in Table 
2.34.  
 
2.4.5.2 Panel B: 2009 
The result of 2009 below is similar to that of the previous year. Chi-square of the Hosmer 
and Lemeshow Test is 5.840 and p-value is 0.665, which means goodness-of-fit of this 
model is qualified. Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients is significant as well. The 
variables industry, lnremu, director, idirector, ctrldirector, sd, smh, intrlrisk and fjp are 
significant at 5%. The variables lnremu and Indptdirector are positively related to the 
purchase of D&O insurance. Ctrldirector and intrlrisk341 are negatively related to the 
purchase of D&O insurance. These results are quite similar to the results of 2008, 
implying that the companies with better corporate governance have more demand for 
                                                            
341 Similarly, if internal risk is coded as four separate dummy variables, the internalization of chairman of 
the board is negatively significant. 
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D&O insurance. 
Different from 2008, sd and smh are significant for 2009 and negatively related to D&O 
insurance. Under reasoning of literature and intuition, more shares held by directors and 
major shareholders may cause more conflict of interest, weaker governance and more 
litigation risk. As a consequence, more demand of D&O insurance is expected. The 
empirical result indicates that more shares held by directors and major shareholders will 
lead to less demand for D&O insurance. This result does not support the theory of 
monitoring hypothesis that states that firms with more risk and poor governance have 
more demand for insurance. Instead, the proposal of this research is supported. The result 
can be found in Table 2.35.  
 
2.4.5.3 Panel C: 2010 
There are similar results from 2010. The Chi-square of the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test is 
6.481 and p-value is 0. 593, which indicates that goodness-of-fit of this model is qualified. 
Omnibus Tests is also significant. Litigation is not significant. Lnremu and idirector are 
positively and significantly related to the purchase of D&O insurance. Ctrldirector, sd, 
smh, and intrlrisk342 are negatively related to insurance purchase. Again, this implies that 
the companies with better corporate governance usually have more demand for D&O 
insurance. All these results imply that the monitoring hypothesis is not supported in this 
                                                            
342 If internal risk is coded as four separate dummy variables, the internalizations of chairman of the board 
and supervisory director are negatively significant. 
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research. The result is presented in Table 2.36. 
 
2.4.6 Model 2: OLS and censored regression  
For the robustness test, which is different from the previous model for which the 
dependent variable is whether a company is insured or not, the amount of coverage is 
used as the dependent variable. Because the amount of coverage is numeric and skewed 
to the right, a variety of econometrics will be employed for more accuracy.   
 
2.4.6.1 Log transformation  
In 2008, the adjust R2 score of regression is around 25%. Capital and daratio are 
significant. The variable Capital, which indicates the size of a company, is positively 
related to the coverage provided by D&O insurance. This supports the hypothesis that 
larger companies have greater demand for D&O insurance. Debt-asset ratio is negatively 
significant, and this indicates that firms with higher debt-asset ratios have less D&O 
insurance. The monitoring hypothesis is rejected. However, the proxies of signal 
hypothesis, the percentage of shares of foreign natural persons, juristic persons and 
financial juristic persons, all are not significant. Therefore, the signal hypothesis cannot 
be supported, either. The result of bootstrap is very similar, but lnremu becomes 
positively significant. This further rejects the monitoring hypothesis.  
In 2009, the adjust R2 score is much higher at 30%. The monitoring hypothesis is not 
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supported. Lnremu is positively significant, and this indicates that remuneration and 
D&O insurance for directors are not substitutes. Moreover, the variable shares held by 
foreign financial juristic persons is positively significant. An increase in shares held by 
foreign financial juristic persons will also increase the demand for D&O insurance. 
Therefore signal hypothesis is implied. This result is also is supported by bootstrap. 
The result of 2010 is similar to that 2009, rejecting monitoring hypothesis and supporting 
signal hypothesis significantly. In addition to variables significant in 2009, ctrldirector 
and daratio are also negatively significant. This indicates more debt-asset ratio and that 
controlled directors will lead to less demand of D&O insurance. This is different from the 
argument of monitoring hypothesis. In conclusion, the monitoring hypothesis suggests 
that companies with weak corporate governance have a greater incentive to purchase 
D&O insurance, and monitoring functions and D&O insurance are substitutes for each 
other. However, there is no evidence supporting this hypothesis in this section. The result 
of log transformed regression and bootstrap can be found in Table 2.37.  
 
2.4.6.2 Box-Cox transformation 
Box-Cox transformation is powerful to place regression closer to linearity by computing 
a suitable power of the dependent variable. For further robustness testing, Box-Cox 
transformation is employed to test the monitoring hypothesis and the signal hypothesis 
among firms with D&O insurance. It can be found that the result is very similar to that of 
the log transformed model. Litigation is insignificant and firms with more internal risk 
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and debt-asset ratios have less demand for D&O insurance. The detailed result is 
presented in Table 2.38.  
 
2.4.6.3 Censored regression and CLAD 
The monitoring hypothesis stipulates that firms that have poor qualities should exhibit 
greater demand for D&O insurance. However, the result of Tobit model shows that the 
number of controlled directors and debt-asset ratio variables are inversely related to D&O 
insurance coverage. This implies that more controlled directors and debt-asset ratios may 
result in less demand for insurance, different from the theory of monitoring hypothesis. 
The result is presented in Table 2.39.  
Again, Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) is carried out to confirm the 
previous Tobit model and the result is even more obvious. The results show that firms 
with greater returns will have less demand for D&O insurance. On the contrary, greater 
remuneration still results in increased demand for insurance, which differs from the 
monitoring hypothesis. In a similar manner, independent director, shares held by directors, 
shares held by major shareholders, controlled directors, internal risks and debt-asset 
ratios are all negatively correlated to the demand for insurance. The result here once 
again confirms the previous tests and do not support the monitoring hypothesis. The final 
result is presented in Table 2.40.  
 
2.4.7 Conclusions  
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This chapter discusses the monitoring hypothesis and tests it in the context of Taiwan. It 
is found that the monitoring hypothesis is not supported. Firms with good corporate 
governance and less risk tend to purchase more D&O insurance. In contrast, firms with 
bad corporate governance and more risk tend to purchase less D&O insurance. This result 
implies that the indemnification function or monitoring function is not sufficient to 
explain the reason to purchase D&O insurance. In the next chapter, this dissertation will 
provide a possible alternative hypothesis, signal hypothesis, to explain why firms 
purchase D&O insurance in Taiwan.  
 
124 
 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 2.1 Framework of Research 
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Figure 2.2 Path diagram of canonical analysis (1) 
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Figure 2.3 Path diagram of canonical analysis (2) 
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Figure 2.4 Path diagram of canonical analysis (3) 
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Figure 2.5 Path diagram of canonical analysis (4) 
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Figure 2.6 Canonical discriminant functions  
 
This figure demonstrates the result of discriminant analysis. It is shown that three clusters 
are separately scattered. Thus, this matches with the previous result of cluster analysis.   
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Figure 2.7 Framework of hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Business structure 
2. Financial performance 
3. Corporate governance  
1) Ownership structure  
2) Internal risk  
3) Remuneration 
4) Board structure   
4. Litigation risk 
Demand of D&O insurance 
5. Signal hypothesis: 
foreigner investors 
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Table 2.1 Table of variables (1) 
 
 Hypothesis Variables Definition Expected 
sign 
Dependent 
variables 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard deviation of 
return on equity  
N/A 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard deviation of 
return on assets  
N/A 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard deviation of 
earnings per share of firms 
N/A 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
 
N/A 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
Standard deviation of short 
term investment 
N/A 
Independent 
variables 
Neutral 
hypothesis 
D&O purchase The dummy variable 
equals 1 when firms with 
insurance and 0 otherwise 
? 
D&O coverage Natural logarithm of D&O 
insurance coverage 
? 
Corporate 
governance 
hypothesis 
Capital Natural logarithm of total 
capital of firms 
? 
Remuneration Natural logarithm of total  
compensation package 
offered to directors 
? 
Director The total number of 
directors 
? 
Independent 
director 
The number of 
independent directors   
? 
Controlled 
director  
Controlled directors. This 
indicates the number of 
directors who are 
nominated or controlled by 
the largest controlling 
group of the company, 
such as family, relatives, or  
+ 
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parent company. 
Shares held by 
director  
The percentage of shares 
held by directors (%) 
+ 
Shares held by 
major 
shareholder  
The percentage of shares 
held by major shareholders 
(%) 
+ 
Duality of 
CEO and COB  
The dummy variable 
equals 1 if chairman of 
board of directors is 
identical to CEO and 0 
otherwise. 
+ 
Controlled 
COB 
If the chairman of board is 
appointed by parent or 
controlling group, the 
value will be granted 1. 
Otherwise, the value would 
be 0. 
+                                                                                                                            
Controlled 
CEO 
If the CEO is appointed by 
parent or controlling group, 
the value will be granted 1. 
Otherwise, the value would 
be 0. 
 
Controlled 
financial 
manager 
If financial manager is 
appointed by parent or 
controlling group, the 
value will be granted 1. 
Otherwise, the value would 
be 0. 
 
Controlled 
supervisory 
director 
If supervisory director is 
appointed by parent or 
controlling group, the 
value will be granted 1. 
Otherwise, the value would 
be 0. 
 
Debt-asset 
ratio   
Debt-asset ratio of firms + 
Litigation The number of disclosed 
significant litigation 
 
 
Table 2.1 (cont.) 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive analysis 
 
This table contains the descriptive statistics of variables, comparing the firms with D&O 
insurance and the firms without D&O insurance form 2008-2010. In general, firms with D&O 
insurance have higher volatility than firms without D&O insurance.  
 
 2008 2009 2010 
 Uninsured  Insured  Uninsured  Insured  Uninsured  Insured  
Variable mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
4.639 8.826 4.508 10.81 3.150 6.386 3.395 8.897 3.272 11.79 3.026 5.196 
 
 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
1.923 2.780 2.045 4.123 1.428 1.484 1.472 1.507 1.311 1.848 1.426 1.779 
             
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
0.614 0.647 0.793 0.856 0.670 1.587 0.820 1.829 0.508 0.517 0.712 1.037 
             
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset 
ratio 
32.35 217.5 34.62 181.6 41.85 513.5 51.55 650.3 53.14 808.3 32.04 404.5 
             
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
2266 1545 4923 2898 1486 8627 4433 3168 1130 7663 4157 3981 
             
D&O 
purchase 
- - 1 0 - - 1 0 - - 1 0 
             
D&O 
coverage 
- - 18.92 1.219 - - 18.90 1.197 - - 18.86 1.090 
             
Log of 
capital 
15.05 1.427 15.37 1.856 15.00 1.416 15.43 1.896 21.90 1.366 22.33 1.826 
             
industry 0.306 0.461 0.561 0.498 0.326 0.469 0.555 0.498 0.317 0.465 0.594 0.491 
             
ROE 1.550 4.065 2.182 15.14 1.581 9.721 -0.04 24.23 1.729 12.16 0.413 8.684 
             
Log of 
remuneration 
16.04 0.960 16.36 1.003 15.99 1.604 16.33 1.526 16.08 1.067 16.5 1.187 
             
Director 9.501 2.829 9.642 2.440 9.075 3.239 9.468 2.528 9.343 2.501 9.642 2.442 
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Independent 
director 
 
 
 
0.868 1.272 1.642 1.392 0.826 1.154 1.497 1.257 0.792 1.099 1.531 1.218 
 
 
 
 
Controlled 
director 
 
2.061 1.886 1.423 1.360 1.859 1.814 1.369 1.339 1.932 1.763 1.377 1.350 
 
Shares held 
by director 
 
25.23 14.65 22.03 14.83 25.23 15.08 22.04 14.81 25.16 13.81 21.76 14.69 
 
Shares held 
by major 
shareholder 
 
20.33 11.28 18.61 11.35 21.76 12.03 18.56 10.37 21.46 11.68 18.36 10.31 
Duality of 
CEO and 
COB 
0.303 0.460 0.265 0.424 0.283 0.450 0.286 0.441 0.294 0.461 0.283 0.443 
             
Internal risk 2.105 0.904 1.756 0.881 2.030 0.947 1.719 0.905 2.063 0.924 1.670 0.936 
             
Debt-asset 
ratio 
 
146.1 554.0 147.9 545.3 124.3 565.4 134.7 513.6 97.04 214.6 124.0 354.5 
 
Prior 
significant 
litigation 
0.135 0.823 0.182 0.659 0.150 1.268 0.209 0.712 0.134 1.020 0.191 0.773 
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Table 2.3 Independent samples test of 2008  
 
This table contains independent sample test of 2008. This is to test if the difference between 
firms with D&O insurance and without D&O insurance is statistically significant or not. Except 
standard deviation of EPS and standard deviation of short-term investment, other differences in 
volatility between firms with D&O insurance and firms without D&O insurance are not 
significant. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate 
significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 
Equal 
variance
s 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-tail
ed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
assumed .057 .811 -.240 1236 .810 -.13126 .54596 -1.20236 .93985 
not 
assumed   
-.240 
1197
.531 
.810 -.13126 .54693 -1.20430 .94178 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
assumed .712 .399 .644 1237 .520 .12118 .18811 -.24788 .49024 
not 
assumed   .642 
1124
.219 .521 .12118 .18870 -.24907 .49143 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
assumed 
12.0
88 
.001 4.213 1237 .000*** .17924 .04254 .09577 .26271 
not 
assumed   4.202 
1150
.398 .000
*** .17924 .04266 .09554 .26294 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
assumed .020 .887 .200 1237 .842 2.27416 11.38622 -20.06428 24.61260 
not 
assumed   
.200 1205
.942 
.841 2.27416 11.36458 -20.02239 24.57071 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
assumed 
14.8
64 
.000 2.287 1237 .022* 265705.39 116174.582 37784.390 
493626.4
05 
not 
assumed   
2.277 1028
.362 .023
* 265705.39 116702.046 36704.063 
494706.7
31 
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Table 2.4 Independent samples test of 2009  
 
This table contains independent sample test of 2009. This is to test if the difference between 
firms with D&O insurance and without D&O insurance is statistically significant or not. Except 
standard deviation of short-term investment, other differences in volatility between firms with 
D&O insurance and firms without D&O insurance are not significant. An asterisk denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and 
three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 
Equal 
variances F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-taile
d) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
assumed .640 .424 .621 1325 .535 .24693 .39764 -.53315 1.02700 
not 
assumed   
.623 
1277
.365 
.533 .24693 .39638 -.53071 1.02456 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
assumed .321 .571 .487 1325 .626 .04438 .09103 -.13421 .22296 
not 
assumed   .489 
1288
.011 .625 .04438 .09077 -.13371 .22246 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
assumed .520 .471 1.687 1325 .092 .15048 .08921 -.02453 .32550 
not 
assumed   1.688 
1324
.578 .092 .15048 .08916 -.02442 .32538 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
assumed .313 .576 .331 1325 .741 9.73759 29.42683 -47.99067 67.46585 
not 
assumed   
.331 1321
.221 
.740 9.73759 29.39225 -47.92299 67.39817 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
assumed 
21.2
16 
.000 2.637 1325 .008** 294170.38 111535.400 75365.143 
512975.6
23 
not 
assumed   
2.669 808.
985 .008
** 294170.38 110236.129 77787.806 
510552.9
60 
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Table 2.5 Independent samples test of 2010 
 
This table contains independent sample test of 2010. This is to test if the difference between 
firms with D&O insurance and without D&O insurance is statistically significant or not. Except 
standard deviation of EPS and standard deviation of short-term investment, other differences in 
volatility between firms with D&O insurance and firms without D&O insurance are not 
significant. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate 
significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 
 
Equal 
variances 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-taile
d) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
assumed 2.24 .135 -.566 1238 .572 -.24601 .43498 -1.09939 .60737 
not 
assumed   
-.525 
769.
158 
.600 -.24601 .46872 -1.16612 .67411 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
assumed .486 .486 1.109 1239 .267 .11487 .10354 -.08826 .31800 
not 
assumed   1.109 
1150
.816 .268 .11487 .10356 -.08832 .31806 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
assumed 
24.3
44 
.000 4.274 1239 .000*** .20419 .04778 .11045 .29792 
not 
assumed   
4.571 
1166
.695 
.000*** .20419 .04467 .11655 .29182 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
assumed 
2.03
1 .154 -.704 1239 .481 -21.09555 29.95663 -79.86687 37.67578 
not 
assumed   
-.650 
744.
272 
.516 -21.09555 32.46606 -84.83151 42.64041 
           
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
assumed 
12.4
98 
.000 2.008 1239 .045* 302732.75 150780.024 6920.3624 
598545.1
38 
not 
assumed   
2.280 
771.
783 .023
* 302732.75 132765.953 42107.542 
563357.9
58 
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Table 2.6 OLS regression of 2008: D&O purchase as proxy variable 
 
This table contains the result of regression of 2008 where D&O purchase is used as the proxy 
variable of D&O insurance, after fixing industry effect and White's heteroscedasticity correction. 
Standard deviation of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short-term investment are used as 
dependent variables in respective panels. This is to test how D&O purchase and control variables 
affect the volatility of returns of firms. Also, ROE and other variables’ average values are added 
as independent variables in respective panels as an underlying measure of central tendency. t 
statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 
0.1 % level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O purchase 0.0366 0.0440 0.0423 0.0688 0.429*** 
 (0.68) (0.78) (0.78) (1.74) (4.51) 
      
Capital 0.00335 -0.0465 0.118*** -0.0744*** 0.139*** 
 (0.12) (-1.55) (4.40) (-4.21) (3.54) 
      
Industry1 -0.193 -0.595* -0.432 -0.623* -0.664 
 (-0.87) (-2.19) (-1.44) (-2.16) (-1.47) 
      
Industry2 -0.0842 -0.109 -0.354 -0.250 -0.309 
 (-0.38) (-0.46) (-1.47) (-1.91) (-1.00) 
      
Industry3 0.374 0.526* 0.0415 -0.204 0.0694 
 (1.49) (2.19) (0.20) (-1.68) (0.25) 
      
Industry4 -0.0332 -0.00384 -0.120 -0.372* -0.379 
 (-0.15) (-0.02) (-0.61) (-2.46) (-1.44) 
      
Industry5 -0.0350 -0.327* -0.270 -0.273* -0.108 
 (-0.23) (-2.26) (-1.92) (-2.41) (-0.43) 
      
Industry6 0.384 0.546 0.350 -0.150 -0.903* 
 (1.33) (1.67) (1.04) (-1.02) (-2.26) 
      
Industry7 -0.636 -0.325 -0.345 -0.912* -0.254 
 (-1.31) (-0.80) (-1.20) (-2.29) (-0.63) 
      
Industry8 0.674** 0.594** 0.0577 -0.316* 0.181 
 (2.90) (2.65) (0.40) (-2.36) (0.37) 
      
Industry9 0.824*** 0.706*** 0.542** 0.0104 0.0853 
 (4.29) (3.32) (3.01) (0.08) (0.29) 
      
Industry10 
 
 
0.143 0.206 0.242 -0.200 -0.0683 
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 (0.50) (0.81) (1.09) (-1.14) (-0.19) 
      
Industry11 -0.0733 -0.0822 0.474 -0.438 0.612 
 (-0.26) (-0.33) (1.73) (-1.67) (1.06) 
      
Industry12 0.115 -0.208 -0.285 -0.0438 -0.519 
 (0.75) (-1.36) (-1.75) (-0.39) (-1.82) 
      
Industry13 -0.259 -0.258 -0.197 -0.0360 -0.105 
 (-0.80) (-0.84) (-0.75) (-0.22) (-0.35) 
      
Industry14 -0.510* -0.599* -0.710* -0.518* 0.311 
 (-1.99) (-2.38) (-2.14) (-2.35) (0.51) 
      
Industry15 0.336 -1.414*** -0.347 -0.0581 -0.964** 
 (1.32) (-4.69) (-1.47) (-0.39) (-2.70) 
      
Industry16 -0.105 -0.606* -0.588* -0.213 -0.260 
 (-0.39) (-2.28) (-2.35) (-1.10) (-0.68) 
      
Industry17 0.000975 -0.256 -0.258 -0.296* -0.479 
 (0.01) (-1.56) (-1.63) (-2.35) (-1.71) 
      
Industry18 0.0134 -0.138 -0.278 -0.161 -0.142 
 (0.09) (-0.84) (-1.78) (-1.42) (-0.49) 
      
Industry19 -0.422* -0.523** -0.573*** -0.217 -0.371 
 (-2.24) (-3.03) (-3.46) (-1.78) (-1.14) 
      
Industry20 -0.168 -0.684 -0.445 -0.498** -0.856 
 (-0.50) (-1.88) (-1.90) (-2.66) (-1.78) 
      
Industry21 0.0970 0.0729 -0.00812 0.137 -0.291 
 (0.83) (0.58) (-0.07) (1.39) (-1.20) 
      
Industry22 -0.143 -0.139 -0.286* 0.0165 -0.0579 
 (-1.22) (-1.10) (-2.28) (0.17) (-0.24) 
      
Industry23 0.130 0.157 0.117 -0.0903 -0.0233 
 (0.98) (1.22) (1.01) (-0.87) (-0.10) 
      
Industry24 -0.223 -0.245 -0.167 -0.0666 -0.194 
 (-1.62) (-1.69) (-1.27) (-0.62) (-0.83) 
      
Industry25 0.0810 0.0367 -0.268* -0.158 -0.137 
 (0.73) (0.33) (-2.45) (-1.73) (-0.63) 
      
Industry26 0.0337 -0.176 -0.270 0.0445 -0.00200 
 (0.21) (-1.25) (-1.82) (0.40) (-0.01) 
      
Industry27 0.0407 0.0161 -0.131 0.0139 -0.00992 
 
 
(0.22) (0.08) (-0.74) (0.10) (-0.03) 
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ROE 
 
0.128*** 
    
 (4.71)     
      
Remuneration  -0.0804* -0.0351 -0.145*** 0.0848*** 0.0356 
 (-2.10) (-1.07) (-4.22) (4.07) (0.66) 
      
Director  -0.0223 -0.00789 -0.0150 0.00206 -0.00474 
 (-0.88) (-0.41) (-0.98) (0.19) (-0.26) 
      
Independent director 0.0226 0.0172 0.0670** 0.0302* 0.0172 
 (1.04) (0.76) (3.28) (2.08) (0.52) 
      
Controlled director -0.000288 0.00289 -0.0170 -0.00691 -0.00377 
 (-0.01) (0.16) (-1.00) (-0.58) (-0.14) 
      
Shares held by director -0.00382 -0.000451 -0.00496* 0.00239 -0.00213 
 (-1.80) (-0.21) (-2.37) (1.67) (-0.65) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
0.00342 0.00433 -0.00299 0.00265 0.00394 
(1.34) (1.78) (-1.11) (1.50) (0.77) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.0812 0.0445 -0.0397 -0.0633 0.159 
 (1.24) (0.72) (-0.60) (-1.23) (1.53) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0831 0.0369 0.0850 -0.119* -0.0991 
 (1.10) (0.49) (1.10) (-2.37) (-0.88) 
      
Controlled CEO -0.0576 -0.0670 0.0297 -0.00967 -0.0935 
 (-0.88) (-1.08) (0.46) (-0.21) (-0.87) 
      
Controlled financial manager -0.223 -0.235 -0.0576 0.0268 0.0783 
(-1.56) (-1.86) (-0.51) (0.33) (0.42) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
-0.0266 -0.0884 -0.0370 -0.0300 -0.0512 
(-0.49) (-1.65) (-0.68) (-0.75) (-0.54) 
      
Litigation  -0.0130 -0.0180 0.0303 0.0533 0.0526 
 (-0.38) (-0.56) (0.98) (1.95) (1.33) 
      
ROA  0.103*    
  (2.54)    
      
EPS   0.293***   
   (11.03)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      1.248***  
    (24.70)  
      
Short-term investment      0.976*** 
     (89.09) 
      
Constant  1.737** 1.220* -0.161 -2.126*** -2.090* 
 (3.07) (2.25) (-0.31) (-6.62) (-2.55) 
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N 842 920 911 1217 931 
R2 0.1511 0.2657 0.3265 0.5647 0.9273 
 
  
Table 2.6 (cont.) 
142 
 
Table 2.7 Bootstrapping of 2008: D&O purchase as proxy variable 
 
This table reports the result of bootstrap of previous OLS regression in 2.2.6.1. Generally, they 
conclude similar results and D&O insurance purchase is not significant in all regressions. t 
statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 
0.1 % level.    
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O purchase 0.0366 0.0440 0.0423 0.0688 0.429*** 
 (0.68) (0.78) (0.78) (1.74) (4.51) 
      
Capital 0.00335 -0.0465 0.118*** -0.0744*** 0.139*** 
 (0.12) (-1.55) (4.40) (-4.18) (3.54) 
      
Industry1 -0.193 -0.595* -0.432 -0.623* -0.664 
 (-0.81) (-2.05) (-1.33) (-1.97) (-1.38) 
      
Industry2 -0.0842 -0.109 -0.354 -0.250 -0.309 
 (-0.38) (-0.46) (-1.46) (-1.88) (-0.98) 
      
Industry3 0.374 0.526* 0.0415 -0.204 0.0694 
 (1.46) (2.18) (0.19) (-1.66) (0.25) 
      
Industry4 -0.0332 -0.00384 -0.120 -0.372* -0.379 
 (-0.15) (-0.02) (-0.60) (-2.44) (-1.46) 
      
Industry5 -0.0350 -0.327* -0.270 -0.273* -0.108 
 (-0.24) (-2.28) (-1.95) (-2.40) (-0.43) 
      
Industry6 0.384 0.546 0.350 -0.150 -0.903* 
 (1.22) (1.57) (0.99) (-1.01) (-2.23) 
      
Industry7 -0.636 -0.325 -0.345 -0.912* -0.254 
 (-1.14) (-0.70) (-1.07) (-1.98) (-0.57) 
      
Industry8 0.674** 0.594* 0.0577 -0.316* 0.181 
 (2.67) (2.42) (0.36) (-2.18) (0.33) 
      
Industry9 0.824*** 0.706*** 0.542** 0.0104 0.0853 
 (4.30) (3.34) (2.99) (0.08) (0.28) 
      
Industry10 0.143 0.206 0.242 -0.200 -0.0683 
 (0.47) (0.77) (1.02) (-1.10) (-0.18) 
      
Industry11 -0.0733 -0.0822 0.474 -0.438 0.612 
 (-0.23) (-0.29) (1.56) (-1.50) (0.97) 
      
Industry12 0.115 -0.208 -0.285 -0.0438 -0.519 
 (0.76) (-1.36) (-1.74) (-0.39) (-1.83) 
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Industry13 -0.259 -0.258 -0.197 -0.0360 -0.105 
 (-0.79) (-0.85) (-0.73) (-0.22) (-0.35) 
      
Industry14 -0.510 -0.599* -0.710* -0.518* 0.311 
 (-1.88) (-2.28) (-1.99) (-2.27) (0.48) 
      
Industry15 0.336 -1.414*** -0.347 -0.0581 -0.964** 
 (1.32) (-4.67) (-1.46) (-0.39) (-2.74) 
      
Industry16 -0.105 -0.606* -0.588* -0.213 -0.260 
 (-0.38) (-2.19) (-2.29) (-1.08) (-0.65) 
      
Industry17 0.000975 -0.256 -0.258 -0.296* -0.479 
 (0.01) (-1.58) (-1.65) (-2.33) (-1.70) 
      
Industry18 0.0134 -0.138 -0.278 -0.161 -0.142 
 (0.09) (-0.85) (-1.78) (-1.42) (-0.48) 
      
Industry19 -0.422* -0.523** -0.573*** -0.217 -0.371 
 (-2.26) (-3.03) (-3.48) (-1.78) (-1.14) 
      
Industry20 -0.168 -0.684 -0.445 -0.498** -0.856 
 (-0.49) (-1.82) (-1.84) (-2.59) (-1.69) 
      
Industry21 0.0970 0.0729 -0.00812 0.137 -0.291 
 (0.85) (0.59) (-0.07) (1.39) (-1.21) 
      
Industry22 -0.143 -0.139 -0.286* 0.0165 -0.0579 
 (-1.24) (-1.12) (-2.31) (0.18) (-0.24) 
      
Industry23 0.130 0.157 0.117 -0.0903 -0.0233 
 (1.00) (1.22) (1.00) (-0.87) (-0.10) 
      
Industry24 -0.223 -0.245 -0.167 -0.0666 -0.194 
 (-1.66) (-1.72) (-1.27) (-0.62) (-0.84) 
      
Industry25 0.0810 0.0367 -0.268* -0.158 -0.137 
 (0.74) (0.33) (-2.47) (-1.74) (-0.64) 
      
Industry26 0.0337 -0.176 -0.270 0.0445 -0.00200 
 (0.21) (-1.24) (-1.83) (0.41) (-0.01) 
      
Industry27 0.0407 0.0161 -0.131 0.0139 -0.00992 
 (0.22) (0.08) (-0.75) (0.10) (-0.03) 
      
ROE 0.128***     
 (4.68)     
      
Remuneration  -0.0804* -0.0351 -0.145*** 0.0848*** 0.0356 
 (-2.08) (-1.06) (-4.22) (4.03) (0.66) 
      
Director  -0.0223 -0.00789 -0.0150 0.00206 -0.00474 
 (-0.90) (-0.41) (-0.98) (0.20) (-0.26) 
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Independent director 0.0226 0.0172 0.0670** 0.0302* 0.0172 
 (1.03) (0.77) (3.24) (2.09) (0.51) 
      
Controlled director -0.000288 0.00289 -0.0170 -0.00691 -0.00377 
 (-0.01) (0.16) (-0.96) (-0.56) (-0.13) 
      
Shares held by director -0.00382 -0.000451 -0.00496* 0.00239 -0.00213 
 (-1.81) (-0.22) (-2.37) (1.65) (-0.64) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
0.00342 0.00433 -0.00299 0.00265 0.00394 
(1.35) (1.76) (-1.10) (1.49) (0.77) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.0812 0.0445 -0.0397 -0.0633 0.159 
 (1.22) (0.71) (-0.61) (-1.22) (1.51) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0831 0.0369 0.0850 -0.119* -0.0991 
 (1.09) (0.49) (1.12) (-2.36) (-0.88) 
      
Controlled CEO -0.0576 -0.0670 0.0297 -0.00967 -0.0935 
 (-0.87) (-1.09) (0.46) (-0.21) (-0.87) 
      
Controlled financial manager -0.223 -0.235 -0.0576 0.0268 0.0783 
 (-1.54) (-1.80) (-0.50) (0.32) (0.41) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
-0.0266 -0.0884 -0.0370 -0.0300 -0.0512 
 (-0.49) (-1.64) (-0.67) (-0.75) (-0.54) 
      
Litigation  -0.0130 -0.0180 0.0303 0.0533 0.0526 
 (-0.30) (-0.45) (0.77) (1.91) (1.04) 
      
ROA  0.103*    
  (2.57)    
      
EPS   0.293***   
   (11.07)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      1.248***  
    (24.63)  
      
Short-term investment      0.976*** 
     (89.93) 
      
Constant  1.737** 1.220* -0.161 -2.126*** -2.090* 
 (3.05) (2.26) (-0.31) (-6.59) (-2.56) 
N 842 920 911 1217 931 
R2 0.1511 0.2657 0.3265 0.5647 0.9273 
Adj-R2 0.1065 0.2305 0.2940 0.5492 0.9239 
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Table 2.8 OLS regression of 2008: D&O coverage as proxy variable 
 
This table contains the result of regression of 2008 where log of D&O coverage is used as the 
proxy variable of D&O insurance, after fixing industry effect and White's heteroscedasticity 
correction. Standard deviation of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short-term investment 
are used as dependent variables in respective panels. This is to test how D&O coverage and 
control variables affect the volatility of returns of firms. Also, ROE and other variables’ average 
values are added as independent variables in respective panels as an underlying measure of 
central tendency. t statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance 
at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate 
significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O coverage 0.0136 0.0872* 0.0546 0.0115 0.0608 
 (0.42) (2.36) (1.55) (0.48) (1.11) 
      
Capital -0.0783* -0.139*** 0.0584 -0.0771** 0.0716 
 (-2.46) (-3.66) (1.62) (-3.08) (1.35) 
      
Industry1 -0.515* -1.015* -1.068** -0.575** -0.626 
 (-2.22) (-2.11) (-3.30) (-2.69) (-1.55) 
      
Industry2 0.331 0.0722 -0.384 0.0849 0.392 
 (1.52) (0.23) (-0.72) (0.45) (1.04) 
      
Industry3 0.371 0.921* 0.363 -0.255 0.0675 
 (0.74) (2.03) (1.44) (-1.51) (0.16) 
      
Industry4 0.871*** 0.787*** 0.927*** 0.637*** 0.569* 
 (5.64) (5.27) (6.23) (4.12) (2.10) 
      
Industry5 0.0243 -0.375 -0.274 -0.212 -0.105 
 (0.10) (-1.34) (-1.39) (-1.17) (-0.27) 
      
Industry6 0.627 0.652 -0.0245 0.423* -0.617 
 (1.11) (1.16) (-0.11) (2.34) (-0.79) 
      
Industry7  -0.0512  -2.345*** 0.554 
  (-0.22)  (-14.40) (1.45) 
      
Industry8 0.151 0.00935 -0.170 -0.242 0.704** 
 (0.57) (0.04) (-0.75) (-1.11) (2.82) 
      
Industry9 0.682 0.440 0.145 0.0903 0.402 
 (1.72) (0.90) (0.50) (0.46) (0.72) 
      
Industry10 0.336 0.427 0.285 -0.218 0.0721 
 (0.95) 
 
(1.22) (1.43) (-0.76) (0.07) 
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Industry11 0.276 -0.179 0.202 -1.127***  
 (1.35) (-1.10) (1.21) (-8.05)  
      
Industry12 0.151 -0.168 -0.433 -0.0249 -0.521 
 (0.73) (-0.65) (-1.05) (-0.11) (-0.88) 
      
Industry13 0.318 -0.143 0.284 0.0481 -0.0817 
 (0.90) (-0.32) (0.77) (0.20) (-0.17) 
      
Industry14  -1.295***  -1.116***  
  (-7.79)  (-8.06)  
      
Industry15 0.600* -1.280*** -0.162 0.0774 -0.879 
 (2.00) (-3.61) (-0.55) (0.38) (-1.90) 
      
Industry16 -0.104 -0.677* -0.815 -0.196 -0.272 
 (-0.39) (-2.42) (-1.96) (-0.55) (-0.33) 
      
Industry17 0.00295 -0.290 -0.299 -0.387* -0.410 
 (0.02) (-1.28) (-1.51) (-2.30) (-1.20) 
      
Industry18 0.102 -0.335 -0.0466 -0.269 -0.537 
 (0.50) (-1.08) (-0.15) (-1.50) (-1.13) 
      
Industry19 -0.401 -0.580* -0.663** -0.200 -0.301 
 (-1.75) (-2.40) (-2.67) (-1.29) (-0.79) 
      
Industry20 0.0505 -0.550 -0.594 -0.211 -0.988** 
 (0.09) (-0.96) (-1.84) (-0.62) (-2.92) 
      
Industry21 0.138 0.0496 -0.134 0.205 -0.229 
 (0.95) (0.30) (-1.00) (1.65) (-0.81) 
      
Industry22 -0.0147 -0.183 -0.310* -0.0123 0.0162 
 (-0.10) (-1.11) (-2.10) (-0.10) (0.06) 
      
Industry23 0.207 0.187 0.0353 -0.168 -0.216 
 (1.24) (1.14) (0.25) (-1.28) (-0.81) 
      
Industry24 -0.143 -0.234 -0.303 -0.181 -0.373 
 (-0.81) (-1.27) (-1.94) (-1.35) (-1.37) 
      
Industry25 0.137 0.0516 -0.416** -0.146 -0.182 
 (0.91) (0.35) (-3.04) (-1.23) (-0.72) 
      
Industry26 0.0432 -0.188 -0.325 0.103 -0.00238 
 (0.21) (-1.09) (-1.89) (0.72) (-0.01) 
      
Industry27 -0.177 -0.176 -0.314 -0.0504 -0.00802 
 (-0.80) (-0.63) (-1.41) (-0.31) (-0.02) 
      
ROE 0.0623     
 (1.93)     
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Remuneration  -0.0139 -0.00677 -0.159*** 0.104*** 0.0376 
 (-0.33) (-0.16) (-3.32) (3.56) (0.50) 
      
Director  -0.00939 0.00143 -0.0154 -0.0119 -0.0204 
 (-0.58) (0.08) (-0.78) (-0.97) (-0.67) 
      
Independent director 0.00953 0.0109 0.0743* 0.0335 0.0523 
 (0.36) (0.35) (2.59) (1.77) (1.20) 
      
Controlled director 0.0266 0.0217 0.00844 0.0240 0.0272 
 (0.90) (0.66) (0.29) (1.15) (0.56) 
      
Shares held by director 0.00142 0.00241 -0.00397 0.00359 -0.00266 
 (0.54) (0.84) (-1.28) (1.80) (-0.56) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
0.00464 0.00439 -0.00429 0.00174 0.00323 
(1.34) (1.22) (-1.07) (0.74) (0.35) 
      
Duality of CEO and 
COB 
0.0546 -0.0112 -0.0853 0.0523 0.268 
 (0.61) (-0.13) (-0.91) (0.80) (1.77) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0740 -0.0551 -0.0343 -0.222** -0.263 
 (0.79) (-0.56) (-0.32) (-3.20) (-1.72) 
      
Controlled CEO -0.0490 -0.0259 0.0827 -0.0421 -0.134 
 (-0.55) (-0.31) (0.88) (-0.65) (-0.79) 
      
Controlled financial 
manager 
-0.179 -0.135 0.0385 0.0648 0.0675 
(-0.94) (-0.68) (0.20) (0.58) (0.22) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
-0.0745 -0.0921 -0.0333 0.0418 -0.0465 
(-1.04) (-1.26) (-0.43) (0.81) (-0.37) 
      
Litigation  -0.0127 -0.0228 0.0438 0.0403 0.0305 
 (-0.22) (-0.39) (0.73) (1.03) (0.37) 
      
ROA  0.0768    
  (1.27)    
      
EPS   0.315***   
   (8.71)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      1.163***  
    (16.74)  
      
Short-term investment      0.976*** 
     (68.00) 
      
Constant  1.426 0.499 0.0695 -2.202*** -1.611 
 (1.80) (0.53) (0.08) (-4.22) (-1.07) 
N 438 476 467 603 474 
R2 0.1130 0.3316 0.3526 0.5938 0.9333 
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Table 2.9 Bootstrap of 2008: D&O coverage as proxy variable 
 
This table reports the result of bootstrap of previous OLS regression. Generally, they conclude 
similar results and D&O insurance coverage is not significant in all regressions. t statistics is 
reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level.    
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O coverage 0.0136 0.0872* 0.0546 0.0115 0.0608 
 (0.41) (2.35) (1.54) (0.48) (1.06) 
      
Capital -0.0783* -0.139*** 0.0584 -0.0771** 0.0716 
 (-2.34) (-3.65) (1.64) (-3.07) (1.31) 
      
Industry1 -0.515* -1.015* -1.068** -0.575* -0.626 
 (-2.23) (-2.00) (-3.04) (-2.52) (-1.31) 
      
Industry2 0.331 0.0722 -0.384 0.0849 0.392 
 (1.38) (0.22) (-0.65) (0.42) (0.97) 
      
Industry3 0.371 0.921 0.363 -0.255 0.0675 
 (0.68) (1.86) (1.36) (-1.45) (0.16) 
      
Industry4 0.871*** 0.787*** 0.927*** 0.637*** 0.569 
 (5.69) (5.33) (6.40) (3.89) (1.87) 
      
Industry5 0.0243 -0.375 -0.274 -0.212 -0.105 
 (0.10) (-1.33) (-1.35) (-1.14) (-0.26) 
      
Industry6 0.627 0.652 -0.0245 0.423* -0.617 
 (0.94) (1.06) (-0.09) (2.11) (-0.67) 
      
Industry7  -0.0512  -2.345*** 0.554 
  (-0.21)  (-13.68) (1.36) 
      
Industry8 0.151 0.00935 -0.170 -0.242 0.704** 
 (0.55) (0.04) (-0.74) (-1.06) (2.66) 
      
Industry9 0.682 0.440 0.145 0.0903 0.402 
 (1.63) (0.85) (0.47) (0.43) (0.67) 
      
Industry10 0.336 0.427 0.285 -0.218 0.0721 
 (0.92) (1.13) (1.31) (-0.71) (0.07) 
      
Industry11 0.276 -0.179 0.202 -1.127***  
 (1.38) (-1.11) (1.25) (-8.25)  
      
Industry12 0.151 -0.168 -0.433 -0.0249 -0.521 
 (0.69) (-0.62) (-0.94) (-0.11) (-0.80) 
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Industry13 0.318 -0.143 0.284 0.0481 -0.0817 
 (0.83) (-0.30) (0.70) (0.18) (-0.16) 
      
Industry14  -1.295***  -1.116***  
  (-7.73)  (-8.16)  
      
Industry15 0.600* -1.280*** -0.162 0.0774 -0.879 
 (1.98) (-3.53) (-0.55) (0.39) (-1.89) 
      
Industry16 -0.104 -0.677* -0.815 -0.196 -0.272 
 (-0.35) (-2.19) (-1.71) (-0.49) (-0.30) 
      
Industry17 0.00295 -0.290 -0.299 -0.387* -0.410 
 (0.01) (-1.30) (-1.49) (-2.36) (-1.17) 
      
Industry18 0.102 -0.335 -0.0466 -0.269 -0.537 
 (0.46) (-0.99) (-0.14) (-1.39) (-1.10) 
      
Industry19 -0.401 -0.580* -0.663** -0.200 -0.301 
 (-1.72) (-2.42) (-2.67) (-1.29) (-0.78) 
      
Industry20 0.0505 -0.550 -0.594 -0.211 -0.988** 
 (0.08) (-0.92) (-1.78) (-0.59) (-2.93) 
      
Industry21 0.138 0.0496 -0.134 0.205 -0.229 
 (0.98) (0.31) (-1.04) (1.62) (-0.80) 
      
Industry22 -0.0147 -0.183 -0.310* -0.0123 0.0162 
 (-0.10) (-1.11) (-2.21) (-0.10) (0.06) 
      
Industry23 0.207 0.187 0.0353 -0.168 -0.216 
 (1.27) (1.19) (0.26) (-1.30) (-0.81) 
      
Industry24 -0.143 -0.234 -0.303* -0.181 -0.373 
 (-0.80) (-1.28) (-2.03) (-1.38) (-1.35) 
      
Industry25 0.137 0.0516 -0.416** -0.146 -0.182 
 (0.95) (0.34) (-3.10) (-1.25) (-0.71) 
      
Industry26 0.0432 -0.188 -0.325 0.103 -0.00238 
 (0.22) (-1.11) (-1.89) (0.73) (-0.01) 
      
Industry27 -0.177 -0.176 -0.314 -0.0504 -0.00802 
 (-0.81) (-0.64) (-1.46) (-0.32) (-0.02) 
      
ROE 0.0623     
 (1.91)     
      
Remuneration  -0.0139 -0.00677 -0.159** 0.104*** 0.0376 
 (-0.31) (-0.16) (-3.26) (3.52) (0.50) 
      
Director  -0.00939 0.00143 -0.0154 -0.0119 -0.0204 
 (-0.55) (0.08) (-0.75) (-0.96) (-0.64) 
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Independent director 0.00953 0.0109 0.0743* 0.0335 0.0523 
 (0.36) (0.36) (2.54) (1.75) (1.17) 
      
Controlled director 0.0266 0.0217 0.00844 0.0240 0.0272 
 (0.88) (0.68) (0.29) (1.13) (0.53) 
      
Shares held by director 0.00142 0.00241 -0.00397 0.00359 -0.00266 
 (0.52) (0.85) (-1.27) (1.77) (-0.55) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
0.00464 0.00439 -0.00429 0.00174 0.00323 
(1.33) (1.22) (-1.07) (0.72) (0.36) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.0546 -0.0112 -0.0853 0.0523 0.268 
 (0.61) (-0.13) (-0.90) (0.80) (1.72) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0740 -0.0551 -0.0343 -0.222** -0.263 
 (0.75) (-0.56) (-0.32) (-3.26) (-1.74) 
      
Controlled CEO -0.0490 -0.0259 0.0827 -0.0421 -0.134 
 (-0.54) (-0.30) (0.88) (-0.64) (-0.78) 
      
Controlled financial 
manager 
-0.179 -0.135 0.0385 0.0648 0.0675 
 (-0.91) (-0.63) (0.19) (0.55) (0.20) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
-0.0745 -0.0921 -0.0333 0.0418 -0.0465 
 (-1.07) (-1.31) (-0.42) (0.82) (-0.36) 
      
Litigation  -0.0127 -0.0228 0.0438 0.0403 0.0305 
 (-0.22) (-0.37) (0.68) (1.01) (0.35) 
      
ROA  0.0768    
  (1.26)    
      
EPS   0.315***   
   (8.66)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      1.163***  
    (16.80)  
      
Short-term investment      0.976*** 
     (66.53) 
      
Constant  1.426 0.499 0.0695 -2.202*** -1.611 
 (1.79) (0.54) (0.08) (-4.09) (-1.06) 
N 438 476 467 603 474 
R2 0.1130 0.3316 0.3526 0.5938 0.9333 
Adj-R2 0.0236 0.2668 0.2918 0.5634 0.9271 
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Table 2.10 OLS regression of 2009: D&O purchase as proxy variable 
 
This table contains the result of regression of 2009 where D&O purchase is used as the proxy 
variable of D&O insurance, after fixing industry effect and White's heteroscedasticity correction. 
Standard deviation of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short-term investment are used as 
dependent variables in respective panels. This is to test how D&O purchase and control variables 
affect the volatility of returns of firms. Also, ROE and other variables’ average values are added 
as independent variables in respective panels as an underlying measure of central tendency. t 
statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 
0.1 % level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O purchase 0.0552 0.0818 0.0110 0.0349 0.236* 
 (0.95) (1.61) (0.16) (0.88) (2.23) 
      
Capital -0.0485* -0.0826*** 0.0781** -0.0738*** 0.101* 
 (-2.24) (-4.10) (2.77) (-4.56) (2.50) 
      
Industry1 -0.460 -0.498 -1.138** -0.239 -0.775 
 (-1.41) (-1.59) (-2.92) (-1.90) (-1.27) 
      
Industry2 -0.191 -0.0909 -0.355 -0.114 0.451 
 (-0.80) (-0.50) (-1.82) (-0.84) (1.08) 
      
Industry3 0.241 0.265 -0.0133 -0.229 0.0170 
 (1.62) (1.88) (-0.05) (-1.63) (0.05) 
      
Industry4 -0.287 -0.191 -0.656** -0.285 -0.0413 
 (-1.77) (-1.31) (-3.13) (-1.83) (-0.15) 
      
Industry5 -0.00370 0.0198 -0.0540 -0.108 0.309 
 (-0.03) (0.15) (-0.31) (-0.97) (1.12) 
      
Industry6 0.162 0.259 -0.192 0.00925 0.294 
 (0.87) (1.41) (-0.72) (0.05) (0.71) 
      
Industry7 0.629*** 0.864*** 0.120 -1.297** 0.144 
 (3.66) (4.38) (0.66) (-3.25) (0.62) 
      
Industry8 -0.0630 -0.0258 0.0632 -0.483 0.852 
 (-0.11) (-0.06) (0.28) (-1.69) (1.65) 
      
Industry9 0.849*** 0.673*** 0.485 0.0343 0.766** 
 (3.72) (3.34) (1.67) (0.27) (2.60) 
      
Industry10 0.0212 0.200 0.110 -0.149 0.655 
 (0.09) (0.91) (0.31) (-0.55) (1.53) 
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Industry11 -0.168 -0.0237 0.305 -0.391 1.198** 
 (-0.40) (-0.08) (1.35) (-1.02) (2.78) 
      
Industry12 0.228 0.0771 -0.224 0.160 0.541 
 (1.56) (0.58) (-1.29) (1.37) (1.87) 
      
Industry13 -0.130 0.0170 -0.224 -0.0702 0.467 
 (-0.42) (0.08) (-0.66) (-0.35) (1.30) 
      
Industry14 -0.0924 0.0372 -1.035*** -0.488 -1.304 
 (-0.40) (0.17) (-4.07) (-1.67) (-0.93) 
      
Industry15 0.203 -0.686*** -0.282 0.00244 0.281 
 (1.02) (-3.49) (-1.15) (0.02) (0.87) 
      
Industry16 -0.140 -0.0785 -0.952** -0.164 0.422 
 (-0.57) (-0.30) (-3.04) (-1.01) (1.15) 
      
Industry17 -0.277 -0.214 -0.671*** -0.166 0.267 
 (-1.71) (-1.40) (-3.56) (-1.13) (0.89) 
      
Industry18 -0.376** -0.244 -0.396* -0.488*** 0.265 
 (-2.62) (-1.82) (-2.51) (-3.42) (0.86) 
      
Industry19 -0.416* -0.297 -0.752*** 0.148 0.226 
 (-2.50) (-1.81) (-4.17) (1.17) (0.64) 
      
Industry20 -0.396 -0.473 -1.080** -0.326 0.435 
 (-1.14) (-1.37) (-2.92) (-1.92) (0.95) 
      
Industry21 0.179 0.260* -0.200 0.192 0.450 
 (1.40) (2.28) (-1.34) (1.84) (1.79) 
      
Industry22 -0.126 -0.00511 -0.311* 0.168 0.198 
 (-1.07) (-0.05) (-2.24) (1.61) (0.81) 
      
Industry23 0.206 0.303** 0.214 0.226* 0.817*** 
 (1.55) (2.60) (1.22) (2.17) (3.47) 
      
Industry24 -0.164 -0.0940 -0.308 0.0867 -0.196 
 (-1.13) (-0.68) (-1.93) (0.76) (-0.57) 
      
Industry25 -0.0212 0.0307 -0.207 -0.0729 0.254 
 (-0.19) (0.30) (-1.62) (-0.75) (1.10) 
      
Industry26 -0.243 -0.322* -0.492** 0.132 0.540 
 (-1.45) (-2.10) (-2.83) (1.21) (1.86) 
      
Industry27 -0.120 0.0189 -0.401 0.267* 0.370 
 (-0.56) (0.09) (-1.58) (2.18) (0.93) 
      
ROE 0.187***     
 (6.68)     
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Remuneration  -0.0481** -0.0335* -0.00352 0.0294 0.0622 
 (-2.91) (-2.40) (-0.19) (1.74) (1.24) 
      
Director  -0.0190 -0.00743 -0.0183 -0.00159 0.00737 
 (-1.13) (-0.51) (-0.99) (-0.16) (0.38) 
      
Independent director -0.0171 -0.0154 0.0749* 0.0327 0.0493 
 (-0.72) (-0.70) (2.38) (1.89) (1.12) 
      
Controlled director -0.0408* -0.0260 -0.0121 -0.0384** -0.0125 
 (-2.03) (-1.49) (-0.54) (-2.70) (-0.40) 
      
Shares held by director 0.00172 0.00183 0.00297 0.00303* -0.00310 
 (0.90) (1.13) (1.19) (2.27) (-0.91) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
0.00427 0.00505* 0.00395 0.00194 0.00167 
(1.58) (2.26) (1.33) (1.09) (0.35) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.0281 0.0464 0.0396 0.0310 0.0101 
 (0.42) (0.81) (0.54) (0.64) (0.08) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0202 0.0231 0.212** -0.0308 -0.0703 
 (0.29) (0.39) (2.61) (-0.58) (-0.54) 
      
Controlled CEO 0.104 0.0870 0.0297 -0.0523 -0.156 
 (1.64) (1.60) (0.40) (-1.11) (-1.25) 
      
Controlled financial 
manager 
-0.0607 0.0467 -0.262 0.0638 -0.0216 
 (-0.45) (0.40) (-1.63) (0.72) (-0.11) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
0.000485 -0.0230 -0.0554 -0.0785 -0.0905 
 (0.01) (-0.45) (-0.83) (-1.93) (-0.86) 
      
Litigation  -0.0116 -0.00916 -0.00262 0.0272* 0.107 
 (-0.19) (-0.25) (-0.04) (1.96) (1.60) 
      
ROA  0.208***    
  (7.17)    
      
EPS   0.257***   
   (7.58)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      1.305***  
    (27.44)  
      
Short-term investment      0.839*** 
     (70.84) 
      
Constant  1.681*** 1.334*** -2.190*** -1.611*** -1.736* 
 (4.03) (3.53) (-4.10) (-5.06) (-2.31) 
N 971 1033 845 1286 940 
R2 0.1890 0.3003 0.2699 0.5925 0.8828 
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Table 2.11 Bootstrap of 2009: D&O purchase as proxy variable 
 
This table reports the result of bootstrap of previous OLS regression. Generally, they conclude 
similar results and D&O insurance purchase is not significant in all regressions. t statistics is 
reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level.    
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O purchase 0.0552 0.0818 0.0110 0.0349 0.236* 
 (0.94) (1.60) (0.16) (0.88) (2.20) 
      
Capital -0.0485* -0.0826*** 0.0781** -0.0738*** 0.101* 
 (-2.16) (-4.02) (2.68) (-4.42) (2.50) 
      
Industry1 -0.460 -0.498 -1.138** -0.239 -0.775 
 (-1.28) (-1.44) (-2.59) (-1.79) (-1.16) 
      
Industry2 -0.191 -0.0909 -0.355 -0.114 0.451 
 (-0.80) (-0.49) (-1.78) (-0.85) (1.06) 
      
Industry3 0.241 0.265 -0.0133 -0.229 0.0170 
 (1.59) (1.85) (-0.05) (-1.63) (0.05) 
      
Industry4 -0.287 -0.191 -0.656** -0.285 -0.0413 
 (-1.79) (-1.33) (-3.08) (-1.85) (-0.15) 
      
Industry5 -0.00370 0.0198 -0.0540 -0.108 0.309 
 (-0.03) (0.15) (-0.31) (-0.98) (1.12) 
      
Industry6 0.162 0.259 -0.192 0.00925 0.294 
 (0.83) (1.39) (-0.67) (0.05) (0.68) 
      
Industry7 0.629** 0.864*** 0.120 -1.297** 0.144 
 (3.18) (3.86) (0.56) (-2.87) (0.58) 
      
Industry8 -0.0630 -0.0258 0.0632 -0.483 0.852 
 (-0.10) (-0.06) (0.26) (-1.57) (1.48) 
      
Industry9 0.849*** 0.673*** 0.485 0.0343 0.766** 
 (3.72) (3.36) (1.59) (0.27) (2.59) 
      
Industry10 0.0212 0.200 0.110 -0.149 0.655 
 (0.09) (0.89) (0.30) (-0.54) (1.47) 
      
Industry11 -0.168 -0.0237 0.305 -0.391 1.198* 
 (-0.35) (-0.07) (1.17) (-0.90) (2.48) 
      
Industry12 0.228 0.0771 -0.224 0.160 0.541 
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 (1.57) (0.59) (-1.29) (1.38) (1.86) 
 
 
      
Industry13 -0.130 0.0170 -0.224 -0.0702 0.467 
 (-0.42) (0.08) (-0.64) (-0.35) (1.29) 
      
Industry14 -0.0924 0.0372 -1.035*** -0.488 -1.304 
 (-0.38) (0.17) (-3.86) (-1.63) (-0.88) 
      
Industry15 0.203 -0.686*** -0.282 0.00244 0.281 
 (1.03) (-3.48) (-1.14) (0.02) (0.86) 
      
Industry16 -0.140 -0.0785 -0.952** -0.164 0.422 
 (-0.54) (-0.30) (-2.87) (-0.98) (1.09) 
      
Industry17 -0.277 -0.214 -0.671*** -0.166 0.267 
 (-1.69) (-1.41) (-3.51) (-1.12) (0.89) 
      
Industry18 -0.376** -0.244 -0.396* -0.488*** 0.265 
 (-2.62) (-1.85) (-2.50) (-3.45) (0.85) 
      
Industry19 -0.416* -0.297 -0.752*** 0.148 0.226 
 (-2.51) (-1.83) (-4.15) (1.17) (0.62) 
      
Industry20 -0.396 -0.473 -1.080** -0.326 0.435 
 (-1.08) (-1.28) (-2.82) (-1.82) (0.89) 
      
Industry21 0.179 0.260* -0.200 0.192 0.450 
 (1.41) (2.27) (-1.34) (1.86) (1.80) 
      
Industry22 -0.126 -0.00511 -0.311* 0.168 0.198 
 (-1.08) (-0.05) (-2.23) (1.63) (0.81) 
      
Industry23 0.206 0.303** 0.214 0.226* 0.817*** 
 (1.56) (2.62) (1.21) (2.20) (3.47) 
      
Industry24 -0.164 -0.0940 -0.308 0.0867 -0.196 
 (-1.14) (-0.69) (-1.95) (0.76) (-0.57) 
      
Industry25 -0.0212 0.0307 -0.207 -0.0729 0.254 
 (-0.19) (0.30) (-1.65) (-0.76) (1.11) 
      
Industry26 -0.243 -0.322* -0.492** 0.132 0.540 
 (-1.44) (-2.10) (-2.79) (1.21) (1.84) 
      
Industry27 -0.120 0.0189 -0.401 0.267* 0.370 
 (-0.55) (0.09) (-1.58) (2.18) (0.92) 
      
ROE 0.187***     
 (6.71)     
      
Remuneration  -0.0481* -0.0335 -0.00352 0.0294 0.0622 
 (-2.29) (-1.95) (-0.14) (1.56) (1.19) 
      
Director  -0.0190 -0.00743 -0.0183 -0.00159 0.00737 
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 (-1.14) (-0.51) (-0.98) (-0.16) (0.37) 
 
 
      
Independent director -0.0171 -0.0154 0.0749* 0.0327 0.0493 
 (-0.72) (-0.70) (2.39) (1.89) (1.13) 
      
Controlled director -0.0408* -0.0260 -0.0121 -0.0384** -0.0125 
 (-2.01) (-1.48) (-0.53) (-2.65) (-0.39) 
      
Shares held by director 0.00172 0.00183 0.00297 0.00303* -0.00310 
 (0.90) (1.13) (1.19) (2.26) (-0.90) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
0.00427 0.00505* 0.00395 0.00194 0.00167 
(1.58) (2.22) (1.32) (1.08) (0.35) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.0281 0.0464 0.0396 0.0310 0.0101 
 (0.42) (0.81) (0.53) (0.65) (0.08) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0202 0.0231 0.212* -0.0308 -0.0703 
 (0.29) (0.39) (2.55) (-0.58) (-0.53) 
      
Controlled CEO 0.104 0.0870 0.0297 -0.0523 -0.156 
 (1.64) (1.56) (0.40) (-1.12) (-1.22) 
      
Controlled financial 
manager 
-0.0607 0.0467 -0.262 0.0638 -0.0216 
 (-0.44) (0.39) (-1.59) (0.71) (-0.11) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
0.000485 -0.0230 -0.0554 -0.0785 -0.0905 
 (0.01) (-0.45) (-0.82) (-1.94) (-0.86) 
      
Litigation  -0.0116 -0.00916 -0.00262 0.0272 0.107 
 (-0.19) (-0.24) (-0.04) (1.22) (1.51) 
      
ROA  0.208***    
  (7.19)    
      
EPS   0.257***   
   (7.45)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      1.305***  
    (27.14)  
      
Short-term investment      0.839*** 
     (69.68) 
      
Constant  1.681*** 1.334*** -2.190*** -1.611*** -1.736* 
 (3.83) (3.37) (-3.92) (-4.94) (-2.25) 
N 971 1033 845 1286 940 
R2 0.1890 0.3003 0.2699 0.5925 0.8828 
Adj-R2 0.1523 0.2706 0.2316 0.5788 0.8773 
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Table 2.12 OLS regression of 2009: D&O coverage as proxy variable 
 
This table contains the result of regression of 2009 where log of D&O coverage is used as the 
proxy variable of D&O insurance, after fixing industry effect and White's heteroscedasticity 
correction. Standard deviation of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short-term investment 
are used as dependent variables in respective panels. This is to test how D&O coverage and 
control variables affect the volatility of returns of firms. Also, ROE and other variables’ average 
values are added as independent variables in respective panels as an underlying measure of 
central tendency. t statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance 
at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate 
significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O coverage 0.0267 0.0318 0.0639 0.0602* 0.0490 
 (0.72) (0.99) (1.39) (2.42) (0.71) 
      
Capital -0.0501 -0.0864** 0.0161 -0.102*** 0.0909 
 (-1.52) (-2.83) (0.42) (-4.48) (1.79) 
      
Industry1 0.133 -0.276 -1.011 0.0278 -0.0978 
 (0.60) (-0.50) (-1.65) (0.18) (-0.09) 
      
Industry2 0.227 0.303* -0.400 -0.0499 0.735 
 (1.50) (2.12) (-1.34) (-0.22) (0.68) 
      
Industry3 0.426 0.374 0.589 -0.217 -0.302 
 (1.84) (1.95) (1.86) (-1.09) (-0.70) 
      
Industry4 -0.409 -0.533 -0.600 0.238 -0.266 
 (-0.60) (-1.12) (-0.65) (1.34) (-0.39) 
      
Industry5 -0.0316 -0.0432 -0.502 0.0183 0.00294 
 (-0.14) (-0.22) (-1.70) (0.11) (0.01) 
      
Industry6 -0.0925 0.113 -0.424 0.161 -1.102* 
 (-0.19) (0.25) (-1.10) (0.66) (-2.45) 
      
Industry7    -2.731***  
    (-16.31)  
      
Industry8 0.264 0.0424 -0.00681 -0.0172 1.656*** 
 (1.45) (0.14) (-0.03) (-0.04) (6.05) 
      
Industry9 0.764* 0.627 -0.118 0.149 0.708 
 (2.08) (1.67) (-0.21) (0.69) (1.44) 
      
Industry10 0.875*** 1.081*** 0.906*** 0.469 -0.215 
 (4.34) (5.14) (5.09) (1.86) (-0.56) 
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Industry11 1.024*** 0.648***  -0.910***  
 (5.61) (4.48)  (-6.35)  
      
Industry12 0.499 0.202 0.0646 0.0958 0.925* 
 (1.73) (0.97) (0.19) (0.47) (2.20) 
      
Industry13 0.0209 0.232 0.472 0.130 0.278 
 (0.06) (0.94) (1.09) (0.52) (0.63) 
      
Industry14    0.979*** 2.116*** 
    (6.46) (6.34) 
      
Industry15 0.375 -0.742** -0.0804 0.263 0.101 
 (1.41) (-2.89) (-0.27) (1.40) (0.24) 
      
Industry16 -0.0393 -0.0381 -0.417 0.162 1.317*** 
 (-0.17) (-0.16) (-1.71) (0.43) (4.40) 
      
Industry17 -0.145 -0.0709 -0.743*** 0.0118 0.289 
 (-0.60) (-0.35) (-3.37) (0.06) (0.84) 
      
Industry18 -0.154 -0.128 -0.575 -0.844** 0.159 
 (-0.60) (-0.49) (-1.73) (-2.98) (0.36) 
      
Industry19 -0.227 0.0700 -0.894*** 0.335* 0.0630 
 (-1.10) (0.36) (-4.44) (1.97) (0.13) 
      
Industry20 -0.0430 -0.297 -1.185*** -0.150 -0.682* 
 (-0.08) (-0.46) (-4.22) (-0.53) (-2.04) 
      
Industry21 0.295 0.374** -0.247 0.304* 0.593* 
 (1.82) (2.72) (-1.37) (2.26) (2.24) 
      
Industry22 -0.0180 0.0878 -0.357* 0.247 0.375 
 (-0.13) (0.74) (-2.28) (1.87) (1.43) 
      
Industry23 0.318 0.462*** 0.239 0.234 0.706** 
 (1.82) (3.34) (1.06) (1.68) (2.71) 
      
Industry24 -0.0503 0.0641 -0.318 0.134 -0.416 
 (-0.29) (0.40) (-1.69) (0.96) (-0.97) 
      
Industry25 0.0837 0.112 -0.168 0.0735 0.162 
 (0.58) (0.92) (-1.04) (0.57) (0.63) 
      
Industry26 -0.0520 -0.126 -0.359 0.212 0.291 
 (-0.28) (-0.76) (-1.95) (1.55) (0.82) 
      
Industry27 -0.199 -0.0410 -0.458 0.255 0.499 
 (-0.72) (-0.15) (-1.60) (1.55) (1.09) 
      
ROE 0.180***     
 (4.14)     
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Remuneration  -0.0459* -0.0326* -0.0240 0.0476** 0.0222 
 (-2.49) (-2.17) (-0.90) (2.60) (0.41) 
      
Director  -0.0115 0.00532 0.00257 -0.00225 -0.0242 
 (-0.63) (0.33) (0.15) (-0.21) (-0.83) 
      
Independent director -0.0387 -0.0334 0.0619 0.0247 0.116* 
 (-1.13) (-1.07) (1.53) (1.05) (1.98) 
      
Controlled director -0.00593 -0.00114 0.0519 -0.0119 -0.000535 
 (-0.18) (-0.04) (1.48) (-0.52) (-0.01) 
      
Shares held by director 0.00317 0.00100 -0.00121 0.00379* -0.00318 
 (1.21) (0.42) (-0.33) (2.00) (-0.67) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
0.00418 0.00453 -0.00230 0.000989 0.000115 
(0.93) (1.21) (-0.50) (0.41) (0.02) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.139 0.0426 -0.0543 0.0877 -0.177 
 (1.38) (0.50) (-0.55) (1.39) (-0.97) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0508 -0.0500 0.0187 -0.0887 -0.334* 
 (0.55) (-0.64) (0.18) (-1.34) (-2.07) 
      
Controlled CEO 0.0779 0.140 0.140 -0.118 0.0573 
 (0.86) (1.73) (1.41) (-1.82) (0.35) 
      
Controlled financial 
manager 
0.0722 0.105 -0.354 0.270* 0.672 
 (0.32) (0.48) (-1.36) (2.25) (1.84) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
-0.0337 -0.0361 -0.186* -0.0790 -0.0000765 
 (-0.41) (-0.51) (-2.08) (-1.51) (-0.00) 
      
Litigation  -0.0796 -0.0478 -0.0721 -0.00654 0.0758 
 (-1.54) (-1.19) (-0.95) (-0.19) (1.00) 
      
ROA  0.148***    
  (3.61)    
      
EPS   0.278***   
   (7.45)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      1.239***  
    (19.83)  
      
Short-term investment      0.842*** 
     (52.52) 
      
Constant  0.979 0.740 -1.957* -2.437*** -1.296 
 (1.44) (1.31) (-2.13) (-5.12) (-1.02) 
N 490 526 437 660 491 
R2 0.1610 0.3246 0.3037 0.6105 0.8966 
Table 2.12 (cont.) 
160 
 
 
Table 2.13 Bootstrap of 2009: D&O coverage as proxy variable 
 
This table reports the result of bootstrap of previous OLS regression. Generally, they conclude 
similar results and D&O insurance coverage is not significant in all regressions. t statistics is 
reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level.    
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O coverage 0.0267 0.0318 0.0639 0.0602* 0.0490 
 (0.71) (0.96) (1.36) (2.30) (0.68) 
      
Capital -0.0501 -0.0864** 0.0161 -0.102*** 0.0909 
 (-1.47) (-2.75) (0.39) (-4.27) (1.78) 
      
Industry1 0.133 -0.276 -1.011 0.0278 -0.0978 
 (0.52) (-0.45) (-1.49) (0.17) (-0.08) 
      
Industry2 0.227 0.303* -0.400 -0.0499 0.735 
 (1.41) (2.02) (-1.23) (-0.22) (0.60) 
      
Industry3 0.426 0.374 0.589 -0.217 -0.302 
 (1.81) (1.84) (1.74) (-1.05) (-0.67) 
      
Industry4 -0.409 -0.533 -0.600 0.238 -0.266 
 (-0.55) (-0.97) (-0.59) (1.21) (-0.33) 
      
Industry5 -0.0316 -0.0432 -0.502 0.0183 0.00294 
 (-0.14) (-0.21) (-1.67) (0.11) (0.01) 
      
Industry6 -0.0925 0.113 -0.424 0.161 -1.102* 
 (-0.16) (0.22) (-0.90) (0.57) (-2.23) 
      
Industry7    -2.731***  
    (-16.10)  
      
Industry8 0.264 0.0424 -0.00681 -0.0172 1.656*** 
 (1.43) (0.14) (-0.03) (-0.04) (5.68) 
      
Industry9 0.764* 0.627 -0.118 0.149 0.708 
 (2.01) (1.59) (-0.18) (0.69) (1.34) 
      
Industry10 0.875*** 1.081*** 0.906*** 0.469 -0.215 
 (3.94) (4.91) (4.18) (1.68) (-0.49) 
      
Industry11 1.024*** 0.648***  -0.910***  
 (5.66) (4.43)  (-6.42)  
      
Industry12 0.499 0.202 0.0646 0.0958 0.925* 
 (1.71) (0.94) (0.18) (0.46) (2.03) 
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Industry13 0.0209 0.232 0.472 0.130 0.278 
 (0.05) (0.86) (1.00) (0.50) (0.61) 
      
Industry14    0.979*** 2.116*** 
    (6.53) (6.24) 
      
Industry15 0.375 -0.742** -0.0804 0.263 0.101 
 (1.37) (-2.87) (-0.27) (1.37) (0.24) 
      
Industry16 -0.0393 -0.0381 -0.417 0.162 1.317*** 
 (-0.16) (-0.15) (-1.53) (0.38) (3.91) 
      
Industry17 -0.145 -0.0709 -0.743** 0.0118 0.289 
 (-0.60) (-0.34) (-3.25) (0.07) (0.82) 
      
Industry18 -0.154 -0.128 -0.575 -0.844** 0.159 
 (-0.57) (-0.46) (-1.62) (-2.74) (0.33) 
      
Industry19 -0.227 0.0700 -0.894*** 0.335* 0.0630 
 (-1.13) (0.35) (-4.18) (2.00) (0.12) 
      
Industry20 -0.0430 -0.297 -1.185*** -0.150 -0.682* 
 (-0.08) (-0.44) (-4.08) (-0.51) (-1.97) 
      
Industry21 0.295 0.374** -0.247 0.304* 0.593* 
 (1.87) (2.79) (-1.36) (2.25) (2.22) 
      
Industry22 -0.0180 0.0878 -0.357* 0.247 0.375 
 (-0.13) (0.75) (-2.27) (1.89) (1.41) 
      
Industry23 0.318 0.462*** 0.239 0.234 0.706** 
 (1.88) (3.38) (1.06) (1.68) (2.70) 
      
Industry24 -0.0503 0.0641 -0.318 0.134 -0.416 
 (-0.30) (0.41) (-1.69) (0.98) (-0.99) 
      
Industry25 0.0837 0.112 -0.168 0.0735 0.162 
 (0.61) (0.94) (-1.01) (0.59) (0.62) 
      
Industry26 -0.0520 -0.126 -0.359 0.212 0.291 
 (-0.28) (-0.77) (-1.94) (1.60) (0.83) 
      
Industry27 -0.199 -0.0410 -0.458 0.255 0.499 
 (-0.72) (-0.15) (-1.57) (1.53) (1.09) 
      
ROE 0.180***     
 (4.13)     
      
Remuneration  -0.0459 -0.0326 -0.0240 0.0476* 0.0222 
 (-1.65) (-1.42) (-0.55) (1.99) (0.35) 
      
Director  -0.0115 0.00532 0.00257 -0.00225 -0.0242 
 (-0.61) (0.32) (0.14) (-0.20) (-0.82) 
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Independent director -0.0387 -0.0334 0.0619 0.0247 0.116 
 (-1.12) (-1.06) (1.50) (1.05) (1.95) 
      
Controlled director -0.00593 -0.00114 0.0519 -0.0119 -0.000535 
 (-0.18) (-0.04) (1.43) (-0.53) (-0.01) 
      
Shares held by director 0.00317 0.00100 -0.00121 0.00379 -0.00318 
 (1.19) (0.42) (-0.32) (1.92) (-0.65) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
0.00418 0.00453 -0.00230 0.000989 0.000115 
(0.90) (1.16) (-0.49) (0.41) (0.02) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.139 0.0426 -0.0543 0.0877 -0.177 
 (1.38) (0.48) (-0.53) (1.40) (-0.99) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0508 -0.0500 0.0187 -0.0887 -0.334* 
 (0.55) (-0.63) (0.17) (-1.37) (-2.04) 
      
Controlled CEO 0.0779 0.140 0.140 -0.118 0.0573 
 (0.86) (1.68) (1.37) (-1.80) (0.35) 
      
Controlled financial 
manager 
0.0722 0.105 -0.354 0.270* 0.672 
 (0.29) (0.43) (-1.22) (2.14) (1.72) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
-0.0337 -0.0361 -0.186* -0.0790 -0.0000765 
 (-0.40) (-0.50) (-2.02) (-1.51) (-0.00) 
      
Litigation  -0.0796 -0.0478 -0.0721 -0.00654 0.0758 
 (-1.49) (-1.12) (-0.94) (-0.18) (0.95) 
      
ROA  0.148***    
  (3.57)    
      
EPS   0.278***   
   (7.25)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      1.239***  
    (19.43)  
      
Short-term investment      0.842*** 
     (52.08) 
      
Constant  0.979 0.740 -1.957* -2.437*** -1.296 
 (1.40) (1.22) (-2.03) (-4.82) (-0.95) 
N 490 526 437 660 491 
R2 0.1610 0.3246 0.3037 0.6105 0.8966 
Adj-R2 0.0862 0.2689 0.2352 0.5840 0.8874 
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Table 2.14 OLS regression of 2010: D&O purchase as proxy variable 
 
This table contains the result of regression of 2010 where D&O purchase is used as the proxy 
variable of D&O insurance, after fixing industry effect and White's heteroscedasticity correction. 
Standard deviation of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short-term investment are used as 
dependent variables in respective panels. This is to test how D&O purchase and control variables 
affect the volatility of returns of firms. Also, ROE and other variables’ average values are added 
as independent variables in respective panels as an underlying measure of central tendency. t 
statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% 
level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O purchase 0.167* 0.197** 0.117 0.0671 0.0366 
 (2.14) (2.76) (1.37) (1.19) (0.19) 
      
Capital -0.0486 -0.0694 0.102* -0.0780** 0.242* 
 (-1.04) (-1.69) (2.29) (-3.17) (2.48) 
      
Industry1 0.229 -0.312 -0.996 0.395 -2.363*** 
 (0.63) (-0.62) (-1.92) (1.24) (-3.80) 
      
Industry2 -0.00974 -0.222 -0.695 0.0444 -0.459 
 (-0.04) (-0.70) (-1.80) (0.22) (-0.84) 
      
Industry3 -0.220 -0.307 -0.164 0.118 -0.469 
 (-0.72) (-0.89) (-0.44) (0.56) (-1.18) 
      
Industry4 0.400 0.116 0.341 0.0888 -1.212* 
 (1.34) (0.33) (0.90) (0.40) (-2.56) 
      
Industry5 0.0602 -0.121 0.327 -0.0675 -1.388** 
 (0.22) (-0.37) (0.87) (-0.35) (-2.87) 
      
Industry6 -0.271 -0.647 -0.378 -0.0106 -1.044 
 (-0.67) (-1.58) (-0.95) (-0.05) (-1.55) 
      
Industry7 -0.182 -0.147 0.138 -0.382 -2.182*** 
 (-0.28) (-0.18) (0.32) (-1.77) (-4.67) 
      
Industry9 0.230 -0.216 0.185 -0.114 -0.969* 
 (0.91) (-0.65) (0.53) (-0.58) (-2.28) 
      
Industry11 -1.420*** -1.186*** -0.844* 0.0225 0.795* 
 (-5.61) (-3.84) (-2.40) (0.12) (2.07) 
      
Industry12 0.375 0.116 0.243 0.236 -0.973* 
 (1.44) (0.35) (0.68) (1.28) (-2.00) 
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Industry13 0.134 0.000817 -0.00130 -0.0796 -1.091 
 (0.44) (0.00) (-0.00) (-0.33) (-1.63) 
      
Industry16 -0.559* -0.564 0.174 -0.942*** -2.283*** 
 (-2.21) (-1.84) (0.48) (-5.21) (-5.78) 
      
Industry17 -0.0973 -0.128 -0.286 -0.00156 -2.123** 
 (-0.28) (-0.33) (-0.69) (-0.01) (-3.13) 
      
Industry18 -0.188 -0.352 -0.222 -0.0840 -0.769 
 (-0.71) (-1.04) (-0.61) (-0.41) (-1.77) 
      
Industry19 -0.270 -0.297 -0.142 0.176 -0.561 
 (-1.01) (-0.92) (-0.40) (0.91) (-1.23) 
      
Industry20 -0.710* -0.879* -0.285 -0.375 -1.664** 
 (-2.22) (-2.58) (-0.80) (-1.25) (-2.99) 
      
Industry21 0.0707 -0.0122 0.344 0.311 -0.883* 
 (0.29) (-0.04) (0.97) (1.80) (-2.16) 
      
Industry22 -0.202 -0.341 0.0517 0.211 -0.682 
 (-0.76) (-1.03) (0.15) (1.17) (-1.82) 
      
Industry23 0.362 0.228 0.362 -0.0156 -0.152 
 (1.42) (0.71) (0.99) (-0.09) (-0.44) 
      
Industry24 -0.534 -0.578 -0.427 0.153 -0.384 
 (-1.54) (-1.60) (-0.88) (0.68) (-0.82) 
      
Industry25 0.155 -0.00520 0.363 0.0589 -0.326 
 (0.66) (-0.02) (1.03) (0.32) (-0.88) 
      
ROE 0.271***     
 (7.40)     
      
Remuneration  -0.0744 -0.00273 -0.0250 0.0869** 0.0222 
 (-1.41) (-0.06) (-0.40) (2.95) (0.19) 
      
Director  -0.0566* -0.0429* -0.0296 -0.0228 0.0218 
 (-2.51) (-2.54) (-1.31) (-1.86) (0.60) 
      
Independent director -0.0387 -0.0393 0.0439 0.0401 0.0274 
 (-1.12) (-1.12) (1.14) (1.62) (0.34) 
      
Controlled director -0.0208 -0.00101 -0.0527 -0.0201 0.0277 
 (-0.80) (-0.04) (-1.86) (-1.10) (0.49) 
      
Shares held by director -0.00243 -0.000137 0.00536 0.00249 0.00638 
 (-0.90) (-0.06) (1.77) (1.40) (1.05) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
-0.00465 -0.00347 -0.00118 0.00206 0.00846 
(-1.34) (-0.95) (-0.28) (0.77) (0.97) 
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Duality of CEO and COB 0.0547 0.110 -0.130 0.125 0.0750 
 (0.54) (1.10) (-1.13) (1.85) (0.33) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0412 0.0373 0.195 -0.0279 -0.179 
 (0.43) (0.38) (1.66) (-0.42) (-0.78) 
      
Controlled CEO 0.122 0.0517 0.281** -0.0361 -0.160 
 (1.39) (0.58) (2.87) (-0.55) (-0.75) 
      
Controlled financial 
manager 
-0.0145 -0.229 -0.435* -0.0658 0.0384 
 (-0.08) (-1.51) (-2.50) (-0.57) (0.09) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
0.0355 -0.0338 0.0733 -0.168** -0.235 
 (0.46) (-0.39) (0.83) (-3.08) (-1.22) 
      
Litigation  0.0241 -0.0201 -0.0311 -0.0133 0.0470 
 (0.75) (-0.44) (-0.81) (-0.61) (0.46) 
      
ROA  0.158**    
  (3.13)    
      
EPS   0.257***   
   (6.48)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      0.768***  
    (17.51)  
      
Short-term investment      0.800*** 
     (37.78) 
      
Constant  2.687** 1.665* -3.289** -1.563** -3.704* 
 (3.13) (2.02) (-3.28) (-3.10) (-2.37) 
N 493 515 477 575 445 
R2 0.2849 0.1869 0.3146 0.4491 0.8221 
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Table 2.15 Bootstrap of 2010: D&O purchase as proxy variable 
 
This table reports the result of bootstrap of previous OLS regression. Generally, they conclude 
similar results and D&O insurance purchase is not significant in all regressions. t statistics is 
reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level.    
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O purchase 0.167* 0.197** 0.117 0.0671 0.0366 
 (2.13) (2.79) (1.33) (1.19) (0.18) 
      
Capital -0.0486 -0.0694 0.102* -0.0780** 0.242* 
 (-1.02) (-1.70) (2.31) (-3.15) (2.46) 
      
Industry1 0.229 -0.312 -0.996 0.395 -2.363*** 
 (0.58) (-0.58) (-1.77) (1.20) (-3.38) 
      
Industry2 -0.00974 -0.222 -0.695 0.0444 -0.459 
 (-0.04) (-0.69) (-1.73) (0.21) (-0.80) 
      
Industry3 -0.220 -0.307 -0.164 0.118 -0.469 
 (-0.70) (-0.88) (-0.43) (0.54) (-1.12) 
      
Industry4 0.400 0.116 0.341 0.0888 -1.212* 
 (1.31) (0.33) (0.87) (0.38) (-2.51) 
      
Industry5 0.0602 -0.121 0.327 -0.0675 -1.388** 
 (0.22) (-0.37) (0.85) (-0.33) (-2.83) 
      
Industry6 -0.271 -0.647 -0.378 -0.0106 -1.044 
 (-0.65) (-1.55) (-0.93) (-0.04) (-1.51) 
      
Industry7 -0.182 -0.147 0.138 -0.382 -2.182*** 
 (-0.25) (-0.15) (0.30) (-1.57) (-4.22) 
      
Industry9 0.230 -0.216 0.185 -0.114 -0.969* 
 (0.87) (-0.64) (0.51) (-0.56) (-2.27) 
      
Industry11 -1.420*** -1.186*** -0.844* 0.0225 0.795* 
 (-5.27) (-3.75) (-2.32) (0.12) (2.05) 
      
Industry12 0.375 0.116 0.243 0.236 -0.973 
 (1.39) (0.34) (0.65) (1.24) (-1.96) 
      
Industry13 0.134 0.000817 -0.00130 -0.0796 -1.091 
 (0.41) (0.00) (-0.00) (-0.32) (-1.64) 
      
Industry16 -0.559* -0.564 0.174 -0.942*** -2.283*** 
 (-2.10) (-1.81) (0.46) (-4.96) (-5.57) 
167 
 
 
 
     
      
Industry17 -0.0973 -0.128 -0.286 -0.00156 -2.123** 
 (-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.66) (-0.01) (-2.91) 
      
Industry18 -0.188 -0.352 -0.222 -0.0840 -0.769 
 (-0.68) (-1.03) (-0.59) (-0.39) (-1.76) 
      
Industry19 -0.270 -0.297 -0.142 0.176 -0.561 
 (-0.97) (-0.92) (-0.38) (0.89) (-1.18) 
      
Industry20 -0.710* -0.879* -0.285 -0.375 -1.664** 
 (-2.08) (-2.47) (-0.77) (-1.19) (-2.72) 
      
Industry21 0.0707 -0.0122 0.344 0.311 -0.883* 
 (0.27) (-0.04) (0.93) (1.74) (-2.12) 
      
Industry22 -0.202 -0.341 0.0517 0.211 -0.682 
 (-0.73) (-1.02) (0.14) (1.15) (-1.74) 
      
Industry23 0.362 0.228 0.362 -0.0156 -0.152 
 (1.36) (0.71) (0.96) (-0.08) (-0.42) 
      
Industry24 -0.534 -0.578 -0.427 0.153 -0.384 
 (-1.44) (-1.54) (-0.82) (0.65) (-0.77) 
      
Industry25 0.155 -0.00520 0.363 0.0589 -0.326 
 (0.63) (-0.02) (0.99) (0.31) (-0.85) 
      
ROE 0.271***     
 (7.47)     
      
Remuneration  -0.0744 -0.00273 -0.0250 0.0869** 0.0222 
 (-1.42) (-0.06) (-0.39) (2.92) (0.19) 
      
Director  -0.0566* -0.0429* -0.0296 -0.0228 0.0218 
 (-2.48) (-2.50) (-1.29) (-1.80) (0.57) 
      
Independent director -0.0387 -0.0393 0.0439 0.0401 0.0274 
 (-1.10) (-1.13) (1.12) (1.62) (0.33) 
      
Controlled director -0.0208 -0.00101 -0.0527 -0.0201 0.0277 
 (-0.79) (-0.04) (-1.82) (-1.07) (0.48) 
      
Shares held by director -0.00243 -0.000137 0.00536 0.00249 0.00638 
 (-0.90) (-0.05) (1.77) (1.39) (1.03) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
-0.00465 -0.00347 -0.00118 0.00206 0.00846 
(-1.35) (-0.94) (-0.29) (0.78) (0.93) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.0547 0.110 -0.130 0.125 0.0750 
 (0.55) (1.10) (-1.11) (1.79) (0.33) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0412 0.0373 0.195 -0.0279 -0.179 
 (0.41) (0.37) (1.65) (-0.43) (-0.77) 
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Controlled CEO 0.122 0.0517 0.281** -0.0361 -0.160 
 (1.35) (0.59) (2.80) (-0.56) (-0.74) 
      
Controlled financial 
manager 
-0.0145 -0.229 -0.435* -0.0658 0.0384 
 (-0.08) (-1.42) (-2.44) (-0.56) (0.09) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
0.0355 -0.0338 0.0733 -0.168** -0.235 
 (0.45) (-0.39) (0.82) (-3.13) (-1.19) 
      
Litigation  0.0241 -0.0201 -0.0311 -0.0133 0.0470 
 (0.59) (-0.39) (-0.57) (-0.52) (0.42) 
      
ROA  0.158**    
  (3.10)    
      
EPS   0.257***   
   (6.37)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      0.768***  
    (17.38)  
      
Short-term investment      0.800*** 
     (37.64) 
      
Constant  2.687** 1.665* -3.289** -1.563** -3.704* 
 (3.09) (2.02) (-3.29) (-3.02) (-2.38) 
N 493 515 477 575 445 
R2 0.2849 0.1869 0.3146 0.4491 0.8221 
Adj-R2 0.2284 0.1257 0.2585 0.4122 0.8064 
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Table 2.16 OLS regression of 2010: D&O coverage as proxy variable 
 
This table contains the result of regression of 2010 where log of D&O coverage is used as the 
proxy variable of D&O insurance, after fixing industry effect and White's heteroscedasticity 
correction. Standard deviation of ROE, ROA, EPS, debt-asset ratio and short-term investment 
are used as dependent variables in respective panels. This is to test how D&O coverage and 
control variables affect the volatility of returns of firms. Also, ROE and other variables’ average 
values are added as independent variables in respective panels as an underlying measure of 
central tendency. t statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance 
at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate 
significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O coverage 0.0254 0.0935 0.0624 0.0416 0.115 
 (0.44) (1.50) (0.89) (1.01) (0.74) 
      
Capital -0.100 -0.126* 0.0484 -0.103** 0.238* 
 (-1.48) (-2.04) (0.76) (-2.91) (2.11) 
      
Industry1 -0.119 -1.208*** -1.641***  -3.377*** 
 (-0.44) (-3.81) (-4.20)  (-6.83) 
      
Industry2 -0.00654 -0.118 -0.483 0.0884 -0.204 
 (-0.02) (-0.35) (-1.21) (0.39) (-0.18) 
      
Industry3 0.255 -0.0346 0.00102 -0.0577 -0.230 
 (0.80) (-0.10) (0.00) (-0.22) (-0.38) 
      
Industry4 0.219 0.243 -0.291 0.339 0.246 
 (0.71) (0.66) (-0.74) (1.26) (0.45) 
      
Industry5 -0.111 -0.168 0.381 -0.0988 -0.907 
 (-0.36) (-0.48) (0.85) (-0.41) (-1.16) 
      
Industry6 -0.0195 -0.620 -0.476 0.0970 -3.153*** 
 (-0.04) (-1.37) (-1.11) (0.22) (-4.82) 
      
Industry7 -1.529*** -1.959***  -0.701**  
 (-5.08) (-4.90)  (-3.03)  
      
Industry9 0.219 -0.243 0.0120 -0.334 -1.393* 
 (0.76) (-0.63) (0.03) (-1.35) (-2.24) 
      
Industry11 -1.399*** -1.153*** -0.776* -0.0416 0.943 
 (-5.23) (-3.81) (-2.02) (-0.21) (1.88) 
      
Industry12 0.642 0.386 0.336 0.153 -1.117 
 (1.91) (1.08) (0.81) (0.59) (-1.23) 
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Industry13 0.365 0.111 -0.0364 0.0918 0.0836 
 (0.85) (0.25) (-0.06) (0.35) (0.14) 
      
Industry17 0.319 0.124 0.304 0.237 -2.522* 
 (1.01) (0.33) (0.78) (0.72) (-2.39) 
      
Industry18 0.227 0.0549 0.0106 0.0908 -0.123 
 (0.69) (0.13) (0.02) (0.42) (-0.20) 
      
Industry19 -0.207 -0.251 -0.0185 0.280 -0.606 
 (-0.67) (-0.72) (-0.05) (1.32) (-0.99) 
      
Industry20 -0.0413 -0.355 0.00221 0.126 -0.890 
 (-0.15) (-1.16) (0.01) (0.53) (-1.54) 
      
Industry21 -0.0233 0.0125 0.372 0.265 -0.667 
 (-0.09) (0.04) (0.99) (1.43) (-1.50) 
      
Industry22 -0.256 -0.433 -0.0364 0.160 -0.694 
 (-0.90) (-1.30) (-0.10) (0.83) (-1.72) 
      
Industry23 0.298 0.223 0.481 -0.0330 -0.269 
 (1.14) (0.71) (1.21) (-0.17) (-0.71) 
      
Industry24 -0.441 -0.371 -0.298 0.189 -0.400 
 (-1.31) (-1.06) (-0.61) (0.79) (-0.82) 
      
Industry25 0.0812 -0.0302 0.405 0.0579 -0.258 
 (0.32) (-0.10) (1.07) (0.30) (-0.61) 
      
ROE 0.196***     
 (4.57)     
      
Remuneration  -0.0602 -0.0464 -0.0266 0.113** -0.0609 
 (-0.88) (-0.69) (-0.30) (2.86) (-0.42) 
      
Director  -0.0198 -0.0353 -0.0143 -0.0429* 0.00728 
 (-0.75) (-1.41) (-0.46) (-2.57) (0.12) 
      
Independent director 0.00348 -0.0211 0.0424 0.0358 0.106 
 (0.08) (-0.46) (0.79) (1.19) (1.01) 
      
Controlled director 0.0180 0.0404 -0.000861 -0.00199 0.0978 
 (0.43) (0.95) (-0.02) (-0.07) (0.92) 
      
Shares held by director -0.00187 0.00138 0.00701 0.00151 0.00493 
 (-0.51) (0.38) (1.53) (0.65) (0.55) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
-0.00872 -0.00607 -0.00572 0.000636 0.0112 
(-1.81) (-1.29) (-0.84) (0.21) (0.87) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.262 0.235 -0.0861 0.168 -0.423 
 (1.76) (1.50) (-0.44) (1.71) (-1.32) 
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Controlled COB 0.0572 -0.0363 0.152 0.0147 -0.447 
 (0.48) (-0.28) (0.94) (0.19) (-1.45) 
      
Controlled CEO -0.0656 -0.123 0.158 -0.174 0.115 
 (-0.56) (-0.92) (1.11) (-1.78) (0.40) 
      
Controlled financial 
manager 
0.169 0.0339 -0.360 -0.0328 -0.354 
 (0.88) (0.16) (-1.88) (-0.17) (-0.52) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
0.0465 -0.0359 0.147 -0.159* -0.0500 
 (0.47) (-0.30) (1.12) (-2.25) (-0.20) 
      
Litigation  0.0214 -0.0185 -0.0430 -0.00411 0.0376 
 (0.65) (-0.35) (-1.31) (-0.16) (0.33) 
      
ROA  0.0535    
  (0.94)    
      
EPS   0.271***   
   (5.34)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      0.805***  
    (13.69)  
      
Short-term investment      0.799*** 
     (27.18) 
      
Constant  2.967* 2.103 -3.316* -2.059** -4.381 
 (2.55) (1.92) (-2.26) (-2.62) (-1.42) 
N 266 283 260 319 248 
R2 0.2562 0.2102 0.2866 0.5084 0.8109 
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Table 2.17 Bootstrap of 2010: D&O coverage as proxy variable 
This table reports the result of bootstrap of previous OLS regression. Generally, they conclude 
similar results and D&O insurance coverage is not significant in all regressions. t statistics is 
reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level.    
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
deviation of 
ROE 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
Standard 
deviation of 
EPS 
Standard 
deviation of 
debt-asset ratio 
Standard 
deviation of 
short-term 
investment 
D&O coverage 0.0254 0.0935 0.0624 0.0416 0.115 
 (0.43) (1.51) (0.89) (0.99) (0.71) 
      
Capital -0.100 -0.126* 0.0484 -0.103** 0.238* 
 (-1.40) (-2.03) (0.76) (-2.93) (2.09) 
      
Industry1 -0.119 -1.208*** -1.641***  -3.377*** 
 (-0.42) (-3.69) (-3.93)  (-6.60) 
      
Industry2 -0.00654 -0.118 -0.483 0.0884 -0.204 
 (-0.02) (-0.33) (-1.11) (0.38) (-0.16) 
      
Industry3 0.255 -0.0346 0.00102 -0.0577 -0.230 
 (0.75) (-0.10) (0.00) (-0.23) (-0.36) 
      
Industry4 0.219 0.243 -0.291 0.339 0.246 
 (0.69) (0.66) (-0.69) (1.06) (0.43) 
      
Industry5 -0.111 -0.168 0.381 -0.0988 -0.907 
 (-0.35) (-0.48) (0.83) (-0.40) (-1.15) 
      
Industry6 -0.0195 -0.620 -0.476 0.0970 -3.153*** 
 (-0.03) (-1.26) (-0.99) (0.19) (-4.48) 
      
Industry7 -1.529*** -1.959***  -0.701**  
 (-4.65) (-4.69)  (-2.84)  
      
Industry9 0.219 -0.243 0.0120 -0.334 -1.393* 
 (0.73) (-0.62) (0.03) (-1.39) (-2.05) 
      
Industry11 -1.399*** -1.153*** -0.776 -0.0416 0.943 
 (-5.08) (-3.72) (-1.88) (-0.21) (1.89) 
      
Industry12 0.642 0.386 0.336 0.153 -1.117 
 (1.83) (1.07) (0.78) (0.59) (-1.16) 
      
Industry13 0.365 0.111 -0.0364 0.0918 0.0836 
 (0.81) (0.24) (-0.06) (0.33) (0.13) 
      
Industry17 0.319 0.124 0.304 0.237 -2.522* 
 (0.91) (0.31) (0.70) (0.63) (-2.16) 
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Industry18 0.227 0.0549 0.0106 0.0908 -0.123 
 (0.64) (0.13) (0.02) (0.41) (-0.19) 
      
Industry19 -0.207 -0.251 -0.0185 0.280 -0.606 
 (-0.66) (-0.73) (-0.04) (1.32) (-0.95) 
      
Industry20 -0.0413 -0.355 0.00221 0.126 -0.890 
 (-0.14) (-1.12) (0.01) (0.53) (-1.47) 
      
Industry21 -0.0233 0.0125 0.372 0.265 -0.667 
 (-0.09) (0.04) (0.94) (1.42) (-1.49) 
      
Industry22 -0.256 -0.433 -0.0364 0.160 -0.694 
 (-0.90) (-1.32) (-0.10) (0.84) (-1.67) 
      
Industry23 0.298 0.223 0.481 -0.0330 -0.269 
 (1.12) (0.72) (1.17) (-0.17) (-0.70) 
      
Industry24 -0.441 -0.371 -0.298 0.189 -0.400 
 (-1.19) (-0.99) (-0.57) (0.75) (-0.74) 
      
Industry25 0.0812 -0.0302 0.405 0.0579 -0.258 
 (0.31) (-0.10) (1.02) (0.30) (-0.57) 
      
ROE 0.196***     
 (4.47)     
      
Remuneration  -0.0602 -0.0464 -0.0266 0.113** -0.0609 
 (-0.85) (-0.70) (-0.30) (2.84) (-0.41) 
      
Director  -0.0198 -0.0353 -0.0143 -0.0429* 0.00728 
 (-0.72) (-1.37) (-0.43) (-2.53) (0.11) 
      
Independent director 0.00348 -0.0211 0.0424 0.0358 0.106 
 (0.08) (-0.43) (0.78) (1.17) (0.95) 
      
Controlled director 0.0180 0.0404 -0.000861 -0.00199 0.0978 
 (0.42) (0.95) (-0.02) (-0.07) (0.89) 
      
Shares held by director -0.00187 0.00138 0.00701 0.00151 0.00493 
 (-0.49) (0.37) (1.50) (0.65) (0.51) 
      
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
-0.00872 -0.00607 -0.00572 0.000636 0.0112 
(-1.75) (-1.25) (-0.82) (0.20) (0.81) 
      
Duality of CEO and COB 0.262 0.235 -0.0861 0.168 -0.423 
 (1.75) (1.56) (-0.43) (1.70) (-1.30) 
      
Controlled COB 0.0572 -0.0363 0.152 0.0147 -0.447 
 (0.47) (-0.27) (0.91) (0.19) (-1.52) 
      
Controlled CEO -0.0656 -0.123 0.158 -0.174 0.115 
 (-0.53) (-0.95) (1.11) (-1.76) (0.38) 
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Controlled financial 
manager 
0.169 0.0339 -0.360 -0.0328 -0.354 
 (0.81) (0.14) (-1.54) (-0.16) (-0.45) 
      
Controlled supervisory 
director 
0.0465 -0.0359 0.147 -0.159* -0.0500 
 (0.47) (-0.30) (1.07) (-2.22) (-0.19) 
      
Litigation  0.0214 -0.0185 -0.0430 -0.00411 0.0376 
 (0.50) (-0.30) (-0.94) (-0.14) (0.28) 
      
ROA  0.0535    
  (0.97)    
      
EPS   0.271***   
   (5.25)   
      
Debt-asset ratio      0.805***  
    (13.02)  
      
Short-term investment      0.799*** 
     (26.30) 
      
Constant  2.967* 2.103 -3.316* -2.059** -4.381 
 (2.42) (1.93) (-2.21) (-2.59) (-1.37) 
N 266 283 260 319 248 
R2 0.2562 0.2102 0.2866 0.5084 0.8109 
Adj-R2 0.1430 0.0983 0.1788 0.4495 0.7807 
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Table 2.18 Table of variables (2) 
 
  Hypothesis Variables Definition 
Insurers Insurance 
LN_s_coverage 
 
The total coverage companies offered 
 Capital LNcapital2 
 
Total capital of the insurers 
 
 
Profiting ability 
ROE2 
 
Return on equity of insurers 
 
investment 
 
Investment income of insurers 
 
Potential risk 
DAratio2 
 
Debt-asset ratio of insurers 
 
retention 
 
The coverage that insurers keep by 
themselves instead of ceding to reinsurers 
 
Reputation 
marketshare 
 
Market share of specific insurer 
 
DOmarketshare 
 
D&O insurance market share of specific  
insurer 
Insured 
firms 
Business 
structure 
 
LNcapital 
 
Total capital of the companies 
Financial 
performance 
ROE Return on equity of firms 
Corporate 
governance 
Sdirector 
 
The percentage of shares held by directors 
(%) 
 
SMH 
 
The percentage of shares held by major 
shareholders (%) 
 
LNRemu 
 
The total of compensation package offered 
to directors 
 
Director 
 
The total number of directors 
 
IDirector 
 
The total number of independent directors 
 
Ctrldirector 
 
Controlled directors. This indicates the 
number of directors nominated or 
controlled by the largest controlling group 
of the company, such as family, relatives, 
or parent company. 
Litigation risk 
DAratio Debt-asset ratio of firms 
StdDevROA Standard deviation of ROA 
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Table 2.19 Descriptive analysis (1) 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of proxy variables of the qualities of insurers and 
insured firms.  
 
Variables Mean stdev 
Log of capital 18.15714 3.849586 
   
ROE 1.140339 13.73671 
   
Log of remuneration 13.48168 6.504939 
   
Director 9.507853 2.768724 
   
Independent director 1.421667 1.339524 
   
Controlled director 1.43093 1.491975 
   
Shares held by directors 22.21868 15.3792 
   
Shares held by major 
shareholders 
18.94886 11.19971 
   
Debt-asset ratio 139.6203 398.9496 
   
Standard deviation of ROA 1.546662 2.325674 
   
Log of D&O insurance 
coverage 
18.85111 1.034086 
   
Log of capital 23.21419 1.174927 
   
Debt-asset ratio 74.76789 5.716327 
   
ROE 0.650141 2.96838 
 
Return on investment 2.068907 1.756284 
 
Retention part of insurers 99.50513 20.36973 
 
Total market share 4.817382 7.578623 
 
D&O insurance market share 0.20853 0.117149 
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Table 2.20 Descriptive analysis (2) 
 
This table presents the qualities of individual D&O insurers. Currently, there are sixteen major 
insurers providing D&O insurance. Group 17 represents the D&O insurance carriers who do not 
belong to the previous 16 major insurers. Every insurer is coded from 1 to 16. The second 
column “N” represents the number of D&O insurance transactions that the insurer has. Thus, 
insurer number 1 has 901 out of 2485 D&O insurance transactions form 2008-2010. 
 
  
Insurer N 
Log of D&O 
insurance 
coverage 
Log of 
capital 
Return on 
investment 
Retention part of 
insurers 
  mean Std. mean Std. mean Std. mean Std. 
1 901 18.77 1.04 23.43 0.08 2.04 0.66 112.96 5.92 
2 484 18.72 1.07 24.87 0.04 4.22 0.35 86.34 2.37 
3 387 19.24 0.87 21.93 0.23 1.15 0.34 115.29 29.64 
4 311 18.88 1.31 21.18 0.16 0.45 0.35 69.95 2.18 
5 58 19.02 1.79 23.37 0.06 0.37 0.10 96.84 5.56 
6 102 18.62 0.94 23.77 0.04 1.22 0.84 88.24 7.31 
7 89 18.43 0.74 23.85 0.05 0.82 2.10 93.85 5.82 
8 20 19.30 0.73 23.12 0.07 0.52 1.52 89.33 4.32 
9 19 19.26 0.81 23.12 0.02 1.44 0.36 95.91 4.83 
10 24 18.67 0.56 23.78 0.09 5.68 2.14 93.97 5.24 
11 28 17.89 2.31 23.37 0.06 2.77 1.03 89.42 0.84 
12 13 18.69 1.11 23.41 0.03 2.19 0.64 92.27 4.71 
13 16 18.44 1.15 23.36 0.13 5.91 10.27 92.35 7.71 
14 14 17.64 1.22 23.28 0.08 1.21 0.23 103.07 8.65 
15 11 18.18 0.60 23.25 0.07 3.87 6.66 95.03 5.57 
16 3 19 0 21.47 0.21 2.77 2.83 112.16 6.84 
17 5 17 2.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2.20 (cont.)  
 
  
Insurer ROE 
Debt-asset 
ratio 
Total market 
share of 
insurers 
D&O 
insurance 
market share 
 mean Std. mean Std. mean Std. mean Std. 
1 -1.59 3.24 77.66 2.27 0.82 3.53 0.34 0.05 
2 3.38 0.89 66.46 2.28 16.98 7.25 0.18 0.03 
3 0.24 0.89 77.21 2.74 1.20 0.37 0.19 0 
4 2.21 0.99 73.14 4.55 0.39 0.36 0.13 0 
5 -0.62 1.82 67.75 2.98 2.55 3.81 0.07 0.01 
6 2.62 1.16 82.06 2.33 10.13 3.07 0.04 0.01 
7 0.78 0.55 81.69 1.91 6.11 4.28 0.02 0 
8 0.70 1.92 80.84 0.56 3.03 3.35 0.01 0 
9 1.11 0.46 75.55 0.68 3.12 0.47 0.01 0 
10 4.80 1.90 75.20 3.98 8.44 3.31 0.01 0 
11 3.22 0.75 72.02 0.29 5.57 2.17 0.01 0 
12 2.29 1.13 71.37 2.04 4.82 1.92 0 0 
13 4.62 2.49 65.01 5.57 3.22 1.52 0 0 
14 -2.76 1.43 87.83 1.33 3.75 4.79 0 0 
15 3.23 2.63 70.38 3.52 3.52 2.02 0 0 
16 -3.62 4.16 83.64 1.12 -1.86 5.05 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2.21 The summarized result of canonical analysis 
This table contains the final result of the canonical analysis. The Wilks L. of both canonical 
variables are significant at 5% level. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
X 
(Insured firms) 
x1 x2 Y 
(Insurers) 
η1 η2 
Log of capital -.92265 .31435 Log of D&O coverage -.06914 .87945 
ROE .02218 -.07046 Log of capital -.01038 -.05867 
Log of remuneration .66596 .51005 Debt-asset ratio .33814 -.06160 
Director .00143 .23929 ROE -.86634 .09405 
Independent director .02307 -.31695 Return on investment -.23534 .04553 
Controlled director .01442 -.13561 Retention .37841 -.08772 
Shares held by directors -.01242 -.26077 Total market share -.39758 .12962 
Shares held by major 
shareholders 
.02268 -.04345 
D&O insurance market 
share 
.26717 -.36359 
Debt-asset ratio .06378 .36303  
  
Standard deviation of 
ROA 
.10476 -.27135 
 
  
Proportion of variance 
explained by opposite 
canonical variable 
4.96822 0.37423 
Proportion of variance 
explained by its own 
canonical variable 
16.22262 11.85339 
Cumulative proportion 
of variance explained by 
opposite canonical 
variable 
4.96822 5.34245 
Cumulative proportion 
of variance explained 
by its own canonical 
variable 
16.22262 28.07601 
Proportion of variance 
explained by its own 
canonical variable 
13.11728 8.15357 
Proportion of variance 
explained by opposite 
canonical variable 
6.14438 0.54404 
Cumulative proportion 
of variance explained by 
its own canonical 
variable 
13.11728 21.27084 
Cumulative proportion 
of variance explained 
by opposite canonical 
variable 
6.14438 6.68842 
Wilks L. 0.57745* 0.92951*  
  
Eigenvalue 0.60967 0.04811  
  
Percentage 89.12897 7.03262  
  
Cumulative percentage 89.12897 96.1616    
Canonical correlation 0.61543 0.21424    
Squared correlation 0.37875 0.0459    
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Table 2.22 Pearson correlation analysis 
 
Note: This table contains the result of Pearson correlation analysis. This tests the correlation 
between the qualities of insurers and the insured firms and thus to figure out if there is any 
tendency in D&O insurance transactions. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance 
at 0.1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Log of 
D&O 
coverage 
Log of 
capital 
of 
insurer 
Debt-asset 
ratio of 
insurer 
ROE of 
insurer 
Return on 
investment 
Retention 
Total 
market 
share 
D&O 
insurance 
market 
share 
Log of 
capital 
of 
insured 
Log of D&O 
coverage 
1 -.036 .060** -.044* -.062** .072** -.064** .037 .102** 
 .072 .003 .029 .002 .000 .001 .066 .000 
Log of capital 
of insurers 
-.036 1 .139** .091** .489** .138** .494** .158** -.002 
.072  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .926 
Debt-asset 
ratio of 
insurers 
.060** .139** 1 -.529** -.443** .371** -.539** .217** -.193** 
.003 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
ROE of 
insurers 
-.044* .091** -.529** 1 .405** -.534** .526** -.598** .498** 
.029 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Return on 
investment 
-.062** .489** -.443** .405** 1 .001 .612** .031 .128** 
.002 .000 .000 .000  .971 .000 .120 .000 
Retention 
.072** .138** .371** -.534** .001 1 -.251** .489** -.227** 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .971  .000 .000 .000 
Total market 
share 
-.064** .494** -.539** .526** .612** -.251** 1 -.280** .223** 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 
D&O 
insurance 
market share 
.037 .158** .217** -.598** .031 .489** -.280** 1 -.175** 
.066 .000 .000 .000 .120 .000 .000  .000 
Log of capital 
of insured 
firms 
.102** -.002 -.193** .498** .128** -.227** .223** -.175** 1 
.000 .926 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
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Table 2.22 (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
ROE  of 
insured 
Log of 
remunerati
on of 
insured 
Director 
Independe
nt director 
Controlled 
director 
Shares 
held by 
directors 
Shares 
held by 
major 
shareholde
rs 
Debt-asset 
ratio of 
insured 
Standard 
deviation 
of ROA 
of 
insured 
Log of D&O 
coverage 
-.017 .062** .060** -.045* -.032 -.066** -.029 .077** -.045* 
.389 .002 .003 .024 .114 .001 .150 .000 .026 
Log of 
capital of 
insurers 
.013 -.005 -.007 -.028 .031 .008 -.010 -.025 .015 
.526 .815 .732 .156 .125 .704 .625 .213 .448 
Debt-asset 
ratio of 
insurers 
.005 .126** .010 .007 .011 -.021 .029 .013 .043* 
.786 .000 .629 .740 .578 .303 .146 .518 .033 
ROE of 
insurers 
-.005 -.339** -.003 -.021 -.017 .021 -.002 -.030 -.061** 
.797 .000 .866 .291 .391 .299 .925 .137 .003 
Return on 
investment 
.006 -.089** -.028 -.043* .005 .010 -.006 -.026 -.022 
.755 .000 .160 .032 .803 .618 .762 .203 .264 
Retention 
-.005 .134** -.026 -.024 .037 -.016 .000 .013 .022 
.810 .000 .197 .232 .062 .433 .985 .532 .265 
Total market 
share 
-.007 -.139** -.022 -.066** .038 .014 -.013 -.045* -.062** 
.722 .000 .275 .001 .060 .489 .524 .026 .002 
D&O 
insurance 
market share 
.003 .060** -.006 .037 .014 -.013 -.033 -.010 .048* 
.884 .003 .771 .067 .489 .530 .104 .604 .017 
Log of 
capital of 
insured firms 
.024 -.460** .227** .019 -.028 -.067** .008 .153** -.164** 
.226 .000 .000 .334 .158 .001 .690 .000 .000 
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Table 2.22 (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Log of 
D&O 
coverage 
Log of 
capital 
of 
insurer 
Debt-asset 
ratio of 
insurer 
ROE of 
insurer 
Return on 
investment 
Retention 
Total 
market 
share 
D&O 
insurance 
market 
share 
Log of 
capital 
of 
insured 
ROE  of  the 
insured    
-.017 .013 .005 -.005 .006 -.005 -.007 .003 .024 
.389 .526 .786 .797 .755 .810 .722 .884 .226 
Log of 
remuneration 
.062** -.005 .126** -.339** -.089** .134** -.139** .060** -.460** 
.002 .815 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000 
Director 
.060** -.007 .010 -.003 -.028 -.026 -.022 -.006 .227** 
.003 .732 .629 .866 .160 .197 .275 .771 .000 
Independent 
director 
-.045* -.028 .007 -.021 -.043* -.024 -.066** .037 .019 
.024 .156 .740 .291 .032 .232 .001 .067 .334 
Controlled 
director 
-.032 .031 .011 -.017 .005 .037 .038 .014 -.028 
.114 .125 .578 .391 .803 .062 .060 .489 .158 
Shares held by 
directors 
-.066** .008 -.021 .021 .010 -.016 .014 -.013 -.067** 
.001 .704 .303 .299 .618 .433 .489 .530 .001 
Shares held by 
major 
shareholders 
-.029 -.010 .029 -.002 -.006 .000 -.013 -.033 .008 
.150 .625 .146 .925 .762 .985 .524 .104 .690 
Debt-asset ratio 
of  the insured 
.077** -.025 .013 -.030 -.026 .013 -.045* -.010 .153** 
.000 .213 .518 .137 .203 .532 .026 .604 .000 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA  of  the 
insured 
-.045* .015 .043* -.061** -.022 .022 -.062** .048* -.164** 
.026 .448 .033 .003 .264 .265 .002 .017 .000 
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Table 2.22 (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROE  of 
insured 
Log of 
remunera
tion of 
insured 
Director 
Independ
ent 
director 
Controlle
d director 
Shares 
held by 
directors 
Shares 
held by 
major 
sharehold
ers 
Debt-asse
t ratio of 
insured 
Standard 
deviation 
of ROA 
of 
insured 
ROE  of  the 
insured    
1 .019 .012 .014 .033 -.029 .012 -.204** .222** 
 .337 .539 .474 .099 .149 .547 .000 .000 
Log of 
remuneration 
.019 1 .013 .019 .031 -.059** -.060** -.033 .040* 
.337  .507 .342 .119 .003 .003 .104 .047 
Director 
.012 .013 1 .173** .085** .113** -.035 .226** -.123** 
.539 .507  .000 .000 .000 .079 .000 .000 
Independent 
director 
.014 .019 .173** 1 -.125** -.012 .003 .100** -.018 
.474 .342 .000  .000 .546 .880 .000 .381 
Controlled 
director 
.033 .031 .085** -.125** 1 -.174** -.037 -.126** -.072** 
.099 .119 .000 .000  .000 .065 .000 .000 
Shares held by 
directors 
-.029 -.059** .113** -.012 -.174** 1 -.141** .027 .013 
.149 .003 .000 .546 .000  .000 .182 .516 
Shares held by 
major 
shareholders 
.012 -.060** -.035 .003 -.037 -.141** 1 .046* .062** 
.547 .003 .079 .880 .065 .000  .021 .002 
Debt-asset 
ratio of  the 
insured 
-.204** -.033 .226** .100** -.126** .027 .046* 1 -.004 
.000 .104 .000 .000 .000 .182 .021  .849 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA  of  
the insured 
.222** .040* -.123** -.018 -.072** .013 .062** -.004 1 
.000 .047 .000 .381 .000 .516 .002 .849  
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Table 2.23 The result of stepwise regressions 
 
This table reports the result of stepwise regressions after White's heteroscedasticity 
correction. The dependent variables are the proxy variables of the qualities of insurers. 
The independent variables are the proxy variables of the qualities of insured firms. The 
latter is selected by stepwise regressions until no more significant variables can be found. 
t statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate 
significance at 0.1% level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ln_s_coverage daratio2 Domarket 
-share 
investment marketshare retention roe2 
lncapital 0.0428*** -0.351*** -0.00527*** 0.0643*** 0.481*** -1.258*** 0.371*** 
 (6.79) (-9.88) (-9.50) (7.29) (11.85) (-13.14) (26.29) 
        
lnremu 0.0226***      -0.0516*** 
 (5.88)      (-7.74) 
        
daratio 0.000171***    -0.00123** 0.00252*
* 
-0.000646*
** 
 (4.23)    (-2.98) (2.80) (-4.15) 
        
idirector -0.0523**  0.00350*  -0.314**   
 (-3.03)  (1.99)  (-2.86)   
        
sd -0.00416**      0.0116*** 
 (-2.77)      (3.49) 
        
Ctrl-dire
ctor 
-0.0312*       
 (-2.03)       
        
director  0.134**  -0.0382* -0.146*  -0.106*** 
  (3.02)  (-2.41) (-2.46)  (-5.21) 
        
Constant 17.92*** 79.71*** 0.299*** 1.261*** -1.911* 121.8*** -4.546*** 
 (109.43) (119.22) (26.94) (6.77) (-2.34) (64.16) (-13.09) 
N 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 
R2 0.0360 0.0402 0.0321 0.0199 0.0628 0.0538 0.2842 
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Table 2.24 The result of panel data 
 
This table reports the result of panel data test. This test considers the variables in previous 
stepwise OLS regression. F-test is conducted to test if fixed-effects regression has better 
effect than OLS regression, and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test is carried 
out to test if random-effects GLS regression has better effect than OLS regression. Then, 
Hausman test is used to test which appropriate between fixed-effects regression and 
random-effects GLS regression. Generally, this test demonstrates similar result with the 
previous test.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ln_s_covera
ge 
daratio2 Domarket-
share 
Invest- 
ment 
marketshare retention roe2 
lncapital -0.000115 -0.422*** -0.00476*** 0.0732*** 0.555*** -1.252*** 0.400*** 
 (-0.02) (-16.75) (-10.70) (8.54) (14.25) (-13.97) (21.10) 
        
lnremu -0.000314      -0.0678*** 
 (-0.11)      (-5.77) 
        
daratio 0.0000168    -0.000812 0.00148 -0.000469* 
 (0.35)    (-1.53) (1.38) (-2.47) 
        
idirector -0.0210  0.00614***  -0.699***   
 (-1.46)  (3.73)  (-4.24)   
        
sd -0.00129 -0.00893     0.00313 
 (-1.17) (-1.17)     (0.70) 
        
ctrldirector 0.0101       
 (0.89)       
        
director  0.0689  -0.0188 -0.0926  -0.0938*** 
  (1.59)  (-1.37) (-1.26)  (-3.63) 
        
Constant 18.79*** 81.56*** 0.293*** 0.990*** -3.123*** 122.0*** -4.843*** 
 (155.78) (135.80) (32.65) (5.30) (-3.51) (72.35) (-9.90) 
N 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 
        
F-test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
        
B-P test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
        
Hausman 
test  
0.0000 
(fixed 
-effects) 
0.8901 
(random 
-effects) 
0.6493 
(random 
-effects) 
0.7096 
(random 
-effects) 
0.0118 
(fixed 
-effect) 
0.3435 
(random 
-effects) 
0.0004 
(fixed 
-effect) 
        
sigma_u 1.0433947 5.256645 .08355662 .8955631 5.846477 11.29233 1.79960 
        
sigma_e .54241282 4.017212 .0713723 1.397048 5.9764545 14.56216 2.14631 
        
rho .7872478 .6313027 .57816112 .2912482 .48900765 .3755204 .412808 
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Table 2.25 Number of cases in each cluster 
 
This table reports the result of cluster analysis. The proxy variables of qualities of 
insurers and the insured firms are used as criteria for attempting to classify 2,485 D&O 
insurance contracts. There are 86 observations in cluster 1, 2,393 observations in cluster 2, 
and 6 observations in cluster 3. 
 
 
Cluster N 
1 86 
2 2393 
3 6 
Valid observations 2485 
Missing observation 0 
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Table 2.26 Final cluster centers of cluster analysis 
 
This table reports the detailed result of cluster analysis. All D&O insurance contracts are 
classified as three clusters, demonstrating the characteristics of insurers and insured firms. 
Generally, their characteristics are consistent. Insured firms with poor qualities intend to 
contract with insurers whose qualities are not very good, and vice versa. The 
homogeneity of market is thus implied.  
 
 Characteristics  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Insurers  Log of capital Low Medium High 
Return on investment Low High Medium 
Retention  Medium Low High 
ROE High Medium Low 
Debt-asset ratio  Low Medium High 
Log of D&O insurance 
coverage 
Medium Low High 
Total market share Medium Large Small 
D&O insurance market share Small Medium Large 
The 
insured 
Log of capital High Medium Low 
ROE High Medium Low 
Director High Low Medium 
Independent director High Low Medium 
Controlled director Low High Medium 
Shares held by directors Low Medium High 
Shares held by major 
shareholders 
Medium Low High 
Debt-asset ratio Medium Low High 
Standard deviation of ROA Low Medium High 
Log of remuneration Low Medium High 
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Table 2.27 Result of multinomial logistic regression 
 
This table contains the result of the multinomial logistic regression, using the second 
group as the base outcome to be compared. t statistics is reported in parentheses.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log of D&O insurance coverage 
-0.527 
(base 
outcome) 
-7.018 
(-0.00) (-0.00) 
Log of capital of insurers 
 
0.144 
 
2.134 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Debt-asset ratio of insurers 
 
-0.538 
 
-1.560 
(-0.00) (-0.00) 
ROE of insurers 
 
0.200 
 
0.446 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Return on investment of insurers 
 
0.453 
 
-0.549 
(0.00) (-0.00) 
Retention of insurers 
 
-0.212 
 
-0.185 
(-0.00) (-0.00) 
Total market share of insurers 
 
-0.452 
 
-1.157 
(-0.00) (-0.00) 
D&O insurance market share of 
insurers 
 
56.10 
 
88.45 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Log of capital of insured firms 
 
-2.643 
 
-3.048 
(-0.01) (-0.00) 
ROE of insured firms 
 
0.277 
 
0.242 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Log of remuneration of insured firms 
 
-0.345 
 
1.100 
(-0.00) (0.00) 
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Director of insured firms 
 
 
0.693 
 
 
-0.00196 
(0.00) (-0.00) 
Independent director of insured firms 
 
-3.613 
 
-4.456 
(-0.00) (-0.00) 
Controlled director of insured firms 
 
4.599 
 
9.022 
(0.01) (0.00) 
Shares held by directors of insured 
firms 
 
-0.307 
 
-0.358 
(-0.00) (-0.00) 
Shares held by major shareholders of 
insured firms 
 
-0.0713 
 
0.143 
(-0.00) (0.00) 
Debt-asset ratio of insured firms 
 
0.101 
 
0.113 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Standard deviation of ROA of insured 
firms 
 
-1.727 
 
-1.735 
(-0.00) (-0.00) 
Constant 
 
37.58 
 
131.7 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 
N = 2485 
LRchi2 = 831.42 
Goodness-of-Fit = 1.000 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
PseudoR2 = 1.0000 
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Table 2.28 Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) sector group 
 
TWSE 
Code 
TWSE sector group 
high technology 
industry 
Code 2 - Label 
of individual 
dummy variable 
1 Cement Industry N Industry1 
2 Food Industry N Industry2 
3 Plastic Industry N Industry3 
4 Textile Industry N Industry4 
5 Electric Machinery Industry N Industry5 
6 Electrical and Cable Industry N Industry6 
8 Glass and Ceramic Industry N Industry7 
9 Paper and Pulp Industry N Industry8 
10 Iron and Steel Industry N Industry9 
11 Rubber Industry N Industry10 
12 Automobile Industry N Industry11 
14 Building Material and Construction Industry N Industry12 
15 Shipping and Transportation Industry N Industry13 
16 Tourism Industry N Industry14 
17 Financial and Insurance Industry N Industry15 
18 Trading and Consumers' Goods Industry N Industry16 
19 Other Industry N Industry17 
21 Chemical Industry N Industry18 
22 Biotechnology and Medical Care Industry N Industry19 
23 Composite Oil, Gas and Electricity Industry N Industry20 
24 Semiconductor Industry Y Industry21 
25 Computer and Peripheral Equipment Industry Y Industry22 
26 Optoelectronic Industry Y Industry23 
27 Communications and Internet Industry Y Industry24 
28 Electronic Parts/Components Industry Y Industry25 
29 Electronic Products Distribution Industry N Industry26 
30 Information Service Industry N Industry27 
31 Other Electronic Industry N - 
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Table 2.29 Table of variables (3) 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Variables Definition 
Expecte
d sign 
Dependent 
variables 
- 
Coverage 
The total coverage 
companies purchased. 
 
N/A 
Purchase 
The dummy variable 
equals 1 if companies 
purchase D&O insurance 
and 0 otherwise. 
N/A 
Independe
nt 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business 
structure 
 
Log of capital 
Total capital of companies 
+/- 
Industry of firms 
The dummy variable 
equals 1 if companies are a 
high technology industry 
and 0 otherwise. The result 
of fixing effect of all 
industries will also be 
compared.  
+ 
Financial 
performance 
ROE 
Return on equity of 
companies  
- 
Corporate 
governance 
Log of 
remuneration 
The total compensation 
package offered to 
directors  
 
+/- 
Directors 
The total number of 
directors  
 
+/- 
Independent 
director  
The total number of 
independent directors 
 
+/- 
Shares held by 
director 
 
The percentage of shares 
held by directors (%) 
 
+ 
Shares held by 
major 
shareholder  
The percentage of shares 
held by major shareholders 
(%) 
 
+ 
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Controlled 
director  
Controlled director 
indicates the number of 
directors nominated or 
controlled by the largest 
controlling group of the 
company, such as family, 
relatives, or parent 
company. 
 
+ 
Duality of CEO 
and COB  
The dummy variable 
equals 1 if the chairman of 
the board of directors is 
identical to CEO and 0 
otherwise. 
 
+ 
Internal risk 
If any chairman of the 
board, CEO, financial 
manager and supervisory 
director is appointed by a 
parent or controlling 
group, the value will be 1. 
The total ranges from 0 to 
4. The result of fixing 
effect of four separate 
situations will also be 
compared. 
+ 
Debt-asset ratio Debt-asset ratio of firms - 
Signal 
hypothesis 
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
The percentage of shares 
of foreign natural person 
 
+ 
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
The percentage of shares 
of foreign juristic person 
 
+ 
Shares of foreign 
financial  
juristic person 
The percentage of shares 
of foreign juristic financial 
person 
+ 
Litigation 
risk 
Prior significant 
litigation 
The number of disclosed 
significant litigations  
+ 
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Table 2.30 Descriptive analysis of D&O insurance purchase in Taiwan 
 
This table contains the descriptive statistics of variables, comparing the firms with D&O 
insurance and the firms without D&O insurance form 2008-2010. In general, firms with 
D&O insurance have larger capital, more remuneration, more directors, and independent 
directors, lesser shares held by directors and major shareholders, lesser controlled 
directors, lesser duality of CEO and COB, lesser internal risk and lesser debt-asset ratio. 
This implies that firms with D&O insurance generally have better qualities of corporate 
governance. Also, firms with D&O insurance have more shares held by foreign juristic 
persons and financial persons. This implies that foreign investors emphasize D&O 
insurance and D&O insurance can convey a positive signal to attract investments.  
 
 2008 2009 2010 
 Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured 
n=613 49.4% n=626 50.5% n=674 50.8% n=653 49.2% n=705 56.8% n=536 43.1% 
Variables Mean Stdv Mea
n 
Stde
v 
Mea
n 
Stde
v 
Mea
n 
Stde
v 
Mea
n 
Stde
v 
Mea
n 
Stde
v 
Log of D&O 
coverage 
 
18.93 1.24 - - 18.90 1.16 - - 18.85 1.03 - - 
Log of capital 15.44 1.69 15.06 1.38 15.34 1.73 14.91 1.41 15.34 1.76 14.98 1.42 
 
ROE 
 
2.28 17.88 0.83 7.23 2.22 12.32 1.51 3.85 0.95 9.72 0.42 23.5
5 
Log of 
remuneration 
 
16.64 1.11 16.21 1.01 16.35 1.02 16.04 0.96 16.30 1.42 16.02 1.22 
Director 
 
9.85 2.62 9.34 2.46 9.66 2.29 9.49 2.77 9.39 2.72 9.01 3.17 
Independent 
director 
 
1.86 1.46 1.01 1.41 1.66 1.36 0.92 1.29 1.58 1.21 0.74 1.12 
Shares held by 
director 
 
24.05 14.86 24.07 14.38 1.44 1.39 2.03 1.88 1.34 1.34 1.90 1.81 
Shares held by 
major 
shareholder 
 
17.91 11.06 19.87 11.57 22.59 14.97 25.92 15.18 22.45 14.85 25.13 14.6
0 
Controlled 
director 
 
1.50 1.43 2.12 1.99 18.63 10.84 20.81 11.74 18.69 10.74 21.85 12.0
3 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
 
0.26 0.44 0.29 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.46 
Internal risk 
 
1.78 0.87 2.11 0.87 1.75 0.88 2.08 0.91 1.69 0.91 2.09 0.92 
Debt-asset ratio 
 
109.60 235.1
3 
117.7
4 
281.6
4 
142.9
9 
480.4
9 
144.5
3 
572.2
9 
123.2
1 
335.2
3 
131.3
8 
504.
44 
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Shares of 
foreign natural 
person 
 
0.30 1.05 0.46 1.66 0.31 1.22 0.35 1.40 0.32 1.40 0.45 1.67 
Shares of 
foreign juristic 
person 
 
10.81 14.70 5.62 10.62 10.04 14.29 5.95 10.32 8.02 13.02 4.81 9.41 
Shares of 
foreign financial  
juristic person 
 
0.22 0.94 0.05 0.32 0.29 1.10 0.09 0.68 0.21 1.01 0.05 0.26 
Prior significant 
litigation 
0.15 0.74 0.13 0.64 0.17 0.61 0.14 0.84 0.20 0.76 0.15 1.37 
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Table 2.31 Independent samples test of 2008  
 
This table contains the independent sample test from 2008, which illustrates whether the 
difference between firms with D&O insurance and without D&O insurance is significant 
or not. The significant variables include: capital, industry, remuneration, number of 
directors, number of independent directors, shares held by major shareholders, number of 
controlled directors, internal risk, shares of foreign natural persons, shares of foreign 
juristic persons, and shares of foreign financial juristic persons. In general, this implies 
that the quality of corporate governance of firms with D&O insurance is statistically 
different from the firms without D&O insurance. An asterisk denotes statistical 
significance at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three 
asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
Equal 
variances 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed
) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Lower Upper 
Log of 
capital 
assumed 
18.181 
.00
0 
4.259 1237 .000*** .37277 .08753 .20106 .54449 
not 
assumed 
 
  
4.250 1179.189 .000*** .37277 .08771 .20069 .54486 
Industry of 
firms 
assumed 165.33
9 
.00
0 
7.421 1237 .000*** .19802 .02668 .14567 .25036 
not 
assumed 
 
  
7.412 
1210.78
0 
.000*** .19802 .02672 .14560 .25043 
ROE assumed 
3.363 
.06
7 
1.878 1237 .061 1.44984 .77218 -.06508 
2.9647
7 
not 
assumed 
 
  
1.863 803.574 .063 1.44984 .77803 -.07737 
2.9770
6 
Log of 
remunerati
on 
assumed 
7.761 
.00
5 
6.978 1232 .000*** .42228 .06052 .30355 .54101 
not 
assumed 
 
  
6.971 
1214.93
0 
.000*** .42228 .06058 .30343 .54112 
Director assumed 
.005 
.94
5 
3.506 1222 .000*** .50902 .14520 .22414 .79389 
not 
assumed 
 
  
3.503 
1212.84
5 
.000*** .50902 .14532 .22391 .79412 
Independe
nt director 
assumed 
.372 
.54
2 
10.31
4 
1236 .000*** .84368 .08180 .68319 
1.0041
6 
not 
assumed   
10.31
0 
1232.50
8 
.000*** .84368 .08183 .68314 
1.0042
1 
Shares held 
by director 
assumed 
.262 
.60
9 
-.024 1222 .981 -.02009 .83578 -1.65982 
1.6196
3 
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not 
assumed 
 
  
-.024 
1217.68
2 
.981 -.02009 .83615 -1.66055 
1.6203
6 
Shares held 
by major 
shareholde
r 
assumed 
.466 
.49
5 
-3.046 1236 .002** -1.9599 .64350 -3.22236 -.69744 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-3.047 
1235.16
0 
.002** -1.9599 .64321 -3.22181 -.69799 
Controlled 
director 
assumed 
27.955 
.00
0 
-6.279 1236 .000*** -.61912 .09860 -.81256 -.42568 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-6.298 1136.017 .000*** -.61912 .09830 -.81199 -.42625 
Duality of 
CEO and 
COB 
assumed 
7.632 
.00
6 
-1.380 1236 .168 -.03505 .02540 -.08487 .01477 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-1.381 
1235.49
9 
.168 -.03505 .02539 -.08486 .01475 
Internal 
risk 
assumed 
.039 
.84
4 
-6.597 1236 .000*** -.32733 .04962 -.42468 -.22999 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-6.597 
1235.39
6 
.000*** -.32733 .04962 -.42468 -.22999 
Debt-asset 
ratio 
assumed 
.413 
.52
1 
-.552 1237 .581 -8.14072 14.75524 
-37.0887
7 
20.807
34 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-.553 
1206.92
2 
.581 -8.14072 14.72760 
-37.0352
6 
20.753
82 
Shares of 
foreign 
natural 
person 
assumed 
17.315 
.00
0 
-2.040 1236 .042* -.16147 .07914 -.31673 -.00620 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-2.049 
1058.81
7 
.041* -.16147 .07881 -.31612 -.00682 
Shares of 
foreign 
juristic 
person 
assumed 
60.380 
.00
0 
7.118 1236 .000*** 5.18138 .72790 3.75333 
6.6094
3 
not 
assumed 
 
  
7.097 1112.633 .000*** 5.18138 .73012 3.74881 
6.6139
5 
Shares of 
foreign 
financial  
juristic 
person 
assumed 
64.500 
.00
0 
4.270 1236 .000*** .16965 .03973 .09169 .24760 
not 
assumed 
 
  
4.237 751.228 .000*** .16965 .04004 .09104 .24825 
Prior 
significant 
litigation 
assumed 
.561 
.45
4 
.444 1237 .657 .01739 .03917 -.05946 .09424 
not 
assumed   
.443 
1203.17
5 
.658 .01739 .03923 -.05958 .09436 
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Table 2.32 Independent samples test of 2009  
 
This table contains the independent sample test from 2009, which illustrates whether the 
difference between firms with D&O insurance and without D&O insurance is significant 
or not. The significant variables include: capital, industry, remuneration, number of 
directors, number of independent directors, shares held by major shareholders, number of 
controlled directors, internal risk, shares of foreign juristic persons, and shares of foreign 
financial juristic persons. In general, this implies that the quality of corporate governance 
of firms with D&O insurance is statistically different from the firms without D&O 
insurance. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% 
level.  
 
Equal 
variance
s 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed
) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Log of 
capital 
assumed 
23.116 
.00
0 
4.888 1325 .000*** .42408 .08677 .25387 .59430 
not 
assumed 
 
  
4.903 
1289.18
6 
.000*** .42408 .08650 .25439 .59378 
Industry of 
firms 
assumed 66.01
2 
.00
0 
8.669 1325 .000*** .23019 .02655 .17810 .28229 
not 
assumed 
 
  
8.677 
1324.08
6 
.000*** .23019 .02653 .17815 .28224 
ROE assumed 
3.731 
.05
4 
1.369 1269 .171 .71528 .52265 -.31008 
1.7406
4 
not 
assumed 
 
  
1.424 805.306 .155 .71528 .50241 -.27090 
1.7014
6 
Log of 
remuneratio
n 
assumed 15.13
5 
.00
0 
5.562 1304 .000*** .30581 .05498 .19795 .41367 
not 
assumed 
 
  
5.573 
1303.92
3 
.000*** .30581 .05488 .19815 .41346 
Director assumed 
7.240 
.00
7 
1.232 1288 .218 .17374 .14105 -.10297 .45045 
not 
assumed 
 
  
1.225 
1214.28
3 
.221 .17374 .14183 -.10452 .45201 
Independent 
director 
assumed 
.340 
.56
0 
10.09
5 
1288 .000*** .74581 .07388 .60087 .89075 
not 
assumed 
 
  
10.110 
1287.90
1 
.000*** .74581 .07377 .60109 .89053 
Shares held 
by director 
assumed 25.16
7 
.00
0 
-6.396 1288 .000*** -.58731 .09182 -.76744 
-.4071
7 
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not 
assumed 
 
  
-6.341 
1147.48
8 
.000*** -.58731 .09262 -.76903 
-.4055
8 
Shares held 
by major 
shareholder 
assumed 
.140 
.70
9 
-3.966 1288 .000*** -3.33079 .83983 -4.97837 
-1.683
21 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-3.964 
1281.21
7 
.000*** -3.33079 .84017 -4.97905 
-1.682
53 
Controlled 
director 
assumed 
6.005 
.01
4 
-3.461 1288 .001*** -2.17656 .62883 -3.41021 
-.9429
1 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-3.453 
1263.86
4 
.001*** -2.17656 .63031 -3.41313 
-.9400
0 
Duality of 
CEO and 
COB 
assumed 10.46
3 
.00
1 
-1.621 1307 .105 -.04003 .02469 -.08846 .00841 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-1.619 
1293.63
4 
.106 -.04003 .02472 -.08852 .00847 
Internal risk assumed 
.179 
.67
3 
-6.643 1307 .000*** -.32956 .04961 -.42689 
-.2322
3 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-6.636 
1295.73
6 
.000*** -.32956 .04966 -.42699 
-.2321
3 
Debt-asset 
ratio 
assumed 
.002 
.96
0 
-.053 1282 .958 -1.54718 29.40213 
-59.2287
4 
56.134
39 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-.052 
1195.96
9 
.958 -1.54718 29.64908 
-59.7171
7 
56.622
82 
Shares of 
foreign 
natural 
person 
assumed 
.890 
.34
6 
-.435 1288 .663 -.03179 .07301 -.17503 .11144 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-.434 
1238.15
4 
.665 -.03179 .07332 -.17564 .11205 
Shares of 
foreign 
juristic 
person 
assumed 50.10
1 
.00
0 
5.864 1288 .000*** 4.09187 .69775 2.72303 
5.4607
2 
not 
assumed 
 
  
5.919 
1207.34
0 
.000*** 4.09187 .69130 2.73558 
5.4481
6 
Shares of 
foreign 
financial  
juristic 
person 
 
assumed 49.59
1 
.00
0 
3.771 1288 .000*** .19340 .05128 .09279 .29401 
not 
assumed 
   
3.821 1118.541 .000*** .19340 .05062 .09408 .29272 
Prior 
significant 
litigation 
assumed 
1.643 
.20
0 
.817 1325 .414 .03285 .04018 -.04598 .11167 
not 
assumed   
.813 
1193.18
3 
.416 .03285 .04038 -.04637 .11206 
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Table 2.33 Independent samples test of 2010  
 
This table contains the independent sample test from 2010, which illustrates whether the 
difference between firms with D&O insurance and without D&O insurance is significant 
or not. The significant variables include: capital, industry, remuneration, number of 
directors, number of independent directors, shares held by directors, shares held by major 
shareholders, number of controlled directors, internal risk, shares of foreign juristic 
persons, and shares of foreign financial juristic persons. In general, this implies that the 
quality of corporate governance of firms with D&O insurance is statistically different 
from the firms without D&O insurance. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 
5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate 
significance at 0.1% level.   
 
Equal 
variances 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed
) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Log of 
capital 
assumed 24.39
0 
.00
0 
4.156 1239 .000*** .38275 .09210 .20205 .56345 
not 
assumed 
 
  
4.267 
1231.59
5 
.000*** .38275 .08970 .20677 .55873 
Industry of 
firms 
assumed 79.48
7 
.00
0 
8.561 1239 .000*** .23745 .02774 .18303 .29186 
not 
assumed 
 
  
8.638 1186.800 .000*** .23745 .02749 .18351 .29138 
ROE assumed 
1.238 
.26
6 
.582 1239 .561 .56835 .97665 -1.34773 
2.4844
3 
not 
assumed 
 
  
.527 666.753 .598 .56835 1.07800 -1.54833 
2.6850
4 
Log of 
remuneratio
n 
assumed 
8.054 
.00
5 
4.000 1239 .000*** .30288 .07572 .15433 .45143 
not 
assumed 
 
  
4.074 
1215.05
5 
.000*** .30288 .07435 .15701 .44876 
Director assumed 
1.933 
.16
5 
2.558 1239 .011** .42852 .16749 .09993 .75712 
not 
assumed 
 
  
2.506 
1051.47
8 
.012** .42852 .17099 .09301 .76404 
Independen
t director 
assumed 
8.789 
.00
3 
11.39
0 
1239 .000*** .76907 .06752 .63660 .90154 
not 
assumed   
11.53
0 
1197.898 .000*** .76907 .06670 .63820 .89994 
Shares held 
by director 
assumed 18.83
4 
.00
0 
-6.025 1239 .000*** -.54270 .09008 -.71943 
-.3659
7 
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not 
assumed 
 
  
-5.806 963.888 .000*** -.54270 .09347 -.72614 
-.3592
6 
Shares held 
by major 
shareholder 
 
assumed 
.019 
.89
0 
-3.046 1203 .002** -2.61289 .85768 -4.29561 
-.9301
8 
not 
assumed   
-3.053 1120.623 .002** -2.61289 .85574 -4.29192 
-.9338
6 
Controlled 
director 
assumed 
6.556 .011 -4.635 1203 .000*** -3.07539 .66354 -4.37722 
-1.773
56 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-4.571 
1049.45
4 
.000*** -3.07539 .67283 -4.39563 
-1.755
15 
Duality of 
CEO and 
COB 
assumed 
1.953 
.16
3 
-.703 1239 .482 -.01818 .02587 -.06893 .03257 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-.701 1140.273 .484 -.01818 .02594 -.06907 .03271 
Internal risk assumed 
.760 
.38
4 
-7.136 1239 .000*** -.37563 .05264 -.47890 
-.2723
6 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-7.137 1152.408 .000*** -.37563 .05263 -.47890 
-.2723
6 
Debt-asset 
ratio 
assumed 
1.006 
.31
6 
-.533 1239 .594 -12.57156 23.58850 
-58.8493
9 
33.706
26 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-.504 858.543 .615 -12.57156 24.96803 
-61.5770
9 
36.433
96 
Shares of 
foreign 
natural 
person 
assumed 
6.075 
.01
4 
-1.343 1239 .179 -.11674 .08691 -.28725 .05377 
not 
assumed 
 
  
-1.311 
1031.85
9 
.190 -.11674 .08906 -.29149 .05801 
Shares of 
foreign 
juristic 
person 
assumed 31.66
8 
.00
0 
4.888 1239 .000*** 3.23666 .66216 1.93758 
4.5357
4 
not 
assumed 
 
  
5.098 
1236.64
1 
.000*** 3.23666 .63490 1.99106 
4.4822
6 
Shares of 
foreign 
financial  
juristic 
person 
assumed 48.12
9 
.00
0 
3.583 1239 .000*** .15911 .04441 .07198 .24623 
not 
assumed 
 
 
  
4.038 826.782 .000*** .15911 .03941 .08176 .23646 
Prior 
significant 
litigation 
assumed 
1.310 
.25
3 
.699 1239 .484 .04276 .06114 -.07720 .16272 
not 
assumed   
.650 777.628 .516 .04276 .06579 -.08638 .17190 
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Table 2.34 Demand of D&O insurance in 2008 
 
This table contains the result of logistic regression of 2008. The dependent variable is a 
binary variable depending on whether firms purchase D&O insurance or not. The 
independent variables are the proxy variables of corporate governance. These test the 
association between D&O insurance purchase and firms’ qualities of corporate 
governance. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 5% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 1% level. 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log of capital .009 .062 .022 1 .883 1.009 .893 1.140 
Industry of firms .564 .141 15.958 1 .000*** 1.758 1.333 2.318 
ROE .004 .005 .642 1 .423 1.004 .995 1.013 
Log of 
remuneration 
.268 .078 11.752 1 .001*** 1.307 1.121 1.523 
Director .071 .027 7.097 1 .008*** 1.074 1.019 1.132 
Independent 
director 
.350 .046 57.518 1 .000*** 1.418 1.296 1.552 
Shares held by 
director 
-.002 .005 .183 1 .669 .998 .989 1.007 
Shares held by 
major shareholder 
-.011 .006 3.582 1 .058* .989 .977 1.000 
Controlled director -.126 .045 7.852 1 .005*** .882 .808 .963 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
.098 .151 .420 1 .517 1.103 .820 1.484 
Internal risk -.319 .087 13.312 1 .000*** .727 .613 .863 
Debt-asset ratio .000 .000 1.217 1 .270 1.000 .999 1.000 
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
-.086 .049 3.096 1 .078* .918 .835 1.010 
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
.020 .006 10.133 1 .001*** 1.020 1.008 1.033 
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Shares of foreign 
financial  juristic 
person 
.311 .156 3.983 1 .046** 1.365 1.006 1.854 
Prior significant 
litigation 
.040 .087 .217 1 .641 1.041 .878 1.234 
Constant -4.994 1.156 18.669 1 .000*** .007 
  
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: χ2 = 7.624 (Sig. = .471) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients: χ2 = 252.657 (Sig. = . 000) 
2 Log likelihood = 1435.688    
Cox & Snell R2 = .187    
Nagelkerke R2 = .250del Summary 
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Table 2.35 Demand of D&O insurance in 2009 
 
This table contains the result of logistic regression of 2009. The dependent variable is a 
binary variable depending on whether firms purchase D&O insurance or not. The 
independent variables are the proxy variables of corporate governance. These test the 
association between D&O insurance purchase and firms’ qualities of corporate 
governance. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 5% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 1% level. 
 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log of capital .045 .057 .624 1 .430 1.046 .936 1.169 
Industry of firms .686 .135 25.671 1 .000*** 1.985 1.523 2.589 
ROE .015 .014 1.233 1 .267 1.016 .988 1.044 
Log of 
remuneration 
.239 .082 8.472 1 .004*** 1.270 1.081 1.491 
Director -.046 .030 2.358 1 .125 .955 .900 1.013 
Independent 
director 
.388 .050 59.888 1 .000*** 1.474 1.336 1.626 
Shares held by 
director 
-.147 .047 9.668 1 .002*** .863 .787 .947 
Shares held by 
major shareholder 
-.018 .005 14.259 1 .000*** .982 .974 .992 
Controlled director -.022 .006 12.640 1 .000*** .978 .967 .990 
Duality of CEO and 
COB 
.050 .154 .108 1 .742 1.052 .779 1.421 
Internal risk -.296 .085 12.029 1 .001*** .744 .629 .879 
Debt-asset ratio .000 .000 .276 1 .599 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
.016 .048 .110 1 .740 1.016 .924 1.117 
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
.020 .006 10.234 1 .001*** 1.021 1.008 1.033 
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Shares of foreign 
financial  juristic 
person 
.116 .087 1.778 1 .182 1.123 .947 1.333 
Prior significant 
litigation 
-.001 .086 .000 1 .989 .999 .844 1.181 
Constant -3.331 1.263 6.952 1 .008*** .036 
  
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: χ2 = 5.840  (Sig. = .665) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients: χ2 = 267.495 (Sig. = . 000) 
2 Log likelihood = 1478.761    
Cox & Snell R2 = .191    
Nagelkerke R2 = .255 
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Table 2.36 Demand of D&O insurance in 2010 
 
This table contains the result of logistic regression of 2010. The dependent variable is a 
binary variable depending on whether firms purchase D&O insurance or not. The 
independent variables are the proxy variables of corporate governance. These test the 
association between D&O insurance purchase and firms’ qualities of corporate 
governance. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 5% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 1% level. 
 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log of capital .074 .059 1.537 1 .215 1.076 .958 1.209 
Industry of firms .605 .140 18.542 1 .000*** 1.831 1.390 2.412 
ROE -.001 .004 .119 1 .730 .999 .991 1.006 
Log of 
remuneration 
.190 .071 7.189 1 .007*** 1.210 1.053 1.390 
Director -.037 .034 1.239 1 .266 .963 .902 1.029 
Independent 
director 
.514 .060 73.026 1 .000*** 1.672 1.486 1.881 
Shares held by 
director 
-.146 .051 8.193 1 .004*** .864 .782 .955 
Shares held by 
major 
shareholder 
-.016 .005 10.338 1 .001*** .984 .975 .994 
Controlled 
director 
-.025 .006 15.623 1 .000*** .976 .964 .988 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
.285 .157 3.317 1 .069* 1.330 .979 1.807 
Internal risk -.320 .087 13.600 1 .000*** .726 .612 .861 
Debt-asset ratio .000 .000 1.068 1 .301 1.000 .999 1.000 
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
 
-.056 .043 1.687 1 .194 .946 .869 1.029 
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Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
.015 .007 4.716 1 .030** 1.015 1.001 1.029 
Shares of foreign 
financial  
juristic person 
.403 .187 4.629 1 .031** 1.496 1.037 2.159 
Prior significant 
litigation 
.010 .058 .033 1 .857 1.010 .903 1.131 
Constant -2.858 1.189 5.778 1 .016** .057   
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: χ2 = 6.481  (Sig. = .593)) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients: χ2 = 274.510 (Sig. = . 000) 
2 Log likelihood = 1371.626     
Cox & Snell R2 = .204 
Nagelkerke R2 = .273 
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Table 2.37 The result of log transformed regression and bootstrap 
 
This table contains the results of the regressions where dependent variables are log 
transformed. t statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical 
significance at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three 
asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level. The dependent variables are the logarithm of 
D&O coverage from 2008 to 2009 respectively. This transforms the D&O coverage 
which is highly skewed and makes the regression close to liner relation. This table also 
presents the result of 10,000 bootstrap replications of each year which does not have to 
follow the assumption of normality of residual and covariance. These results are similar 
and thus unbiased.   
 
 (1) 
 
D&O 
coverage 
2008 
(2) 
 
Bootstrap 
of 2008 
(3) 
 
D&O 
coverage 
2009 
 
(4) 
 
Bootstrap 
of 2009  
(5) 
 
D&O 
coverage 
2010 
(6) 
 
Bootstrap 
of 2010  
Log of capital 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.326*** 0.326*** 
(7.77) (7.36) (9.57) (9.64) (12.00) (12.04) 
 
Industry of firms 0.169 0.169 0.231** 0.231** 0.178** 0.178** 
(1.70) (1.65) (2.90) (2.93) (2.68) (2.64) 
 
ROE 0.00216 0.00216 -0.00172 -0.00172 -0.00917* -0.00917* 
(0.83) (0.64) (-0.56) (-0.21) (-2.47) (-2.40) 
 
Log of 
remuneration 
0.103 0.103* 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.0338 0.0338 
(1.88) (2.00) (4.03) (3.42) (1.10) (1.02) 
 
Director 0.0108 0.0108 -0.0430* -0.0430 -0.0131 -0.0131 
(0.56) (0.68) (-2.32) (-1.89) (-0.83) (-0.77) 
 
Independent 
director 
-0.0453 -0.0453 -0.00708 -0.00708 0.00345 0.00345 
(-1.38) (-1.41) (-0.25) (-0.25) (0.13) (0.12) 
 
Shares held by 
director 
-0.000359 -0.000359 -0.0503 -0.0503 -0.0564* -0.0564* 
(-0.11) (-0.11) (-1.55) (-1.60) (-2.06) (-2.19) 
 
Shares held by 
major shareholder 
-0.00244 -0.00244 0.00400 0.00400 0.00362 0.00362 
(-0.56) (-0.56) (1.44) (1.23) (1.53) (1.24) 
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Controlled director -0.0718 -0.0718 -0.00545 -0.00545 -0.00539 -0.00539 
(-1.86) (-1.84) (-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.75) (-1.66) 
 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
-0.0663 -0.0663 0.137 0.137 0.0610 0.0610 
(-0.60) (-0.58) (1.48) (1.64) (0.83) (0.89) 
 
Internal risk 0.0200 0.0200 -0.0795 -0.0795 -0.0314 -0.0314 
(0.31) (0.32) (-1.51) (-1.62) (-0.76) (-0.82) 
 
Debt-asset ratio -0.000483* -0.000483* -0.000133 -0.000133 -0.000291* -0.00029
1* 
(-2.04) (-2.46) (-1.57) (-1.28) (-2.49) (-2.06) 
 
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
-0.0114 -0.0114 0.000734 0.000734 0.0273 0.0273 
(-0.26) (-0.34) (0.02) (0.02) (1.24) (1.60) 
 
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
0.00211 0.00211 -0.00118 -0.00118 0.00100 0.00100 
(0.53) (0.50) (-0.35) (-0.27) (0.36) (0.31) 
 
Shares of foreign 
financial  juristic 
person 
0.0561 0.0561 0.0808* 0.0808** 0.0700* 0.0700* 
(1.06) (1.34) (2.20) (2.72) (2.18) (2.10) 
 
 
Prior significant 
litigation 
-0.00831 -0.00831 0.0181 0.0181 -0.0384 -0.0384 
(-0.13) (-0.16) (0.30) (0.32) (-0.94) (-0.89) 
 
cons 12.08*** 12.08*** 11.61*** 11.61*** 13.50*** 13.50*** 
(14.86) (14.88) (15.58) (12.80) (24.50) (23.20) 
 
N 602 602 663 663 688 688 
R2 0.2712  0.323004  0.349823  
Adj-R2 0.2512  0.306236  0.334320  
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Table 2.38 The result of Box-cox transformed regression 
 
This table contains the result of regressions where dependent variables are Box-cox 
transformed. Box-Cox transformation is conducted to fit the regression closer to linearity 
by computing the proper power of dependent variables. The power of dependent variable 
(lamda) is 5.58423 for year 2008, 3.831266 for year 2009 and 2.643553 for year 2010.t 
statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate 
significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Log of D&O 
coverage 2008 
Log of D&O 
coverage 2009 
Log of D&O 
coverage 2010 
 
Log of capital 1465554.8*** 5006.0*** 111.0*** 
(10.14) (10.31) (12.55) 
 
Industry of firms 575256.0 3575.1** 55.99** 
(1.73) (2.96) (2.59) 
 
ROE 7368.2 -17.52 -3.224** 
(0.84) (-0.38) (-2.67) 
 
Log of remuneration 312907.0 2811.4*** 10.69 
(1.71) (3.96) (1.07) 
 
Director 34608.0 -612.8* -4.110 
(0.54) (-2.18) (-0.80) 
 
Independent director -95213.1 -158.2 1.292 
(-0.86) (-0.37) (0.14) 
 
Shares held by 
director 
-930.9 65.89 1.417 
(-0.09) (1.57) (1.84) 
 
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
-8417.2 -78.78 -1.668 
(-0.57) (-1.39) (-1.67) 
 
Controlled director -338523.6** -926.3 -19.84* 
(-2.61) (-1.88) (-2.22) 
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Duality of CEO and 
COB 
-201396.2 1691.1 18.69 
(-0.54) (1.21) (0.78) 
 
Internal risk 78309.8 -1192.1 -11.19 
(0.36) (-1.50) (-0.83) 
 
Debt-asset ratio -2310.8** -2.572* -0.107** 
(-2.91) (-2.02) (-2.79) 
 
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
-51442.5 -46.46 9.158 
(-0.35) (-0.10) (1.27) 
 
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
14801.6 19.17 0.549 
(1.11) (0.38) (0.60) 
 
Shares of foreign 
financial  juristic 
person 
266381.0 1349.3* 24.50* 
(1.49) (2.43) (2.34) 
 
 
Prior significant 
litigation 
-62944.0 69.64 -13.87 
(-0.30) (0.08) (-1.04) 
 
Constant -13444773.6*** -36452.0** 552.5** 
(-4.93) (-3.23) (3.08) 
 
N 602 663 688 
R2 0.3696 0.3626 0.3710 
Adj-R2 0.3524 0.3469 0.3560 
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Table 2.39 The result of Tobit model 
 
This table contains results of the Tobit model from 2008 to 2010. The dependent variable 
is the logarithm of D&O insurance coverage from 2008 to 2010 respectively. t statistics is 
reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two 
asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 
0.1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Log of D&O 
coverage 2008 
Log of D&O 
coverage 2009 
Log of D&O 
coverage 2010 
 
Log of capital 0.336*** 0.307*** 0.326*** 
(7.84) (9.68) (12.13) 
 
Industry of firms 0.170 0.232** 0.178** 
(1.72) (2.94) (2.72) 
 
ROE 0.00219 -0.00171 -0.00917* 
(0.84) (-0.57) (-2.50) 
 
Log of 
remuneration 
0.103 0.189*** 0.0339 
(1.89) (4.08) (1.12) 
 
Director 0.0106 -0.0431* -0.0132 
(0.55) (-2.35) (-0.84) 
 
Independent 
director 
-0.0457 -0.00711 0.00341 
(-1.40) (-0.25) (0.13) 
 
Shares held by 
director 
-0.000385 0.00401 0.00362 
(-0.12) (1.46) (1.55) 
 
Shares held by 
major shareholder 
-0.00239 -0.00544 -0.00539 
(-0.55) (-1.47) (-1.77) 
 
Controlled 
director 
-0.0718 -0.0502 -0.0563* 
(-1.87) (-1.56) (-2.08) 
 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
-0.0693 0.137 0.0612 
(-0.63) (1.50) (0.84) 
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Internal risk 0.0197 -0.0795 -0.0314 
(0.31) (-1.53) (-0.77) 
 
Debt-asset ratio -0.000485* -0.000132 -0.000291* 
(-2.07) (-1.59) (-2.51) 
 
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
-0.0115 0.000786 0.0274 
(-0.26) (0.03) (1.25) 
 
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
0.00215 -0.00120 0.000992 
(0.55) (-0.36) (0.36) 
 
Shares of foreign 
financial  juristic 
person 
0.0558 0.0808* 0.0701* 
(1.06) (2.22) (2.20) 
 
 
Prior significant 
litigation 
-0.00853 0.0182 -0.0384 
(-0.14) (0.30) (-0.95) 
 
Constant 12.07*** 11.60*** 13.50*** 
(14.94) (15.75) (24.76) 
 
N 602 663 688 
sigma 1.128*** 0.933*** 0.795*** 
Pseudo R2 0.0919 0.1259 0.1526 
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Table 2.40 The result of censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) 
 
This table contains results of censored least absolute deviations estimator (CLAD) from 
2008 to 2010. The dependent variable is the logarithm of D&O insurance coverage from 
2008 to 2010 respectively. CLAD does not have to follow assumptions of the Tobin 
model where dependent variable shall be normally distributed with certain censoring 
point. Thus, the result here is more robust. t statistics is reported in parentheses. An 
asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance 
at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Log of D&O 
coverage 2008 
Log of D&O 
coverage 2009 
Log of D&O 
coverage 2010 
 
Log of capital 0.384*** 0.229*** 0.217*** 
(20.88) (15.26) (8.04) 
 
Industry of 
firms 
-0.153*** 0.380*** -0.0176 
(-3.50) (9.95) (-0.29) 
 
ROE 0.00545*** -0.00104* -0.0131*** 
(9.10) (-2.52) (-3.54) 
 
Log of 
remuneration 
0.107*** 0.152*** 0.118** 
(4.47) (7.27) (3.06) 
 
Director -0.0111 -0.0225* -0.0137 
(-1.17) (-2.54) (-0.97) 
 
Independent 
director 
-0.0689*** -0.0930*** 0.0576* 
(-4.83) (-6.82) (2.16) 
 
Shares held by 
director 
0.000852 -0.00288* -0.00474* 
(0.59) (-2.19) (-2.22) 
 
Shares held by 
major 
shareholder 
-0.0150*** -0.0232*** -0.0110*** 
(-7.28) (-13.42) (-3.67) 
 
 
Controlled 
director 
-0.0665*** -0.0617*** -0.0668* 
(-4.07) (-4.20) (-2.55) 
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Duality of 
CEO and COB 
-0.113* 0.125** 0.0948 
(-2.44) (2.71) (1.40) 
 
Internal risk -0.112*** -0.0961*** -0.111** 
(-3.96) (-3.73) (-2.87) 
 
Debt-asset 
ratio 
-0.00141*** -0.0000976*** -0.000550*** 
(-10.47) (-4.40) (-4.28) 
 
Shares of 
foreign natural 
person 
-0.0466** -0.0418*** 0.0193 
(-2.80) (-4.90) (0.62) 
 
 
Shares of 
foreign juristic 
person 
0.00319 0.0136*** 0.00634* 
(1.70) (9.60) (2.44) 
 
 
Shares of 
foreign 
financial  
juristic person 
0.0642*** 0.0764*** 0.0706* 
(4.13) (4.01) (2.13) 
 
 
 
Prior 
significant 
litigation 
-0.0492*** 0.0957** -0.125** 
(-4.37) (3.07) (-3.20) 
 
 
cons 12.28*** 13.68*** 14.23*** 
(33.54) (38.94) (23.80) 
 
N 604 661 686 
Sigma 1.119077 .9318748    .7941698    
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CHAPTER 3  
SIGNALING HYPOTHESIS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The release of economically relevant information is important for the evaluation of firms’ 
outstanding securities and the ability to attract investment in the future.343 Under this 
theory, this section will test whether insured firms purchase D&O insurance in order to 
convey a positive signal to the market and even promote their reputation or value. The 
previous chapter initially tests monitoring hypothesis of D&O insurance in Taiwan. After 
rejecting the monitoring hypothesis, this chapter will find an alternative theory to explain 
the role of D&O insurance in corporate governance, which is the signal hypothesis. This 
dissertation argues that the purchase of D&O insurance can convey positive signals to 
investors, and firms would prefer to purchase insurance to convey a positive signal to 
attract investment and to promote their value.  
Three empirical works are processed to test this signal hypothesis. First of all, in order to 
assess how D&O insurance conveys a positive signal, the first set of regressions applies 
Ohlson model and uses the market value of insured firms as dependent variable. If D&O 
insurance indeed has a positive signal effect, the purchase will positively contribute to the 
market value of insured firms. The second set of regressions use foreign investments as 
                                                            
343 See Robert M. Lawless, Stephen P. Ferris, & Bryan Bacon, The Influence of Legal Liability on 
Corporate Financial Signaling, 23 J. CORP. L. 209 (1998).  
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dependent variables. Foreign investor usually concerns more about firms’ corporate 
governance. If D&O insurance contributes to the increase of foreign investments, then the 
positive signal effect of D&O insurance is implied. Alternatively, the third set of 
regressions uses D&O insurance as dependent variable and foreign investments as well as 
other control variables as independent variables. This is to test how foreign investors care 
about D&O insurance. Then, it is found that the firms purchase more D&O insurance 
usually have better qualities of corporate governance. Concluding the findings here, this 
research infers that D&O insurance in Taiwan has a positive effect, and this may be the 
reason why good firms have more D&O insurance.    
 
3.2 The first test of signal effect of D&O insurance: market value of insured firms as 
dependent variable   
3.2.1 Introduction  
By the reasoning of signal hypothesis, the purchase of D&O insurance will release a 
signal to investors, and investors will evaluate that positively. Thus, D&O insurance 
purchase should have a positive effect on firms’ stock price. In addition to the proxy 
variable, percentage of shares of foreign investors, used in following section, this section 
will use another intuitive proxy variable, which is stock price.  
This study applies the famous model proposed by Ohlson (1995) concerning evaluating 
the value of firms. If the empirical result demonstrates a positive relationship between 
D&O insurance and stock price, then the hypothesis concerning the positive effect of 
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D&O insurance will be supported. In contrast, inverse association between D&O 
insurance and stock price implies D&O insurance emits a negative signal to the market. 
Under such circumstance, it would be necessary to try to find the reasons which can 
explain this result which is different from the previous chapter. Finally, the empirical 
evidence supports the former, and the positive effect of D&O insurance is confirmed.  
 
3.2.2 Literature review: The development and application of Ohlson’s model 
3.2.2.1 Corporate governance and market value of firms  
Albeit the discussion of corporate governance is sprouting, it should be wondered that 
firm’s corporate governance behavior indeed increase their market value? However, in 
the United States, many empirical works cannot provide strong evidence for the 
relationship between corporate governance behavior and increase of market value.344 
Similar problems are also addressed in emerging market. Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang 
and Woochan Kim test the relationship between corporate governance and market value 
of firms in Korea by OLS regression and instrument variables.345 They find that corporate 
governance is an important but maybe casual factor of market value of firms.346 Bernard 
S. Black also carries out empirical analysis in Russian.347 He concludes that firm’s 
                                                            
344 See Bernard S. Black, Does Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian Data, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2131, 2131 (2001). Different arguments like corporate governance can increase Apple’s market 
value, see In re Apple Computer, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. C 06-4128 JF (HRL), 2008 WL 4820784, at 2 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2008) 
345 See Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' 
Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366, 366 (2006). 
346 Id.  
347 See Bernard S. Black, supra note 344, at 2131. 
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corporate governance will affect their market value significantly if countries’ constraints 
on corporate governance are limited.348  
However, different argument advocates corporate governance would substantially affect 
market value and shareholders.349 Lawrence D. Brown and Marcus L. Caylor test the 
association between firms’ performance and Gov-Score, which is composed by 51 
corporate governance factors. They find firms with better governance indeed have better 
profit, more value and more benefit for shareholders.350 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen 
and Allen Ferrell test the association between market value and corporate governance 
arrangements which are based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for 
mergers and charter amendments. They find the index of such arrangements is inversely 
associated with market value.351 Literature also proposes that market value of firms 
would be affected by their corporate governance in Russia.352  
 
3.2.2.2 D&O insurance, signal effect and market value of firms  
It is controversy that whether D&O insurance increase firm performance and 
shareholder’s wealth. The negative viewpoint mainly bases on the problem and risk that 
                                                            
348 Id. 
349 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?  22:2 
Rev. Fin. Stud. 783, 783 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423. 
350 See Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 28-32 
(2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=586423. 
351 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, supra note 349, at 39. 
352 5 L of Intl Trade § 151:3. 
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might be induced by D&O insurance. If D&O insurance represents the potential risk, 
opportunistic behavior and moral hazard, firms would avoid purchasing D&O insurance 
to damage the reputation and value of firms. 
For example, John M. R. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann, Jarrad Harford find there is an 
inverse association between D&O insurance coverage and the performance of 3-year 
stock price.353 And managers who have high D&O insurance coverage have poor 
performance in the future.354 In this way, the negative signal effect of D&O insurance is 
expected. Similarly, M. Martin Boyer proposes that if firms signal their quality by 
purchasing less D&O insurance,355 this implies D&O insurance itself is a bad signal. 
Zhihong Chen, Oliver Zhen Li and Hong Zou further find that shareholders perceive 
D&O insurance negatively, especially when firms are with excessive coverage.356 All 
these studies imply D&O insurance may have a negative signal effect.  
In contrast, some literature proposes the positive effect of D&O insurance on firm’s 
performance and market value. Sanjai Bhagat, James A. Brickley and Jeffrey L. Coles 
find that D&O insurance has positive on shareholder wealth and no negative effect is 
found. 357  Jinyoung Park also finds the D&O insurance can positively contribute 
                                                            
353 See John M. R. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann & Jarrad Harford, supra note 156, at 633. They provide two 
interpretations for the use of D&O insurance. First, managers use insurance to solidify their ability to 
exploit inside information. Secondly, D&O insurance is used to protect the assets of managers and firms 
from litigation. Even though these two interpretations are not exclusive, their evidence implies that the 
former is more important.  
354 Id. 
355 See M. Martin Boyer, supra note 6, at 12. 
356 See Zhihong Chen, Oliver Zhen Li & Hong Zou, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and the 
Cost of Equity Capital 31 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1837912. 
357 See Sanjai Bhagat, James A. Brickley & Jeffrey L. Coles, Managerial Indemnification and Liability 
Insurance: The Effect on Shareholder Wealth, 54.4 J. Risk & Ins. 733 (1987). 
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shareholder’s wealth.358 He tests the association between D&O insurance coverage and 
the quality of firms’ voluntary disclosure.359 He finds that there is an association between 
insurance coverage and forecast frequency and precision. 360  The more insurance 
coverage, the more disclosure occurs. There is also more precise and timely.361 Also, 
positive response from market is given to such information.362 All these results imply the 
positive signal effect of D&O insurance.  
 
3.2.2.3 Introduction of the Ohlson model 
When evaluating firm value, non-accounting is usually and relatively less explored.363 
The Ohlson model can give a direct link between accounting amount and firm value. 
With the following refinement, Ohlson model has been frequently applied in the 
valuation model of firms in accounting research.364 The model postulates abnormal 
earnings by following two equations:365  
                   111
~~
  tt
a
t
a
t vxx   (1) 
                        121
~  ~   ttt vv                      (2) 
 
                                                            
358 See Jinyoung Park supra note 86, at 30. 
359 Id. at 3. 
360 Id, at 4.  
361 Id. 
362 Id. 
363 See Alnoor Bhimania, Mohamed Azzim Gulamhussenb, Samuel Da-Rocha Lopesc, Accounting and 
Non-Accounting Determinants of Default: An Analysis of Privately-Held Firms, 29:6 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 
517, 520 (2010). 
364 See CHII-SHYAN KUO, THE PRICING AND DETERMINANTS OF THE DISCRETIONARY COMPONENT OF 
EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION VALUE 51 (2007). 
365 See Kin Lo & Thomas Z. Lys, The Ohlson Model: Contribution to Valuation Theory, Limitations, and 
Empirical Applications 12 (2000), http://ssrn.com/abstract=210948. 
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Where vt indicates the information not yet captured by accounting and ~  is mean 0 
disturbance term.366 Ohlson model is applied to evaluate how D&O insurance and 
corporate governance might affect firms’ market value. 
 
3.2.3 Hypothesis development  
In addition to Ohlson model, this dissertation also follows the thoughts of Lawrence D. 
Brown and Marcus L. Caylor which tests the relationship between firm performance and 
corporate governance, 367  to test the relation between firm performance, corporate 
governance and D&O insurance purchase. This research assumes D&O insurance have 
positive effect on firms’ market value. The detailed hypothesis can be presented below.  
 
3.2.3.1 Signal hypothesis 
The core issue that should be defined first is, is D&O insurance a positive or negative 
signal to the market? Even though D&O itself is positive news, if it is accompanied by 
other information such as more internal risks, will this negatively affect firms’ 
performance and market price? If D&O insurance protects directors and officers and lets 
them concentrate on management without worrying about litigation risk, D&O insurance 
will have positive signal effect. In contrast, if D&O insurance implies that firms might be 
not confident about their businesses, and firms might be in potential litigation trouble. 
                                                            
366 Id. 
367 See Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, supra note 350, at 1.    
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Even worse, if the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection have been induced, 
then the purchase of D&O insurance is a bad news to the market.  
Whether or not D&O insurance can spur firms to optimize their corporate governance is 
an important signal to the market.368 Under the theory of signal hypothesis, the purchase 
and coverage of D&O insurance will convey a positive signal to the market and thus 
improve the market value of insured firms. The hypothesis is set up below:  
H1: The purchase and coverage of D&O insurance is positively related to the 
market value of firms.  
 
3.2.3.2 Corporate governance hypothesis  
In addition to the main hypothesis, other relevant variables are used as control variables. 
As discussed in the literature review, the effect of corporate governance on firms’ market 
value is controversial. If D&O insurance is an outside monitoring mechanism for 
corporate governance, it would be reasonable to believe that D&O insurance and other 
governance mechanisms affect insured firms’ market value. This study assumes other 
corporate governance mechanisms would positively affect firms’ market value.  
H2: The quality of corporate governance is positive related to the market value of 
firms.  
 
3.2.4 Data, variables, methods and research design  
                                                            
368 See Sean J. Griffith, supra note 85, at 28. 
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3.2.4.1 Data 
The data source of this section is the same as the test in 2.2.4. There were 1,239 
observations in 2008, 1,327 observations in 2009, and 1,241 observations in 2010.  
 
3.2.4.2 Variables  
Utilizing the Olhson model, accounting and non-accounting information affects firms’ 
market value. Researchers traditionally use stock price as market value. In D&O 
insurance literature, M. Martin Boyer also uses market value of equity as the measure of 
the wealth of shareholder.369 This study uses the market value of firms as the dependent 
variable. According to the regulation in Taiwan, within three months after the close of 
each fiscal year, listed firms have to publicly announce and register with the competent 
authority financial reports duly audited and attested by a certified public accountant, 
approved by the board of directors, and recognized by the supervisors.370 Firms are 
required to disclose the information regarding D&O insurance after three months of each 
fiscal year. Prior to November 24, 2010 when the authority amended the regulation, this 
period was four months. Therefore, the data from different periods following different 
regulations are used in this study. In order to assess the influence of finance information 
more accurately, the average stock price of firms of May as dependent variable is used in 
panels of 2008 and 2009. The average stock price of April is assigned as dependent 
                                                            
369 See M. Martin Boyer, supra note 6, at 9. 
370 Securities and Exchange Act (Amended 2010. 11. 24) Article 36 sec1.  
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variable in panel of in 2010.   
Regarding independent variable, the variables bv and EPS represent the book value of 
and earnings per share of firms. Regarding the proxy variable of D&O insurance, 
purchase is a binary variable, which is coded as “1” when firms with insurance and “0” 
otherwise. Then variable lncoverage is the natural logarithm of D&O insurance coverage. 
In order to analyze the effect of D&O insurance on firms’ performance completely, this 
research will use these two D&O insurance proxy variables in separate panels. The 
variable purchase would be used in panel A, and the variable lncoverage would be used 
in panel B.  
In terms of the proxy variables of corporate governance, this dissertation would like to 
consider non-accounting information and the factors concerning directors and D&O 
insurance. First of all, it is usually believed that the duality of the chairman of board 
(COB) and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is negatively related to market value of firms. 
Under agency theory, the duality of COB and CEO might cause interest conflict and 
damage the benefit of firms. Maria Carapeto, Meziane Lasfer and Katerina Machera test 
this issue by event study, and their research strongly support agency theory.371 They find 
that the announcement of split of COB and CEO would cause positive abnormal returns 
and vice versa.372 In order to test the influence of duality of COB and CEO on the 
performance of firms, this study sets up the variable dual. It is a dummy variable, which 
                                                            
371 See Maria Carapeto, Meziane Lasfer & Katerina Machera, Does Duality Destroy Value? (2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=686707. 
372 Id.  
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is granted 1 when the chairman of board is identical to CEO and 0 otherwise.  
Ideally, independent directors are not affected by interest conflict and it is usually 
considered as a good mechanism for corporate governance.373 Accordingly, appointment 
of independent or outside directors should convey positive signal to the market and have 
a significant positive price effect. However, Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang and Woochan 
Kim argue that even in developed countries there is no evidence to prove that firms with 
more independent directors have better performance or higher share price.374 Moreover, 
appointment of additional independent directors may signal that firms plan to address 
business problem.375 Some empirical research propose that more independent directors 
have no statistically significant effect on board’s performance. Some literature even argue 
that more independent directors would make board’s performance worse.376 In emerging 
market, Rajesh Chakrabarti, Krishnamurthy Subramanian and Frederick Tung test India 
market and find that independent director is indeed an importance component of 
monitoring function and adds the value of firms. 377  Even though the results are 
controversial, but the importance of independent director is undisputable. This 
dissertation hypothesizes that the number of independent directors is positively or 
negatively related to market value of firms. The variable idirector indicates the number of 
                                                            
373 See Perry E. Wallace, Accounting, Auditing and Audit Committees after, et al.: Governing outside the 
Box without Stepping off the Edge in the Modern Economy, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 91, 114 (2003).  
374 See Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, supra note 345, at 408. 
375 See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part Ii: Empirical Studies of 
Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 402 (2002).  
376 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 943 (1999). 
377 See Rajesh Chakrabarti, Krishnamurthy Subramanian & Frederick Tung, Independent Directors and 
Firm Value: Evidence from an Emerging Market 20 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1631710. 
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independent directors. 
The value of shares may be affected the ownership structure of firms. In firms with 
dispersed ownership, individual shareholders have less possibility and more cost to 
control the firms. They also have less incentive to monitor firms. As a result, control is in 
the hand of management.378 On the other hand, in firms with concentrated ownership, 
controlling shareholders and blockholders have more incentive to monitor 
management.379 However, blockholders are also a source of agency cost because they 
may act for their own benefits and other investors may have to pay for such costs. If 
investors expect more cost than benefit from ownership, they will discount the shares. In 
contrast, if investors expect more benefit than cost, they may be willing to pay more.380 
Every ownership structure may have different impacts on investors. This is also why 
securities law regulates the disclosure of ownership structure.381 Moreover, dominant 
owner might also influence firms’ performance and corporate governance.382 Jayesh 
Kumar tests Indian market and finds that the shares of directors would significantly 
influence firms’ performance beyond a certain threshold.383  
These factors such as board and ownership structure also affect the risk of directors and 
related with D&O insurance. This research sets up following variables to be proxies. The 
                                                            
378 See Michael C. Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
127, 135 (2009).  
379 Id.  
380 Id. 
381 Id. 
382 See Jayesh Kumar, Agency Theory and Firm Value in India 23 (2004), 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN023822.pdf. 
383 Id, at 23-4. 
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variable Intrlrisk indicates the number of directors and officers appointed by parent 
company or the controlling group. If the chairman of the board, the CEO, the financial 
manager or supervisory director is appointed by the parent company or the controlling 
group, the value will be 1 and 0 otherwise. The final summation ranges from 0 to 4. This 
variable might be negatively related to market value of firms. The variable ctrldirector 
indicates the number of controlled directors. This dissertation hypothesizes that it is 
negatively related to market value of firms. The variable sd indicates the percentage of 
shares of directors and smh indicates the percentage of shares of major shareholders. 
These variables are also expected to be negatively related to market value of firms. All of 
the variables and their descriptions are provided in Table 3.1. 
In conclusion, in order to consider the effect of D&O insurance and corporate governance 
on firms’ market value, this study adds D&O insurance and corporate governance into 
Ohlson model and reformulates the new equation below. DO represents the proxy 
variable of D&O insurance, including purchase and lncoverage. CG represents the proxy 
variables of corporate governance, including dual, intrlrisk, idirector, sd, smh and 
ctrldirector. 
  
            MV = a0 + a1BV + a2 EPS + CG＋DO                (3) 
 
3.2.4.3 Methods and research design 
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used in this research. After an initial test of 
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regression, further regression analyses are conducted by generating interaction terms 
which consisted of D&O insurance and other significant variables. Like 2.2.5.2.3, the 
variables in interaction models are mean-centered. The relationships between market 
value of firms and how those variables are affected by D&O insurance can be tested. For 
robustness, the binary variable, insured or not, is used in panel A, and insurance coverage 
is used in panel B.  
 
3.2.5 Empirical result and analysis 
3.2.5.1 Descriptive analysis 
From 2008 to 2010, the mean of market value, book value and EPS all grow gradually. 
The standard deviations also increase slightly. Similarly, the insured rate has the same 
tendency. The average of the binary variable, purchase, in 2008 is 0.49, and this means 
the overall insured rate is around 49%. Then the insured rate is 51% in 2009 and 57% in 
2010. The mean of coverage also increases gradually from 2008 to 2010, but the standard 
deviation is less. This indicates that more firms begin to increase insurance coverage, but 
the difference between coverage becomes less. This matches with the intuition about the 
insurance market. When the insured ratio is low, some firms purchase a large amount and 
some purchase nothing, and thus, the deviation is larger. When more and more firms start 
to buy insurance, the difference between coverage will decrease and the deviation of 
coverage will become less. The results of descriptive analysis are presented in Table 3.2 
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and 3.3. 
In order to further observe the difference between insured firms and uninsured firms, 
independent sample tests are conducted in this section. It is found that the difference of 
means between insured and uninsured firms is significant. This indicates that insured 
firms have significantly higher market value than uninsured firms from 2008 to 2010. 
Two implications can be drawn from this result. First, firms that purchase D&O insurance 
also have higher market value, and this implies D&O may be beneficial for firms’ market 
value. The effect and magnitude of D&O insurance will be tested by following regression 
analyses. Secondly, firms with higher market value may purchase more insurance. The 
results of independent samples test are presented in Table 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. 
 
3.2.5.2 Regression analysis 
In the first panel, the dummy variable, insured or not, is used as proxy variable of D&O 
insurance. From the result of 2008, it is found that the variables of D&O insurance 
purchase and the number of independent directors are positively significant. Furthermore, 
its coefficient 0.0957 largest, compared with other significant variables. This 
demonstrates that the purchase of D&O insurance is positively correlated to market value 
of firms. In the second panel, D&O insurance coverage is used as a proxy variable of 
D&O insurance. From 2008 to 2010, coverage of insurance is positively significant. This 
provides more obvious evidence than the previous panel and indicates a positive 
association between D&O insurance and market value. From such positive correlation, 
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the positive signal effect of D&O insurance will be one possible explanation. The results 
are reported in Table 3.7 and 3.8.  
 
3.2.6 Conclusion 
From the empirical tests in this section, they demonstrate a positive association between 
D&O insurance purchase and market value of firms. Purchasing D&O insurance and 
increasing insurance coverage are positively correlated to the increase of market value of 
firms. This result not only matches with the previous empirical results, but also sheds 
light on the effect of D&O insurance. A possible explanation is the signal hypothesis – a 
firm may purchase D&O insurance for bettering its reputation albeit its litigation risk is 
low. Even though insurance costs premium, but it can convey a positive signal which is 
even more significant than the book value and EPS of firms. Hence, the empirical result 
provides possible support for the signal hypothesis and explains why firms will do so 
even though they have good corporate governance and their litigation risk is 
comparatively low. More substantial elaboration will be provided in the following 
section.  
 
3.3 Second test of signal effect of D&O insurance: foreign investment as dependent 
variable     
3.3.1 Introduction  
The previous section uses market value of firms as a dependent variable in regressions to 
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test the signal effect of D&O insurance. To secure its robustness, this section will conduct 
a regression on another dependent variable, which is foreign investment. It is usually 
believed that foreign investors emphasize firms’ corporate governance more. This section 
will analyze if there is a positive association between foreign investment and D&O 
insurance purchase. 
 
3.3.2 Variables and hypothesis development 
Professor Sean J. Griffith argues that the following information about D&O insurance 
conveys an important signal concerning insured firms’ qualities of corporate governance: 
the amount of coverage, identity of insurer, type of D&O insurance, and price.384 Like 
previous research, this study hypothesizes that more insurance coverage should emit 
positive signal to the market and thus would attract more foreign investments. In addition, 
as Sean J. Griffith suggests, the identity of the D&O insurer could also be an important 
signal.385 Different insurers may have different reputations and risk criteria of risk 
assessment.386 Being covered by a prestigious D&O insurer means that the insurer would 
like to ensure the loss of insured firms by his estate and reputation, and good signal is 
implied. In contrast, a cut-rate insurer may have worse risk management and less security. 
As a result, being covered by a cut-rate D&O insurer may not be good news to the market. 
Taking this into account, this dissertation uses the identity of the insurer as another proxy 
                                                            
384 See Sean J. Griffith, supra note 51, at 1204-6. 
385 Id. at 1205. 
386 Id.  
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variable of D&O insurance information.  
In sum, because of the availability, this study will use D&O insurance coverage and 
identity of insurer as the proxy variables of D&O insurance information.387 And, such 
information about D&O insurance is set as the independent variables in the regression 
analysis. Regarding the calculation of D&O insurance coverage, it is common that one 
insured firm may purchase D&O insurance from more than one insurer. In other words, 
multiple insurers may coinsure insured firms. Under this circumstance, the amount of 
each insurance policy will be calculated by proportion of coinsurance.  
Foreign investments, including the percentage of shares of foreign natural persons, 
foreign juristic persons and foreign financial juristic persons, are set as dependent 
variables. This is to further test the signal effect of D&O insurance: how D&O insurance 
emits signal to the market and, consequently, whether foreign investors are attracted or 
repelled. Other variables about firms’ corporate governance are set as control variables in 
regressions. The variables used in this dissertation are presented in table 3.9. In 
conclusion, two hypotheses are presented from the discussion above: 
H1: D&O insurance coverage is correlated to foreign investments 
H2: Being insured by a prestigious insurer is correlate to foreign investments 
 
                                                            
387 In Taiwan, D&O insurance information about insurance purchase, insurance coverage and insurer are 
public, but the type of insurance policy and premium are not. Even though the importance of D&O 
insurance premium is also emphasized by Sean J. Griffith, this research does not consider this because the 
information is not available. Neither is the type of D&O insurance policy that firms purchased available. 
This situation also happens in the United States where D&O insurance information is not mandatorily 
disclosed. In contrast, the Canadian market has a full disclosure system and this information is available. 
See Sean J. Griffith, supra note 51, at 1203. 
233 
 
 
 3.3.3 Data and method  
The source of data in this section is the same as the test in 2.4.3. Ordinary least square 
regression (OLS) is applied to estimate the relationship between dependent variables and 
independent variables. This dissertation uses different proxy variables about foreign 
investments in respective panels, including the percentage of shares of foreign natural 
persons, foreign juristic persons and foreign financial juristic persons. Furthermore, 
bootstrap of 10,000 times replications is also conducted. The regression is presented 
below: 
݂݋ݎ݁݅݃݊	݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ
= ߙ + ߚଵܦ&ܱ	݅݊ݏݑݎܽ݊ܿ݁	݂݅݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊ + ߚଶܿ݋ݎ݌݋ݎܽݐ݁݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁
+ ߝ 
(1) 
3.3.4  Empirical result and analysis  
There are two main panels in empirical analyses. The first panel is to use D&O insurance 
coverage as the proxy variable of D&O insurance information. The second panel is to use 
the identity of the insurer as the proxy variable of D&O insurance information. The final 
results are presented in Table 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, and 3.12.  
 
3.3.4.1 Panel 1 
In the first panel, when the dependent variable is the percentage of shares held by foreign 
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natural persons, the D&O insurance coverage is not statistically significant. However, 
when the dependent variable is the percentage of shares held by foreign juristic persons, 
D&O insurance coverage is positively significant from 2008 to 2010. This result 
generally shows that D&O insurance coverage is positively related to the shares held by 
foreign juristic persons. The result of bootstrap is very similar. The variable D&O 
insurance coverage is still positively significant except for 2008. When the dependent 
variable is the percentage of shares held by foreign financial juristic persons, the variable 
D&O insurance coverage is positively significant from 2008 to 2010. The result of 
bootstrap is also identical. This result demonstrates that the more D&O insurance 
coverage purchased, the more investments there are from foreign financial juristic 
persons. This demonstrates a positive correlation of D&O insurance coverage and foreign 
investment. 
 
3.3.4.2 Panel 2 
Sean J. Griffith argues that the identity of the insurer can convey the signal concerning 
insured firms’ qualities.388 Taking this into account, the reputation and quality of insurers 
should be positively related to the qualities of insured firms.in order to test this theory, 
the second panel uses the identity of the D&O insurer as the proxy variable of D&O 
insurance information. Five dummy variables, insurer 1 to 5, denote the six categories of 
                                                            
388 Id., at 1025. 
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D&O insurers, the top 5 insurers and other insurers,389 in property insurance market. 
Similarly, percentage of shares held by foreign natural persons, foreign juristic persons 
and foreign financial juristic person are used as dependent variables in respective 
regressions.  
Generally, the results in this panel is much vaguer than the previous models, especially 
proxy variables of the identity of insurer are not significant in 2010. Other significant 
results have discrepant tendencies: coefficient of insurer 3 is positive in 2008 and 2009, 
but insurer 4 is negative in 2009 and insurer 1 is negative in 2010. A possible explanation 
is that, as discusses in 1.3, Taiwanese D&O insurance market is comparatively young, 
and its market leaders are not identical to those in general property insurance market. 
Different insurers may have different implication to the market, and thus affect the 
evaluations from investors of insured firms. However, since most of the tests are not 
significant, and thus the overall effect of the identity of insurer is still vague. More 
comprehensive empirical tests, especially when more data are available, are suggested by 
this research.  
 
 3.3.5 Conclusions  
In this section, the empirical evidence shows that D&O insurance coverage is generally 
and positively correlated to the foreign investment of the insured firms. This result is 
                                                            
389 If a categorical variable has n levels, not n but n-1 dummy variables each with two levels are required. 
See DAVID RAY ANDERSON, DENNIS J. SWEENEY & THOMAS A. WILLIAMS, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND 
ECONOMICS 672 (2010). 
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similar to the previous findings that D&O insurance purchase is positively related to the 
quality of insured firms, and also provides initial support of theory of Sean J. Griffith in 
the background of Taiwan. Such findings may provide grounds for signal hypothesis – 
D&O insurance conveys a positive signal to market and thus attracts foreign investors. 
More arguments and responses to counterarguments will be provided in the Chapter 4.  
 
3.4 Third test of signal effect of D&O insurance: D&O insurance as dependent variable        
3.4.1 Introduction  
Similar to the previous two sections, more robustness checks of the signal hypothesis of 
D&O insurance will be conducted in different approaches in this section. In Chapter 2, in 
addition to the test of the monitoring hypothesis, this research also sets up three proxy 
variables for the signal effect of D&O insurance, which includes the shares of foreign 
natural person, the shares of foreign juristic person and shares of foreign financial juristic 
person. If they are positively associated with the proxy variables of D&O insurance, then 
this result would indicate that foreign investors indeed emphasize D&O insurance. This 
will also imply the positive effect of D&O insurance and echo the empirical result of this 
chapter. The comparison between these results would be made to check their robustness.  
 
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics  
In the dataset of Chapter 2, the statistical analysis implies that the signal hypothesis is 
supported. Foreign natural persons hold more shares in uninsured companies rather than 
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insured companies in 2008. However, foreign juristic persons and foreign financial 
juristic persons, which are more professional and concerned about corporate governance, 
have more shares in insured companies than uninsured companies. This indicates foreign 
juristic persons and foreign financial juristic persons indeed emphasize the importance of 
D&O insurance, and the hypothesis that the purchase of D&O insurance has signal 
effects to attract investment is sustained. Similar situations also happen in 2009 and 2010. 
Shares of foreign natural persons are slightly higher for uninsured companies than 
insured ones, but this is not statistically significant. In contrast, firms with D&O 
insurance have more shares of foreign juristic persons and financial persons than firms 
without D&O insurance; this is very significant statistically (<0.001). This shows that 
foreign juristic persons and financial persons who care corporate governance and signal 
also care the purchase of D&O insurance. This implies that the signal hypothesis may be 
supported. 
 
3.4.3 Model 1: logistic regression 
3.4.3.1 Panel A: 2008  
Different from monitoring hypothesis, signal hypothesis is implied by the empirical result 
in this section. The firms with good corporate governance care more about corporate 
governance. In contrast to the firms with poor corporate governance, they are more 
willing to improve governance and reputation. Therefore, even though they have better 
governance and less litigation record, they are still willing to purchase D&O insurance. 
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This may be because they care about corporate governance, so they do not mind doing 
everything possible to promote governance and reputation in order to attract greater 
investments. In this model, the percentage of shares of foreign juristic persons and 
foreign juristic financial persons are positively significant. This indicates that foreign 
juristic persons and foreign juristic financial persons indeed evaluate D&O insurance 
positively. The coefficient of foreign juristic financial persons is 0.311 and comparatively 
high. This may provide possible explanation for signal hypothesis – firms may attract 
investments via insurance purchase. Thus, signal hypothesis is implied.  
 
3.4.3.2 Panel B: 2009 
Regarding proxies of signal hypothesis, the variable of the percentage of shares of foreign 
financial juristic persons is not significant. However, the percentage of shares of foreign 
juristic persons is still positively significant. This indicates that more shares of foreign 
juristic persons will increase the demand for D&O insurance. The positive association 
between D&O insurance and foreign investment is still demonstrated.  
 
3.4.3.3 Panel C: 2010 
The percentage of shares of foreign juristic persons and foreign juristic financial persons 
is positive and significant. All these results are different from the theory of monitoring 
hypothesis, and instead provide possible ground for the signal hypothesis. 
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3.4.4 Model 2: OLS and censored regression  
3.4.4.1 Log transformation  
In log transformation model, the shares held by foreign financial juristic persons are 
positively significant and thus imply that signal hypothesis is supported. In Taiwan, firms 
with good corporate governance have more interest in purchasing D&O insurance. This 
may be because they care about corporate governance and intend to purchase insurance to 
emit some signal, albeit litigation risk is low. 
 
3.4.4.2 Box-Cox transformation 
The result here provides similar evidence. In 2009 and 2010, shares of foreigner financial 
juristic persons are positively related to coverage, and signal hypothesis may be implied.  
 
3.4.4.3 Censored regression and CLAD 
The variable for the percentage of shares held by foreigner financial juristic persons is 
positively significant in 2009 and 2010. Attention should be given to the results that the 
percentage of shares held by foreign person variable is negatively significant. This 
indicates that more shares that are held by foreign persons, the more likely it is to result 
in decreased demand for insurance. However, the percentage of shares held by foreign 
juristic persons and foreign financial juristic persons are both positively significant. This 
matches with the previous results. In comparison with natural persons, foreign 
institutional investors are usually concerned primarily with corporate governance in 
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relationship to investment targets. Accordingly, the positive association between D&O 
insurance and foreign investment is still suggested.  
 
3.4.5 Principle component analysis (PCA) and regression  
Form the analysis above, it is found that the regressions in Chapter 2 do not provide 
grounds for the monitoring hypothesis but the signal hypothesis. Such result corresponds 
with the empirical result in this chapter. This section will use the dataset in Chapter 2 to 
carry out principle component analysis to further test the magnitudes of proxy variables 
of signal hypothesis.  
The principal component analysis is proposed by Karl Pearson proposed.390 It is a 
multivariate technique to extract important components’ form variables and still explain 
variance properly.391 It can reduce data dimensionality392 and explore data trends but also 
retain as much of the original data as possible. PCA is widely used in social science, 
business and finance research.393 PCA will be employed to find the principal component 
of variables. If the proxies of signal hypothesis are significant in PCA, then signal 
hypothesis may be implied. The detailed results are presented from Table 3.14 through 
                                                            
390 See K. Pearson, On Lines and Planes of Closest Fit to Systems of Points in Space, 2:6 PHIL. MAG. 
559-72 (1901). 
391 See Hervé Abdi & Lynne J. Williams, Principal component analysis, 2:4 WILEY INTERDISC. REV. 433, 
433 (2010). 
392 See Sampath Deegalla & Henrik Bostrom, Reducing High-Dimensional Data by Principal Component 
Analysis vs. Random Projection for Nearest Neighbor Classification, in ICMLA '06 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MACHINE LEARNING AND APPLICATIONS (IEEE Computer Society 
Washington, 2006). 
393 For example, David F. Larcker, Scott A. Richardson & A. Irem Tuna use PCA to reduce dimensions 
from 39 individual corporate governance indicators to 14 factors. See David F. Larcker, Scott A. 
Richardson & A. Irem Tuna, Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational 
Performance. 82:4 ACCT. REV. 963, 965 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976566. 
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Table 3.18.  
 
3.4.5.1 Panel A. 2008 
For preparation, KMO and Bartlett's Test are helpful to determine whether the data is 
suitable for PCA or not. As for the data of 2008, the test score of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy is 0.602. A low value (<0.5) for this score indicates that 
the data may not be appropriate for PCA. And, the test score of Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity is 0.000 and thus null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity 
matrix394 is rejected. A total of 16 variables can be extracted to seven components, which 
are significant. These seven components can explain 61.485% of all variance.  
Among these seven components, component 1 is the most important and significant; 14% 
of all variance is explained by it. It can be found that component 1 primarily consists of 
capital, remuneration and the percentage of shares of foreign juristic persons. 
Considering these factors, component 1 could be named as “capital and compensation of 
directors.” And, in component 1, the proxy of signal hypothesis, the percentage of shares 
of foreign juristic persons, is the top third factor. This indicates the importance of the 
percentage of shares of foreign juristic persons among all variables.   
Again, if component 1 is used as the dependent variable and the amount of D&O 
insurance coverage is used as the independent variable to conduct OLS regression, the 
                                                            
394 See UCLA ATS Statistical Consulting, 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/SPSS/output/principal_components.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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adjust R-square is 0.206. The coefficient of variable component 1 is 0.541 and the 
p-value is close to 0. Similarly, if component 1 is used as the independent variable and 
whether D&O insurance was purchased or not is used as the dependent, the model is 
significant and p-value is close to 0. This result not only confirms the importance of 
component 1 with PCA above but also indicates that the percentage of shares of foreign 
juristic persons positively and significantly affects the demand for D&O insurance.  
 
3.4.5.2 Panel B. 2009 
The result from 2009 is almost identical to that of 2008. There are seven components, 
which are significant and extracted from 16 variables, and the most important component 
is consists of capital, remuneration and the percentage of shares of foreign juristic 
persons; 15.12% of total variance can be explained by component 1. This also 
demonstrates the importance of the proxy of signal hypothesis, which contains the 
percentage of shares of foreign juristic persons. When component 1 is used as the 
independent variable and D&O insurance coverage is used as the dependent variable, the 
adjust R-square is 0.217 Component 1 is very significant. The PCA and regression of 
2009 also confirms the positive contributions of the proxy of signal hypothesis to the 
demand for insurance.  
 
3.4.5.3 Panel C. 2010 
The result for 2010 is slightly different from the previous models. There are only six, 
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rather than seven, components, which is significant. However, the most important 
component “capital and compensation of directors” also consists of capital, remuneration 
and the percentage of shares of foreign juristic persons; 14% of all variance can be 
explained by this component. The percentage of shares of foreign juristic persons ranks 
as number two in component 1. This is more significant than it was in the previous two 
years and indicates the importance of proxy of signal hypothesis. This result is confirmed 
by regression analysis. In OLS regression, where the dependent variable is coverage, 
adjust R-square is 0.231 and component 1 is still positively significant at 0.001 level. In 
the logistic regression, where the dependent variable is whether a company is insured or 
not, component 1 is also positively significant at 0.001 level. This result shows that the 
proxy of signal hypothesis is critical among all variables and positively contributes to the 
demand for D&O insurance.  
 
3.4.6 Conclusions 
This section has discussed monitoring hypothesis and tested it within the context of 
Taiwan. The empirical evidence shows that the monitoring hypothesis is not supported in 
Taiwan. Firms with good corporate governance and less risk intend to purchase more 
D&O insurance. In contrast, firms with bad corporate governance and more risk intend to 
purchase less D&O insurance. A possible alternative explanation of this phenomenon is 
signal hypothesis. Firms with good corporate governance are usually more concerned 
about corporate governance. Even though they are of better quality and have less 
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potential risk, they are still willing to purchase insurance to convey that they are good 
firms and thus improve their reputations and attract investors. In the empirical works in 
this section, the percentage of shares of foreign investors are used as the proxy variables 
of signal hypothesis. This hypothesis is implied by regressions and principal component 
analysis. This study summarizes that firms with good corporate governance have more 
demand for insurance, and this is likely because it can emit a positive signal rather than 
because they need insurance to cancel out potential risks.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Table 3.1 Table of variables (1) 
 
 Hypothesis  Variables Definition Expected 
sign 
Dependent 
variables 
 Log of market 
value 
Natural logarithm of market value 
of firms. The natural logarithm of 
average stock price of May 2009 in 
panel 2008. The natural logarithm 
of average stock price of May 2010 
in panel 2009. The natural 
logarithm of average stock price of 
April 2011 in panel 2010. 
N/A 
Independent 
variables 
 Book value Book value of firms  + 
EPS Earnings per share of firms + 
Signal 
hypothesis 
D&O purchase The dummy variable equals 1 when 
firms with insurance and 0 
otherwise 
 
+ 
D&O coverage Natural logarithm of D&O 
insurance coverage 
+ 
Corporate 
governance  
hypothesis 
Duality of CEO 
and COB  
The dummy variable equals 1 if 
chairman of board of directors is 
identical to CEO and 0 otherwise. 
 
- 
Internal risk If any chairman of the board, CEO, 
financial manager and supervisory 
director is appointed by a parent or 
controlling group, the value will be 
1. The total ranges from 0 to 4. 
- 
Independent 
Director 
Independent directors. This 
indicates the number of 
independent directors.  
 
+ 
Shares held by 
director  
The percentage of shares held by 
directors (%) 
 
- 
Shares held by 
major 
shareholder  
The percentage of shares held by 
major shareholders (%) 
 
- 
Controlled 
director 
 
Controlled directors. This indicates 
the number of directors who are 
nominated or controlled by the 
largest controlling group of the 
company, such as family, relatives, 
or parent company. 
- 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics (1) 
 
This table contains the descriptive statistics of variables used in this chapter by year.   
 
 
 2008 2009 2010 
Variables mean Stdev. mean Stdev. mean Stdev. 
Log of market value 2.75 0.79 3.19 0.78 3.25 0.85 
Book value 16.17 8.87 17.09 9.82 18.14 11.37 
EPS 1.07 3.87 1.32 3.15 2.06 3.41 
D&O purchase 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 
D&O coverage 18.89 1.31 18.90 1.16 18.87 1.04 
Director 9.58 2.53 9.27 2.99 9.55 2.51 
Independent Director 1.30 1.38 1.17 1.24 1.23 1.23 
Controlled director 1.72 1.67 1.61 1.62 1.63 1.57 
Shares held by 
director 
24.23 15.14 23.60 14.83 23.32 14.99 
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
19.67 11.32 20.12 11.42 19.85 11.54 
Duality of CEO and 
COB 
0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 
Internal risk 1.91 0.91 1.87 0.94 1.84 0.95 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics (2) 
This table contains the descriptive statistics of variables, comparing the firms with D&O 
insurance and the firms without D&O insurance. In general, firms with D&O insurance 
have increased capital, directors and independent directors than firms without D&O 
insurance. Firms with D&O insurance also have fewer controlled directors, shares held 
by directors and major shareholders, duality of CEO and COB, and internal risk.  
2008 2009 2010 
 Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured 
 
mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev 
Log of market value 2.62 0.73 2.87 0.82 3.09 0.71 3.28 0.82 3.12 0.75 3.32 0.88 
Book value 16.11 8.35 15.78 8.95 16.70 9.18 17.66 10.56 17.97 10.98 18.73 12.37 
EPS 1.28 4.47 0.82 3.24 1.22 3.24 1.41 3.08 2.15 3.50 2.12 3.58 
D&O purchase 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
D&O coverage - - 18.89 1.31 - - 18.90 1.16 - - 18.87 1.04 
Capital 15.06 1.43 15.37 1.74 15.01 1.42 15.44 1.77 21.91 1.37 22.33 1.70 
Director 9.50 2.83 9.64 2.27 9.08 3.24 9.47 2.70 9.34 2.68 9.64 2.29 
Independent Director 0.87 1.27 1.64 1.36 0.83 1.15 1.50 1.24 0.79 1.13 1.53 1.18 
Controlled director 2.06 1.88 1.42 1.39 1.86 1.81 1.37 1.37 1.93 1.72 1.38 1.35 
Shares held by director 25.24 14.64 22.06 14.59 25.24 15.09 22.04 14.42 25.17 14.76 21.76 14.60 
Shares held by major shareholder 20.33 11.29 18.62 10.89 21.76 12.04 18.56 10.58 21.47 11.59 18.36 10.97 
Duality of CEO and COB 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.28 0.45 
Internal risk 2.11 0.90 1.76 0.88 2.03 0.95 1.72 0.91 2.06 0.91 1.67 0.94 
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Table 3.4 Independent samples test of 2008 
 
This table contains the independent sample test of 2008. This assesses the difference 
between firms with D&O insurance and without D&O insurance. Except book value, 
director and duality of CEO and COB, other variables are significant. This indicates the 
differences of mean in table 3 are significant. An asterisk denotes statistical significance 
at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks 
indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 
Equal 
variance 
F Sig. t df 
Sig.(two 
tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95 % CI 
Lower Upper 
Log of market 
value 
assumed 7.037 .008 -5.869 1233 .000*** -.259 .044 -.346 -.173 
not 
assumed 
  -5.862 1212.457 .000*** -.259 .044 -.346 -.173 
Book value assumed .034 .854 .630 1135 .529 .325 .516 -.687 1.337 
not 
assumed 
  .633 1132.945 .527 .325 .514 -.683 1.333 
EPS assumed 3.752 .053 2.085 1237 .037* .464 .222 .027 .900 
not 
assumed 
  2.092 1140.674 .037* .464 .222 .029 .899 
Log of capital assumed 25.64 .000 -3.484 1237 .001*** -.314 .090 -.492 -.137 
not 
assumed 
  -3.477 1182.634 .001*** -.314 .090 -.492 -.137 
Director assumed 6.645 .010 -.956 1218 .339 -.141 .147 -.430 .148 
not 
assumed 
  -.958 1173.420 .338 -.141 .147 -.429 .147 
Independent 
Director 
assumed 2.191 .139 -10.27 1218 .000*** -.774 .075 -.922 -.626 
not 
assumed 
  -10.264 1209.334 .000*** -.774 .075 -.922 -.626 
Controlled 
director 
assumed 23.88 .000 6.707 1218 .000*** .638 .095 .451 .824 
not 
assumed 
  6.727 1132.554 .000*** .638 .095 .452 .824 
Shares held by 
director 
assumed .121 .728 3.800 1218 .000*** 3.182 .837 1.539 4.825 
not 
assumed 
  3.800 1217.681 .000*** 3.182 .837 1.539 4.825 
           
Shares held by 
major 
shareholder 
 
assumed 1.889 .170 2.682 1218 .007** 1.705 .636 .458 2.953 
not 
assumed   2.683 1217.708 .007** 1.705 .636 .459 2.952 
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Table 3.4 (cont.) 
 
 
         
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
assumed 8.612 .003 1.466 1237 .143 .038 .026 -.013 .088 
not 
assumed 
  1.467 1236.562 .143 .038 .026 -.013 .088 
Internal risk assumed .021 .884 6.877 1237 .000*** .348 .051 .249 .448 
not 
assumed 
  6.879 1236.932 .000*** .348 .051 .249 .448 
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Table 3.5 Independent samples test of 2009 
 
This table contains the independent sample test of 2009. This assesses the difference 
between firms with D&O insurance and without D&O insurance. Except Except book 
value, EPS, director and duality of CEO and COB, other variables are significant. This 
indicates the differences of mean in table 3 are significant. An asterisk denotes statistical 
significance at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three 
asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
Equal 
variance 
F Sig. t df 
Sig.(two 
tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95 % CI 
Lower Upper 
Log of market 
value 
assumed 11.15 .000 -4.43 1273 .000*** -.19275 .04342 -.27793 -.10757 
not 
assumed 
  -4.47 1271.44 .000*** -.19275 .04309 -.27728 -.10822 
Book value assumed 3.125 .077 -1.71 1260 .086 -.95739 .55787 -2.05185 .13708 
not 
assumed 
  -1.72 1247.86 .085 -.95739 .55627 -2.04871 .13394 
EPS assumed .011 .917 -1.110 1324 .267 -.19269 .17360 -.53324 .14787 
not 
assumed 
  -1.10 1315.32 .268 -.19269 .17373 -.53350 .14813 
Log of capital assumed 32.898 .000 -4.89 1324 .000*** -.43072 .08804 -.60345 -.25800 
not 
assumed 
  -4.90 1279.22 .000*** -.43072 .08776 -.60289 -.25856 
Director assumed 4.410 .036 -2.40 1324 .016 -.39302 .16363 -.71402 -.07201 
not 
assumed 
  -2.39 1268.61 .017 -.39302 .16407 -.71490 -.07113 
Independent 
Director 
assumed 3.480 .062 -10.2 1324 .000*** -.67082 .06580 -.79990 -.54174 
not 
assumed 
  -10.2 1321.93 .000*** -.67082 .06573 -.79976 -.54188 
Controlled 
director 
assumed 26.679 .000 5.55 1324 .000*** .48913 .08813 .31624 .66201 
not 
assumed 
  5.527 1212.60 .000*** .48913 .08849 .31551 .66274 
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Table 3.5 (cont.) 
 
         
Shares held by 
director 
assumed .844 .359 3.878 1284 .000*** 3.19131 .82298 1.57677 4.80585 
not 
assumed 
  3.873 1271.78 .000*** 3.19131 .82397 1.57483 4.80779 
Shares held by 
major shareholder 
assumed 9.573 .002 5.068 1284 .000*** 3.19897 .63121 1.96066 4.43728 
not 
assumed 
  5.051 1243.55 .000*** 3.19897 .63334 1.95643 4.44151 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
assumed .078 .780 -.140 1324 .889 -.00347 .02482 -.05215 .04522 
not 
assumed 
  -.140 1323.06 .889 -.00347 .02482 -.05215 .04521 
Internal risk assumed .198 .657 6.118 1324 .000*** .31146 .05091 .21159 .41133 
not 
assumed 
  6.114 1316.65 .000*** .31146 .05094 .21152 .41140 
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Table 3.6 Independent samples test of 2010  
 
This table contains the independent sample test of 2010. This assesses the difference 
between firms with D&O insurance and without D&O insurance. Except book value, 
director and duality of CEO and COB, other variables are significant. This indicates the 
differences of mean in table 3 are significant. An asterisk denotes statistical significance 
at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks 
indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 
Equal 
variance 
F Sig. t df 
Sig.(two 
tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95 % CI 
Lower Upper 
Log of market 
value 
assumed 10.698 .001 -4.14 1237 .000*** -.19696 .04752 -.29019 -.10372 
not 
assumed 
  -4.23 1220.32 .000*** -.19696 .04652 -.28822 -.10570 
Book value assumed 1.371 .242 -1.115 1211 .265 -.76169 .68319 -2.10205 .57867 
not 
assumed 
  -1.13 1183.51 .258 -.76169 .67241 -2.08093 .55755 
EPS assumed .255 .614 .106 1239 .915 .02163 .20323 -.37708 .42034 
not 
assumed 
  .107 1163.87 .915 .02163 .20264 -.37595 .41922 
Log of capital assumed 18.249 .000 -4.72 1239 .000*** -.42409 .08985 -.60035 -.24782 
not 
assumed 
  -4.86 1235.05 .000*** -.42409 .08726 -.59528 -.25289 
Director assumed 3.164 .076 -2.118 1239 .034 -.29927 .14132 -.57653 -.02201 
not 
assumed 
  -2.07 1048.68 .038 -.29927 .14435 -.58251 -.01602 
Independent 
Director 
assumed .085 .770 -11.14 1239 .000*** -.73900 .06632 -.86912 -.60889 
not 
assumed 
  -11.20 1174.11 .000*** -.73900 .06596 -.86842 -.60959 
Controlled 
director 
assumed 12.904 .000 6.372 1239 .000*** .55553 .08718 .38450 .72656 
not 
assumed 
  6.173 991.618 .000*** .55553 .09000 .37892 .73214 
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Table 3.6 (cont.) 
 
         
Shares held by 
director 
assumed .118 .731 4.050 1239 .000*** 3.40361 .84045 1.75475 5.05246 
not 
assumed 
  4.044 1145.39 .000*** 3.40361 .84169 1.75218 5.05503 
Shares held by 
major shareholder 
assumed 3.874 .049 4.820 1239 .000*** 3.10462 .64416 1.84085 4.36839 
not 
assumed 
  4.784 1118 .000*** 3.10462 .64899 1.83126 4.37799 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
assumed .626 .429 .397 1237 .692 .01032 .02600 -.04069 .06133 
not 
assumed 
  .396 1141.25 .692 .01032 .02604 -.04077 .06141 
Internal risk assumed 3.661 .056 7.384 1237 .000*** .39275 .05319 .28839 .49711 
not 
assumed 
  7.408 1161.35 .000*** .39275 .05302 .28873 .49677 
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Table 3.7 The result of regression panel A 
 
This table contains the result of the regression where binary variable purchasing D&O 
insurance or not is used as the proxy variable of D&O insurance. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of firms’ market value. Interaction terms are generated by the 
product of D&O insurance purchase and significant variables. t statistics is reported in 
parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% 
level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
year 2008 2008-interaction 2009 2010 
     
Book value 0.0177 0.0191 -0.0105 0.0384 
 (0.85) (0.92) (-0.50) (1.36) 
     
EPS -0.0290 -0.0283 0.0456* -0.0117 
 (-1.64) (-1.61) (2.11) (-0.57) 
     
D&O purchase 0.0957* 0.0834* 0.0759 0.0468 
 (2.45) (2.18) (1.75) (1.12) 
     
Duality of CEO and COB -0.0423  -0.128** -0.195*** 
(-1.02)  (-2.74) (-4.30) 
     
Internal risk 0.0468* 0.0139 0.0628* 0.0784** 
 (1.97) (0.45) (2.38) (3.05) 
     
Independent Director 0.0828*** 0.119*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (6.01) (5.76) (6.64) (6.66) 
     
Controlled director -0.0298* -0.0372* -0.0158 -0.0217 
 (-2.39) (-2.54) (-1.11) (-1.47) 
     
Shares held by director 0.00144  0.000960 0.00154 
 (1.15)  (0.69) (1.12) 
     
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
-0.00136  -0.00154 -0.00165 
 (-0.82)  (-0.87) (-0.95) 
     
255 
 
Table 3.7 (cont.) 
 
 
    
D&O purchase * 
controlled director 
 0.0217   
 (0.84)   
     
D&O purchase * 
independent director 
 -0.0594*   
 (-2.16)   
     
D&O purchase * internal 
risk  
 0.0483   
 (1.05)   
     
Constant 1.986*** 2.148*** 2.639*** 2.459*** 
 (16.26) (21.95) (19.88) (17.98) 
N 789 791 894 1015 
R2 0.0898 0.0955 0.0809 0.0744 
Adj- R2 0.0793 0.0851 0.0716 0.0661 
Breusch-Pagan test  0.8448 0.6695 0.7794 0.0813 
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Table 3.8 The result of regression panel B 
 
This table contains the result of the regression where D&O insurance coverage is used as 
the proxy variable of D&O insurance. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
firms’ market value. Interaction terms are generated by the product of D&O insurance 
purchase and significant variables. t statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk 
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% 
level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 2008 2008 
-interaction 
2009 2009 
-interaction 
2010 2010 
-interaction 
 
Book value 0.0356 0.0223 -0.0321  0.0264  
 (1.19) (1.07) (-1.09)  (0.69)  
       
EPS -0.0357 -0.0368* 0.0579  0.00298  
 (-1.46) (-2.10) (1.83)  (0.11)  
       
D&O coverage 0.0440* 0.0507** 0.0575* 0.0572* 0.0840** 0.134*** 
 (2.38) (2.65) (2.17) (2.18) (3.28) (4.25) 
       
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
-0.0333  -0.155* -0.107 -0.204** -0.257*** 
 (-0.54)  (-2.26) (-1.94) (-3.18) (-4.45) 
       
Internal risk 0.0698  0.0682  0.0823* 0.100*** 
 (1.92)  (1.70)  (2.21) (3.62) 
       
Independent 
Director 
0.0623** 0.103*** 0.0728** -0.0204 0.115*** 0.114*** 
(3.30) (7.95) (3.05) (-0.86) (5.02) (5.40) 
       
Controlled 
director 
-0.0162  0.00543  0.0213  
(-0.72)  (0.22)  (0.87)  
       
Shares held by 
director 
0.000308  -0.00266  0.000356  
(0.17)  (-1.28)  (0.18)  
       
Shares held by 
major 
shareholder 
-0.00151  -0.00149  -0.00535*  
(-0.62)  (-0.56)  (-2.16)  
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Table 3.8 (cont.) 
 
 
     
D&O coverage * 
Independent 
Director 
 -0.00360  -0.0158  -0.0520** 
 (-0.28)  (-0.82)  (-2.64) 
       
D&O coverage * 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
   -0.0780  -0.139* 
   (-1.43)  (-2.15) 
       
D&O coverage * 
Internal risk 
     0.0618* 
     (2.14) 
       
Constant 1.164** 2.162*** 1.839** 2.913*** 0.985 2.932*** 
 (2.81) (22.26) (3.30) (88.09) (1.86) (94.70) 
N 409 812 477 672 577 704 
R2 0.0528 0.0843 0.0503 0.0180 0.0940 0.0873 
Adj- R2 0.0315 0.0787 0.0320 0.0106 0.0796 0.0781 
Breusch-Pagan 
test  
0.6286 0.6481 0.9101 0.1873 0.6239 0.3700 
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Table 3.9 Table of variables (2) 
 
 Factor  Variables Definition 
Expected 
sign 
Dependent 
variables 
 
Shares held by 
foreign 
natural 
person 
 
The percentage of shares of foreign 
natural person 
 
Shares held by 
foreign 
juristic person 
 
The percentage of shares of foreign 
juristic person 
 
Shares held by 
foreign 
financial 
juristic person 
The percentage of shares of foreign 
juristic financial person 
 
Independent 
variables 
D&O 
insurance 
information 
D&O 
coverage 
Natural logarithm of D&O insurance 
coverage 
 
? 
D&O insurer Identity of D&O insurer 
? 
Corporate 
governance 
Log of capital  Natural logarithm of total capital of 
firms 
? 
 
ROE Return on equity of firms 
- 
Log of 
remuneration 
Natural logarithm of total  
compensation package offered to 
directors 
 
? 
Director  The total number of directors 
 
? 
Independent 
director 
The number of independent 
directors 
? 
  
 
Controlled 
director  
Controlled directors. 
 
 
 
+ 
259 
 
 
 
This indicates the number of 
directors who are nominated or 
controlled by the largest controlling 
group of the company, such as 
family, relatives, or parent company. 
 
Shares held by 
director  
The percentage of shares held by 
directors (%) 
 
+ 
Shares held by 
major 
shareholder  
The percentage of shares held by 
major shareholders (%) 
 
 
+ 
Duality of 
CEO and 
COB  
The dummy variable equals 1 if 
chairman of board of directors is 
identical to CEO and 0 otherwise. 
 
+ 
Internal risk If any chairman of board, CEO, 
financial manager or supervisory 
director is appointed by parent or 
controlling group, the value is 
granted 1. The total ranges from 0 to 
4. 
 
+ 
Debt-asset 
ratio 
Debt-asset ratio of firms 
 
 
+ 
Significant 
litigation 
The number of disclosed significant 
litigations 
+ 
 
  
Table 3.9 (cont.) 
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Table 3.10 The test of signal effect of D&O insurance information: D&O coverage 
 
This table reports the test of the effects of D&O insurance information in respective years, 
applying OLS regression after White's heteroscedasticity correction. The proxy variables 
of signal effect of D&O insurance are the percentage of shares held by foreign natural 
person, foreign juristic person and foreign financial juristic person. The D&O insurance 
information tested here is its coverage. Other independent variables about insured firms’ 
corporate governance are used as controlled variables. t statistics is reported in 
parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% 
level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010  
 Shares held by foreign natural 
person 
Shares held by foreign juristic 
person 
Shares held by foreign financial 
juristic person 
D&O 
coverage 
0.0188 0.0436 0.0282 0.827 1.519** 1.591** 0.156*** 0.221*** 0.240***  
(0.94) (1.35) (1.24) (1.61) (2.92) (2.79) (3.93) (5.31) (5.36)  
           
Log of 
capital 
-0.0183 -0.0149 -0.0130 5.217*** 5.130*** 6.616*** 0.198*** 0.194*** 0.386***  
(-0.67) (-0.53) (-0.79) (12.07) (12.64) (16.00) (4.10) (5.73) (9.96)  
           
ROE -0.00266 -0.00702* 0.00722* 0.0212 -0.0239 -0.0527 0.00520 -0.00103 -0.00252  
(-1.90) (-2.24) (2.08) (0.84) (-1.48) (-1.16) (0.96) (-0.60) (-0.88)  
           
Log of 
remuneration 
0.0294 0.0604** -0.000495 2.927*** 0.724 -0.112* 0.173*** 0.133*** -0.0272***  
(1.59) (2.98) (-0.14) (6.01) (1.95) (-2.09) (3.46) (6.29) (-5.53)  
           
Director -0.0352** -0.0278* -0.0173 -0.706** -0.903*** -0.853*** -0.0869* -0.103*** -0.127***  
(-2.89) (-2.09) (-1.90) (-2.86) (-4.60) (-3.93) (-2.57) (-4.90) (-4.78)  
           
Independent 
director 
0.0260 0.0333 -0.0112 1.229** 1.209** 0.998** 0.0357 0.0655 0.0313  
(1.06) (0.87) (-0.61) (3.26) (3.09) (2.61) (1.08) (1.66) (0.80)  
           
Controlled 
director 
0.0512 0.0265 0.0253 1.077** 0.812* 0.697 0.114* 0.0609 0.0488  
(1.06) (0.61) (0.61) (2.69) (2.27) (1.78) (2.12) (1.70) (1.09)  
           
Shares held 
by director 
-0.0000739 -0.00375 -0.00474* 0.0545 0.0919* 0.0837* -0.00859*** -0.00441 -0.00321  
(-0.02) (-1.63) (-2.31) (1.34) (2.40) (2.24) (-3.37) (-1.58) (-1.51)  
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Shares held 
by major 
shareholder 
0.00362 0.00353 0.000780 0.413*** 0.320*** 0.336*** 0.0101* 0.0148*** 0.0140***  
(0.85) (1.06) (0.38) (8.79) (6.67) (6.49) (2.10) (4.12) (4.15)  
           
Duality of 
CEO and 
COB 
0.00208 -0.0514 0.0337 1.365 3.051** 2.639** -0.0493 0.328*** 0.410***  
(0.02) (-0.59) (0.53) (1.36) (3.03) (2.83) (-0.43) (3.34) (4.66)  
           
Internal risk -0.0891 -0.0363 -0.00509 -1.625* -0.848 -0.765 -0.0109 -0.000527 0.0846  
(-1.20) (-0.49) (-0.11) (-2.42) (-1.36) (-1.22) (-0.17) (-0.01) (1.57)  
           
Debt-asset 
ratio 
0.0000494 0.0000599 0.000178 -0.00246 -0.00280* -0.00950*** 0.0000528 -0.000160 -0.000682**  
(0.64) (0.83) (1.83) (-1.85) (-2.18) (-4.64) (0.34) (-1.75) (-2.89)  
           
Significant 
litigation 
0.0639 -0.0189 -0.0187 -0.481 -0.371 -0.481 -0.154** -0.0895 -0.0640  
(0.77) (-0.26) (-0.45) (-0.76) (-0.61) (-1.07) (-3.27) (-1.84) (-1.58)  
           
Constant 0.0494 -0.966 0.281 -135.5*** -111.9*** -167.8*** -7.798*** -8.517*** -11.91***  
(0.08) (-1.29) (0.54) (-14.79) (-12.54) (-19.08) (-8.00) (-10.39) (-11.23)  
N 764 845 854 764 845 854 764 845 854  
R2 0.0155 0.0288 0.0192 0.5695 0.4878 0.5348 0.2682 0.3144 0.4199  
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Table 3.11 The test of signal effect of D&O insurance information: D&O coverage 
 
Following the previous test, this table reports the result of bootstrapping. t statistics is 
reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two 
asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 
0.1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010  
 Shares held by foreign natural 
person 
Shares held by foreign juristic 
person 
Shares held by foreign financial 
juristic person 
D&O 
coverage 
0.0188 0.0436 0.0282 0.827 1.519** 1.591** 0.156*** 0.221*** 0.240***  
(0.90) (1.32) (1.22) (1.56) (2.84) (2.71) (3.80) (5.10) (5.44)  
           
Log of 
capital 
-0.0183 -0.0149 -0.0130 5.217*** 5.130*** 6.616*** 0.198*** 0.194*** 0.386***  
(-0.65) (-0.50) (-0.78) (11.54) (11.78) (15.72) (4.03) (5.46) (9.93)  
           
ROE -0.00266 -0.00702 0.00722* 0.0212 -0.0239 -0.0527 0.00520 -0.00103 -0.00252  
(-0.24) (-1.35) (2.00) (0.10) (-0.88) (-1.11) (0.11) (-0.35) (-0.83)  
           
Log of 
remuneration 
0.0294 0.0604** -0.000495 2.927*** 0.724 -0.112* 0.173** 0.133*** -0.0272***  
(1.43) (2.73) (-0.14) (4.73) (1.69) (-2.08) (2.80) (5.46) (-5.52)  
           
Director -0.0352** -0.0278* -0.0173 -0.706** -0.903*** -0.853*** -0.0869* -0.103*** -0.127***  
(-2.79) (-2.06) (-1.86) (-2.85) (-4.49) (-3.88) (-2.50) (-4.79) (-4.74)  
           
Independent 
director 
0.0260 0.0333 -0.0112 1.229*** 1.209** 0.998** 0.0357 0.0655 0.0313  
(1.05) (0.87) (-0.61) (3.30) (3.09) (2.62) (1.05) (1.67) (0.80)  
           
Controlled 
director 
0.0512 0.0265 0.0253 1.077** 0.812* 0.697 0.114* 0.0609 0.0488  
(1.06) (0.61) (0.61) (2.65) (2.25) (1.79) (2.14) (1.70) (1.10)  
           
Shares held 
by director 
-0.0000739 -0.00375 -0.00474* 0.0545 0.0919* 0.0837* -0.00859*** -0.00441 -0.00321  
(-0.02) (-1.62) (-2.30) (1.33) (2.39) (2.25) (-3.31) (-1.56) (-1.50)  
           
Shares held 
by major 
shareholder 
0.00362 0.00353 0.000780 0.413*** 0.320*** 0.336*** 0.0101* 0.0148*** 0.0140***  
(0.84) (1.04) (0.37) (8.53) (6.63) (6.54) (2.08) (4.10) (4.08)  
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Duality of 
CEO and 
COB 
0.00208 -0.0514 0.0337 1.365 3.051** 2.639** -0.0493 0.328*** 0.410***  
(0.02) (-0.59) (0.53) (1.36) (2.99) (2.83) (-0.43) (3.38) (4.58)  
           
Internal risk -0.0891 -0.0363 -0.00509 -1.625* -0.848 -0.765 -0.0109 -0.000527 0.0846  
(-1.20) (-0.49) (-0.11) (-2.45) (-1.37) (-1.22) (-0.17) (-0.01) (1.57)  
           
Debt-asset 
ratio 
0.0000494 0.0000599 0.000178 -0.00246 -0.00280 -0.00950*** 0.0000528 -0.000160 -0.000682**  
(0.49) (0.59) (1.73) (-1.62) (-1.50) (-4.41) (0.31) (-1.25) (-2.78)  
           
Significant 
litigation 
0.0639 -0.0189 -0.0187 -0.481 -0.371 -0.481 -0.154** -0.0895 -0.0640  
(0.73) (-0.25) (-0.42) (-0.72) (-0.59) (-0.97) (-2.97) (-1.70) (-1.43)  
           
Constant 0.0494 -0.966 0.281 -135.5*** -111.9*** -167.8*** -7.798*** -8.517*** -11.91***  
(0.08) (-1.29) (0.54) (-14.28) (-12.46) (-18.83) (-7.81) (-10.21) (-11.30)  
N 764 845 854 764 845 854 764 845 854  
R2 0.0155 0.0288 0.0192 0.5695 0.4878 0.5348 0.2682 0.3144 0.4199  
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Table 3.12 The test of signal effect of D&O insurance information: D&O coverage 
 
This table presents the test of the effects of D&O insurance information in respective 
years. The proxy variables of signal effect of D&O insurance are the percentage of shares 
held by foreign natural person, foreign juristic person and foreign financial juristic person. 
The D&O insurance information tested here is its insurer. Variables Insure 1 ~ 5 are 
dummy variables denoting the top 5 and other insurers in property insurance market. 
Other independent variables about insured firms’ corporate governance are used as 
controlled variables. t statistics is reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical 
significance at the 5% level, two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three 
asterisks indicate significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010  
 Shares held by foreign natural 
person 
Shares held by foreign juristic 
person 
Shares held by foreign financial 
juristic person 
Insurer1 
 
0.103 0.113 0.0884 -0.930 -0.900 -2.568* 0.268 0.230 0.00897  
(0.90) (1.00) (0.79) (-0.74) (-0.85) (-2.19) (1.64) (1.61) (0.09)  
           
Insurer2 
 
-0.0844 -0.0382 0.315 -5.887 1.168 1.913 -0.308 0.234 0.154  
(-0.41) (-0.21) (0.74) (-1.39) (0.28) (0.41) (-1.83) (0.65) (0.32)  
           
Insurer3 
 
1.107 0.962 0.761 12.24** 12.85* 20.53 1.095 1.070 1.960  
(1.41) (1.47) (1.47) (2.82) (2.50) (1.95) (1.45) (1.45) (1.60)  
           
Insurer4 
 
-0.244 -0.340** -0.278 7.134 -6.862* -2.430 0.443 -0.289 -0.176  
(-1.98) (-2.93) (-1.16) (1.27) (-2.23) (-0.32) (0.69) (-1.30) (-0.39)  
           
Insurer5 
 
-0.0644 -0.0832 0.402 3.311 3.522 2.374 0.259 0.196 -0.0527  
(-0.52) (-0.78) (1.03) (0.93) (1.21) (0.79) (0.67) (1.06) (-0.25)  
           
Log of 
capital 
-0.0137 0.00306 -0.0653 5.485*** 5.764*** 2.550** 0.260*** 0.291*** 0.246***  
(-0.55) (0.10) (-1.49) (14.75) (15.98) (2.72) (5.60) (9.06) (4.77)  
           
ROE -0.00264 -0.00723* 0.00946* 0.0210 -0.0345* 0.132* 0.00542 -0.00221 0.00714*  
(-1.90) (-2.47) (2.45) (0.86) (-2.09) (2.13) (1.03) (-1.53) (2.06)  
           
Log of 
remuneration 
0.0248 0.0596** 0.00546 3.015*** 0.758 -0.0316 0.176** 0.138*** -0.0217***  
(1.34) (2.88) (1.14) (5.86) (1.95) (-0.48) (3.19) (5.86) (-4.24)  
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Director -0.0337** -0.0281* -0.00563 -0.742** -0.974*** -0.0361 -0.0953** -0.112*** -0.0897**  
(-2.89) (-2.10) (-0.38) (-3.06) (-4.91) (-0.11) (-2.84) (-5.11) (-2.96)  
           
Independent 
director 
0.0229 0.0303 0.0112 1.206** 1.266** 1.809*** 0.0332 0.0749 0.0774  
(0.92) (0.80) (0.48) (3.18) (3.17) (3.58) (0.98) (1.83) (1.70)  
           
Controlled 
director 
0.0489 0.0215 -0.0133 0.979* 0.713* -0.382 0.111* 0.0472 -0.0161  
(1.02) (0.50) (-0.30) (2.40) (1.99) (-0.75) (2.01) (1.30) (-0.33)  
           
Shares held 
by director 
-0.000491 -0.00360 -0.00678* 0.0510 0.101** -0.0611 -0.00913*** -0.00323 -0.00923***  
(-0.16) (-1.60) (-2.14) (1.25) (2.74) (-1.27) (-3.54) (-1.14) (-3.45)  
           
Shares held 
by major 
shareholder 
0.00381 0.00336 0.00976* 0.409*** 0.314*** 0.361*** 0.0101* 0.0140*** 0.0146***  
(0.88) (1.01) (2.04) (8.52) (6.71) (4.82) (2.09) (3.92) (3.50)  
           
Duality of 
CEO and 
COB 
-0.00462 -0.0398 -0.0865 1.152 3.496*** 1.438 -0.0611 0.408*** 0.381***  
(-0.04) (-0.46) (-1.00) (1.14) (3.42) (1.05) (-0.54) (4.00) (3.54)  
           
Internal risk -0.0862 -0.0395 0.0169 -1.464* -0.860 -1.001 -0.0150 -0.0137 0.0637  
 (-1.16) (-0.53) (0.30) (-2.17) (-1.38) (-1.36) (-0.23) (-0.21) (1.15)  
           
Debt-asset 
ratio 
0.0000546 0.0000537 0.000221 -0.00256 -0.00316* -0.00131 0.0000391 -0.000210 -0.000331  
 (0.71) (0.78) (1.77) (-1.91) (-2.11) (-0.54) (0.25) (-1.74) (-1.36)  
           
Significant 
litigation 
0.0594 -0.0230 -0.0358 -0.441 -0.491 -0.610 -0.164** -0.106* -0.0820*  
 (0.71) (-0.31) (-0.82) (-0.68) (-0.84) (-1.23) (-3.18) (-2.20) (-2.16)  
           
Constant 0.394 -0.402 1.738 -124.8*** -92.70*** -50.28* -5.760*** -5.849*** -4.375***  
 (0.85) (-0.77) (1.79) (-17.59) (-13.55) (-2.51) (-7.14) (-8.23) (-3.98)  
N 764 845 864 764 845 864 764 845 864  
R2 0.0214 0.0325 0.0423 0.5715 0.4865 0.2296 0.2630 0.2968 0.2713  
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Table 3.13 The test of signal effect of D&O insurance information: D&O coverage 
 
Following the previous test, this table reports the result of bootstrapping. t statistics is 
reported in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, two 
asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level, and three asterisks indicate significance at 
0.1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010  
 Shares held by foreign natural 
person 
Shares held by foreign juristic 
person 
Shares held by foreign financial 
juristic person 
Insurer1 
 
0.103 0.113 0.0884 -0.930 -0.900 -2.568* 0.268 0.230 0.00897  
(0.90) (1.00) (0.79) (-0.75) (-0.86) (-2.19) (1.65) (1.62) (0.09)  
           
Insurer2 
 
-0.0844 -0.0382 0.315 -5.887 1.168 1.913 -0.308 0.234 0.154  
(-0.35) (-0.19) (0.74) (-1.22) (0.26) (0.41) (-1.63) (0.61) (0.30)  
           
Insurer3 
 
1.107 0.962 0.761 12.24* 12.85* 20.53 1.095 1.070 1.960  
(1.24) (1.29) (1.47) (2.49) (2.20) (1.95) (1.29) (1.28) (1.41)  
           
Insurer4 
 
-0.244 -0.340* -0.278 7.134 -6.862* -2.430 0.443 -0.289 -0.176  
(-1.51) (-2.48) (-1.16) (0.94) (-1.96) (-0.32) (0.52) (-1.15) (-0.33)  
           
Insurer5 
 
-0.0644 -0.0832 0.402 3.311 3.522 2.374 0.259 0.196 -0.0527  
(-0.46) (-0.76) (1.03) (0.88) (1.20) (0.79) (0.61) (1.06) (-0.25)  
           
Log of 
capital 
-0.0137 0.00306 -0.0653 5.485*** 5.764*** 2.550** 0.260*** 0.291*** 0.246***  
(-0.54) (0.10) (-1.49) (13.53) (14.80) (2.72) (5.34) (8.67) (4.33)  
           
ROE -0.00264 -0.00723 0.00946* 0.0210 -0.0345 0.132* 0.00542 -0.00221 0.00714  
(-0.24) (-1.50) (2.45) (0.10) (-1.32) (2.13) (0.12) (-0.97) (1.88)  
           
Log of 
remuneration 
0.0248 0.0596** 0.00546 3.015*** 0.758 -0.0316 0.176** 0.138*** -0.0217***  
(1.18) (2.62) (1.14) (4.63) (1.71) (-0.48) (2.58) (5.12) (-4.20)  
           
Director -0.0337** -0.0281* -0.00563 -0.742** -0.974*** -0.0361 -0.0953** -0.112*** -0.0897**  
(-2.78) (-2.08) (-0.38) (-3.07) (-4.75) (-0.11) (-2.78) (-4.97) (-2.91)  
           
Independent 
director 
0.0229 0.0303 0.0112 1.206** 1.266** 1.809*** 0.0332 0.0749 0.0774  
(0.92) (0.80) (0.48) (3.21) (3.18) (3.58) (0.96) (1.83) (1.71)  
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Controlled 
director 
0.0489 0.0215 -0.0133 0.979* 0.713* -0.382 0.111* 0.0472 -0.0161  
(1.02) (0.50) (-0.30) (2.38) (1.97) (-0.75) (2.03) (1.30) (-0.33)  
           
Shares held 
by director 
-0.000491 -0.00360 -0.00678* 0.0510 0.101** -0.0611 -0.00913*** -0.00323 -0.00923***  
(-0.16) (-1.58) (-2.14) (1.25) (2.72) (-1.27) (-3.46) (-1.13) (-3.33)  
           
Shares held 
by major 
shareholder 
0.00381 0.00336 0.00976* 0.409*** 0.314*** 0.361*** 0.0101* 0.0140*** 0.0146***  
(0.87) (0.99) (2.04) (8.25) (6.64) (4.82) (2.06) (3.88) (3.46)  
           
Duality of 
CEO and 
COB 
-0.00462 -0.0398 -0.0865 1.152 3.496*** 1.438 -0.0611 0.408*** 0.381***  
(-0.04) (-0.46) (-1.00) (1.14) (3.39) (1.05) (-0.54) (4.05) (3.51)  
           
Internal risk -0.0862 -0.0395 0.0169 -1.464* -0.860 -1.001 -0.0150 -0.0137 0.0637  
 (-1.17) (-0.53) (0.30) (-2.20) (-1.39) (-1.36) (-0.23) (-0.21) (1.16)  
           
Debt-asset 
ratio 
0.0000546 0.0000537 0.000221 -0.00256 -0.00316 -0.00131 0.0000391 -0.000210 -0.000331  
 (0.54) (0.58) (1.77) (-1.67) (-1.52) (-0.54) (0.22) (-1.26) (-1.28)  
           
Significant 
litigation 
0.0594 -0.0230 -0.0358 -0.441 -0.491 -0.610 -0.164** -0.106* -0.0820*  
 (0.68) (-0.30) (-0.82) (-0.64) (-0.81) (-1.23) (-2.92) (-2.07) (-1.98)  
           
Constant 0.394 -0.402 1.738 -124.8*** -92.70*** -50.28* -5.760*** -5.849*** -4.375***  
 (0.82) (-0.74) (1.79) (-15.61) (-12.85) (-2.51) (-6.51) (-7.96) (-3.61)  
N 764 845 864 764 845 864 764 845 864  
R2 0.0214 0.0325 0.0423 0.5715 0.4865 0.2296 0.2630 0.2968 0.2713  
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Table 3.14 Total Variance Explained 
This and following tables present the result of principal component analysis of the dataset in chapter 2. This table presents the total variance explained by the 
components extracted by principal component analysis from 2008 to 2010. In 2008, the top 7 components explain 61.485 % variance. In 2009, the top 7 
components explain 63.009 % variance. In 2010, the top 6 components explain 56.403 % variance. 
 2008 2009 2010 
 Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
compon
ent 
Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulati
ve % 
Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumula
tive % 
Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulat
ive % 
Total 
% of 
Varia
nce 
Cumulati
ve % 
Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumula
tive % 
Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulat
ive % 
1 2.353 14.705 14.705 2.353 14.705 14.705 2.42 15.126 15.126 2.42 
15.12
6 
15.126 2.256 14.1 14.1 2.256 14.1 14.1 
2 1.667 10.421 25.126 1.667 10.421 25.126 1.763 11.019 26.145 1.763 
11.01
9 
26.145 1.728 10.801 24.901 1.728 10.801 24.901 
3 1.539 9.619 34.744 1.539 9.619 34.744 1.396 8.723 34.868 1.396 8.723 34.868 1.405 8.779 33.679 1.405 8.779 33.679 
4 1.119 6.996 41.74 1.119 6.996 41.74 1.343 8.391 43.259 1.343 8.391 43.259 1.325 8.281 41.96 1.325 8.281 41.96 
5 1.098 6.861 48.601 1.098 6.861 48.601 1.135 7.091 50.35 1.135 7.091 50.35 1.224 7.649 49.609 1.224 7.649 49.609 
6 1.048 6.548 55.149 1.048 6.548 55.149 1.025 6.408 56.758 1.025 6.408 56.758 1.087 6.794 56.403 1.087 6.794 56.403 
7 1.014 6.336 61.485 1.014 6.336 61.485 1 6.251 63.009 1 6.251 63.009 0.983 6.145 62.547 
   
8 0.965 6.029 67.514 
   
0.969 6.058 69.067 
   
0.953 5.954 68.501 
   
9 0.943 5.894 73.408 
   
0.859 5.37 74.438 
   
0.897 5.609 74.111 
   
10 0.867 5.421 78.829 
   
0.83 5.185 79.623 
   
0.844 5.274 79.384 
   
11 0.724 4.525 83.354 
   
0.8 5.001 84.624 
   
0.7 4.378 83.762 
   
12 0.709 4.433 87.787 
   
0.641 4.003 88.628 
   
0.663 4.144 87.907 
   
13 0.642 4.012 91.799 
   
0.568 3.549 92.177 
   
0.588 3.676 91.583 
   
14 0.557 3.483 95.282 
   
0.486 3.038 95.214 
   
0.512 3.198 94.781 
   
15 0.453 2.832 98.114 
   
0.428 2.676 97.891 
   
0.482 3.01 97.792 
   
16 0.302 1.886 100 
   
0.338 2.109 100 
   
0.353 2.208 100 
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Table 3.15 Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
This table presents the component score coefficient matrix from 2008 to 2010.  
year 2008 2009 2010 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log of capital 0.838 0.174 -0.067 -0.176 0.003 -0.015 -0.07 0.341 0.092 -0.022 -0.02 0.048 -0.046 -0.01 0.348 0.14 0.091 -0.03 0.037 0.061 
Industry of firms -0.072 -0.235 0.671 -0.164 0.176 0.237 0.075 -0.042 -0.152 -0.083 0.578 0.075 -0.01 0.056 -0.04 -0.175 -0.049 0.503 0.328 -0.002 
ROE 0.015 0.031 0.256 0.543 -0.161 -0.237 0.032 -0.002 -0.025 0.229 -0.059 -0.099 0.644 0.242 0.076 0.154 -0.289 0.202 -0.424 -0.002 
Log of 
remuneration 
0.702 0.222 0.286 -0.059 -0.202 -0.085 0.035 0.3 0.148 -0.081 0.108 -0.069 0.009 0.162 0.272 0.217 -0.016 0.056 0.05 -0.171 
Director 0.447 -0.001 -0.252 0.18 -0.221 0.401 0.196 0.226 -0.008 -0.295 -0.153 0.108 -0.073 0.331 0.259 0.048 -0.201 -0.19 0.232 0.003 
Independent 
director 
-0.06 -0.39 0.456 0.092 -0.2 0.333 0.338 0.024 -0.255 -0.179 0.304 0.062 -0.027 0.107 0.088 -0.252 -0.186 0.227 0.208 0.168 
Controlled 
director 
-0.206 0.71 0.077 -0.067 -0.291 -0.138 0.108 -0.071 0.397 -0.196 0.013 0.028 0.072 0.302 -0.105 0.403 -0.105 0.005 0.23 -0.14 
Shares held by 
director 
0.032 -0.229 -0.253 0.114 -0.562 -0.103 0.372 -0.015 -0.193 -0.272 -0.362 0.084 0.055 -0.408 0.019 -0.154 -0.335 -0.346 -0.091 0.161 
Shares held by 
major shareholder 
-0.014 0 -0.334 0.543 0.454 -0.204 0.255 -0.015 0.039 0.52 -0.079 -0.105 -0.113 0.2 -0.082 -0.032 0.41 -0.024 -0.341 0.006 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
-0.223 0.376 0.081 -0.01 0.283 0.43 0.166 -0.123 0.205 0.065 0.157 0.382 -0.023 -0.388 -0.157 0.144 0.128 0.095 0.128 0.456 
Internal risk -0.211 0.792 0.062 -0.047 -0.05 0.103 0.213 -0.095 0.427 -0.139 0.023 0.144 0.08 -0.093 -0.149 0.406 -0.031 -0.016 0.164 0.171 
Debt-asset ratio 0.419 -0.072 -0.489 -0.277 0.149 0.216 -0.035 0.117 -0.077 0.161 -0.222 0.497 0.118 -0.041 0.067 -0.083 0.273 -0.36 0.302 0.345 
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
0.684 0.049 0.241 0.166 0.058 -0.006 0.062 -0.004 0.083 0.142 -0.065 -0.193 -0.654 -0.028 0.01 0.006 0.222 -0.095 0.018 -0.465 
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
0.397 0.127 0.377 0.134 0.344 -0.242 0.021 0.283 0.036 0.123 0.097 -0.01 -0.045 -0.312 0.273 0.013 0.181 0.1 -0.11 0.157 
Shares of foreign 
financial  person 
0.076 0.165 -0.128 0.474 0.032 0.522 -0.189 0.173 0.1 0.172 0.225 -0.102 0.22 -0.393 0.147 0.073 0.239 0.302 -0.052 0.193 
Prior significant 
litigation 
0.063 -0.064 -0.136 -0.245 0.277 -0.105 0.72 0.009 -0.057 0.185 0.062 0.602 -0.178 0.281 0 -0.077 0.14 0.007 0.32 -0.422 
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Table 3.16 Component Matrix of 2008: Ranked by significance in component 1 
 
This table contains the component matrix of 2008 ranked by significance in 
component 1. Component 1 explains the largest part of all variance, which is 14.705%. 
In component 1, the proxy variable of signal effect of D&O insurance, shares of 
foreign juristic person, ranks as third among all variables. This result implies the 
importance of signal effect of D&O insurance.  
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Log of capital .838 .174 -.067 -.176 .003 -.015 -.070 
        
Log of 
remuneration 
.702 .222 .286 -.059 -.202 -.085 .035 
        
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
.684 .049 .241 .166 .058 -.006 .062 
        
Director .447 -.001 -.252 .180 -.221 .401 .196 
        
Shares of foreign 
financial  juristic 
person 
.397 .127 .377 .134 .344 -.242 .021 
        
Internal risk -.211 .792 .062 -.047 -.050 .103 .213 
        
Controlled 
director 
-.206 .710 .077 -.067 -.291 -.138 .108 
        
Industry of firms -.072 -.235 .671 -.164 .176 .237 .075 
        
Debt-asset ratio .419 -.072 -.489 -.277 .149 .216 -.035 
        
Independent 
director 
-.060 -.390 .456 .092 -.200 .333 .338 
        
Shares held by 
major shareholder 
-.014 .000 -.334 .543 .454 -.204 .255 
        
ROE .015 .031 .256 .543 -.161 -.237 .032 
        
Shares held by 
director 
.032 -.229 -.253 .114 -.562 -.103 .372 
        
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
.076 .165 -.128 .474 .032 .522 -.189 
        
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
-.223 .376 .081 -.010 .283 .430 .166 
        
Prior significant 
litigation 
.063 -.064 -.136 -.245 .277 -.105 .720 
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Table 3.17 Component Matrix of 2009: Ranked by significance in component 1 
 
This table contains the component matrix of 2009 ranked by significance in 
component 1. Component 1 explains the largest part of all variance, which is 15.126%. 
In component 1, the proxy variable of signal effect of D&O insurance, shares of 
foreign juristic person, ranks as third among all variables. This result implies the 
importance of signal effect of D&O insurance.  
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Log of capital 
 
.826 .161 -.030 -.027 .055 -.047 -.010 
Log of 
remuneration 
 
.726 .262 -.113 .145 -.079 .010 .162 
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
 
.684 .063 .172 .130 -.011 -.046 -.312 
Director .548 -.014 -.412 -.206 .122 -.075 .331 
 
Shares of foreign 
financial  juristic 
person 
 
.419 .177 .239 .303 -.116 .225 -.393 
Internal risk 
 
-.231 .753 -.195 .030 .163 .082 -.093 
Controlled 
director 
 
-.172 .699 -.273 .017 .032 .074 .302 
Independent 
director 
 
.058 -.449 -.250 .408 .070 -.028 .107 
Shares held by 
major shareholder 
 
-.035 .068 .726 -.106 -.120 -.116 .200 
Industry of firms 
 
-.100 -.268 -.115 .775 .085 -.010 .056 
Shares held by 
director 
 
-.037 -.341 -.379 -.486 .095 .056 -.408 
Shares held by 
director 
 
.022 -.100 .258 .083 .683 -.182 .281 
Debt-asset ratio 
 
.282 -.136 .225 -.298 .564 .121 -.041 
Duality of CEO 
and COB 
 
-.298 .362 .091 .210 .434 -.024 -.388 
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
 
-.011 .146 .198 -.087 -.219 -.671 -.028 
ROE -.006 -.045 .320 -.079 -.113 .661 .242 
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Table 3.18 Component Matrix of 2010: Ranked by significance in component 1 
 
This table contains the component matrix of 2010 ranked by significance in 
component 1. Component 1 explains the largest part of all variance, which is 14.1%. 
In component 1, the proxy variable of signal effect of D&O insurance, shares of 
foreign juristic person, ranks as second among all variables. This result implies the 
importance of signal effect of D&O insurance.  
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Log of capital .786 .242 .128 -.039 .046 .067 
       
Shares of foreign 
juristic person 
.616 .023 .255 .132 -.135 .170 
       
Log of remuneration .614 .375 -.023 .074 .061 -.185 
       
Director .584 .083 -.283 -.252 .283 .003 
       
Internal risk -.336 .702 -.043 -.021 .201 .186 
       
Controlled director -.236 .697 -.148 .007 .281 -.152 
       
Independent director .199 -.436 -.261 .301 .254 .183 
       
Shares held by major 
shareholder 
-.184 -.056 .576 -.032 -.417 .006 
       
Shares held by director .042 -.266 -.471 -.458 -.111 .175 
       
Industry of firms -.091 -.302 -.069 .667 .402 -.002 
       
Debt-asset ratio .152 -.144 .383 -.476 .369 .375 
       
Shares of foreign 
financial  juristic 
person 
.331 .126 .336 .400 -.064 .210 
       
ROE .171 .266 -.405 .267 -.519 -.002 
       
Shares of foreign 
natural person 
.023 .010 .312 -.125 .023 -.506 
       
Duality of CEO and 
COB 
-.354 .249 .180 .126 .156 .496 
       
Prior significant 
litigation 
.000 -.133 .197 .009 .392 -.459 
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CHAPTER 4  
IMPLICATIONS AND FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Empirical findings and relevant discussions  
Following the empirical test of the monitoring hypothesis and the signal hypothesis in 
previous chapters, qualitative analysis will be processed in this chapter. This chapter will 
try to find more substantial reasons why monitoring hypothesis cannot functions well, 
and why signal hypothesis is implied. The focus will be on the differences between legal 
environments in Taiwan and the United States. More substantial reasons to further 
support the previous empirical results will be developed. 
 
4.1.1 Discussion about the monitoring hypothesis  
4.1.1.1 Litigation system  
Shareholders’ litigation and securities litigation are important sources of litigation risk for 
corporations and directors,395 but these practices are not so popular in Taiwan. In the 
United States, shareholders’ litigation can be divided into two forms, direct suit and 
derivative suit. Direct suit is used to redress harms inflicted on the shareholders directly. 
In contrast, derivative suit396 enables shareholders to obtain redress for harms inflicted on 
the corporation, typically by corporate management.397 The prevalence of shareholders’ 
litigation and securities litigation398 causes directors and corporations to be at high risk to 
                                                            
395 For more discussion about empirical studies on the prevalence and effects of shareholder suits, see Curt 
Cutting, Turning Point for Rule 10b-5: Will Congressional Reforms Protect Small Corporations, 56 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 555, 564 (1995). 
396 In the United States, derivative suits are based on the common law principles, and can be traced back to 
a case in 1882, see Hawes v City of Oakland, 104 US 450 (1882). 
397 See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 470 (Cal. 1969). 
398 See Curt Cutting, supra note 395, at 564. 
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be sued. This provides substantial incentive to purchase D&O insurance,399 and thus to 
develop insurers as external monitors. However, the maturity and popularity of 
shareholders’ litigations in Taiwan are not the same as the United States.  
In Taiwan, there is no specific rule for direct suit and thus standard tort law will be 
applied. 400  Derivative suits were established in 1966 in Article 214 in Taiwanese 
Company Law.401 Shareholders who have been continuously holding 3% or more of the 
total number of the outstanding shares of the corporation over one year may request in 
writing the supervisors of the corporation to institute, for the corporation, an action 
against a director of the corporation. In case the supervisors fails to institute an action 
within 30 days after having received the request, then the shareholders filing such request 
may institute the action for the corporation.402  
However, some flaws in the legislation decrease the incentive for filing derivative 
litigation. When suing shareholders win the lawsuits, the benefits belong to corporations 
instead of shareholders.403 In Taiwan, where a lawsuit is found by a final judgment to be 
based on facts apparently true, the defendant director shall be liable to compensate the 
shareholders who instituted the action for the loss or damage resulting from such an 
                                                            
399 Once corporations buy D&O insurance, the risk of shareholder litigation shifts, in whole or in part, to a 
third-party insurer. See Sean J. Griffith, supra note 51, at 1173. 
400 Taiwanese Company Law art. 23, § 2 (2009). “If the responsible person of a company has, in the course 
of conducting the business operations, violated any provision of the applicable laws and/or regulations and 
thus caused damage to any other person, he/she shall be liable, jointly and severally, for the damage to such 
other person.” 
401 This system comes from the derivative suit in the United States. See Taying Liaow, Examining 
Corporate Management and Directors' Liability: A Review of Stockholders' Derivative Suits under 
Taiwan's Company Law, 37 SOCIOECON. L. AND INST. REV. 103, 107 (2006). 
402 Taiwanese Company Law art. 214 (2009). 
403 A similar situation also takes place in Japan. The shareholders in Japan have less reason than 
shareholders in the United States to bring suit, because even the winners do not result in increases in 
shareholder wealth. See Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 351, 381 (2001).  
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action. 404  However, whether attorney fees and litigation fees are included in this 
compensation or not is still controversial. Hence, there are weak incentives for 
shareholders to file such suit.  
In addition, unlike the United States, contingency fees are not allowed in Taiwan. It is 
obvious that incentive for litigation would be much less. What is more, shareholders are 
liable if shareholder litigation has no apparent basis. When the suing shareholders lose 
the lawsuits and thus cause damage to the corporations, the suing shareholders shall be 
liable for indemnifying the corporation for such damage.405 When a lawsuit is instituted 
and is found by a final judgment to be based on facts apparently untrue, the shareholders 
who instituted the action shall be liable to compensate the defendant director for loss or 
damage resulting from such an action.406 With risk of loss and weak beneficial incentive, 
it is difficult to expect shareholders to ignore these potential liabilities to file a suit. In the 
end, this legislation not only decreases the incentives to file a suit, but also limits the 
development of shareholders’ litigation. All these factors increase the difficulty of 
litigation and the litigation risk of directors and officers. 
Furthermore, Hirschman’s exit-voice paradigm407 may shed more light on this issue. In 
this model, participants can choose to exit from the organization, or stay and voice their 
dissents.408 In corporate law, “voice” refers to the rights of shareholders in firms’ decision 
making, and “exit” denotes that the dissenting shareholder may exit corporate by 
                                                            
404 Taiwanese Company Law art. 215, § 2 (2009). 
405 Taiwanese Company Law art. 214, § 2 (2009).  
406 Taiwanese Company Law art. 215, § 1 (2009).   
407 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970).  
408 See Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsidering China's 
Antimonopoly Law, 49 Va. J. Int'l L. 379, 428 (2009).  
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appraisal, buyout or other mechanisms.409 Anglo-American countries tend to emphasize 
“voice”, but European regimes tend to emphasize “exit”.410 Such difference may cause 
different emphasis on the duty of director and litigation, and then affect the development 
of D&O insurance. This may explain the discrepant development of D&O insurance in 
the United States and Taiwan.    
 
4.1.1.2 Ownership structure  
The difference in the development of D&O insurance in Taiwan and the United States 
may be also caused by divergence of ownership structure. Generally, Anglo-American 
countries have dispersed ownership structure.411 In contrast, concentration of ownership 
in public companies is prevalent in East Asia, including Taiwan. 412  In such 
circumstance,413 because firms is generally under the control of controlling shareholders, 
minor shareholders are less likely to file a litigation,414 and controlling shareholders have 
less incentive to lead a litigation against directors who are nominated by themselves. This 
causes less popularity of shareholder litigation in Taiwan, and thus the incentive based on 
real demand to purchase D&O insurance is even less. Concentrated ownership structure 
provides explanation for limited litigation risk, and implies there may be reasons other 
                                                            
409 See Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. 
INT'L ECON. L. 791 (2002).  
410 See Janis Sarra, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets, Canadian and International 
Developments, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1691, 1721-3 (2002).  
411 See Anke Weber, An Empirical Analysis of the 2000 Corporate Tax Reform in Germany: Effects on 
Ownership and Control in Listed Companies, 29 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 57, 57 (2009).  
412 See Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Carol Yuan-Chi Pang, supra note 96, at 83-4. Yu-Hsin Lin, Overseeing 
Controlling Shareholders: Do Independent Directors Constrain Tunneling in Taiwan?, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L 
L.J. 363, 368-9 (2011). 
413 In addition, Rafael La Porta elaborates the competing ownership structure, dispersed and concentrated, 
and its correlation to investor protection. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership around the World, 
54 J. FIN. 471, 511 (1999). 
414 See Marco Ventoruzzo, Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Proposals, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 
841, 882-3 (2010). Also see George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. 
REV. 733, 763-4 (1941).  
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than substantial demand for D&O insurance purchase in Taiwan.   
Also, cross shareholding between D&O insurer and insured may cause limited 
monitoring function of D&O insurance in Taiwan. For example, in 2010, Taiwan Life 
purchased D&O insurance from TLG Insurance, which is 100% invested by Taiwan Life 
Financial Group.415 In such case, it may be not easy to expect D&O insurer will exert 
monitoring function which is proposed in literature.  
4.1.1.3 Burden of proof 
In the United States, the “business judgment rule” is a limited presumption of correctness 
in corporate directors’ decisions.416 Unless corporate directors acted fraudulently, illegally, 
oppressively, or in bad faith, they are protected by the rule no matter how poor their 
business judgment is.417 Normally, the business judgment rule protects directors from 
shareholder suits for corporate losses.418 In contrast, plaintiffs have to collect evidence to 
overrule this assumption to sue directors.  
In the United States, because litigation is prevalent and almost all corporations have 
D&O insurance, a majority of suits are closed by settlement. For plaintiffs, the risk of 
wasting time and money serve as strong incentives for them to settle. Since defendants 
usually have D&O insurances, if plaintiffs choose to settle within the coverage, plaintiffs 
can get compensation in the short time rather than spending more time in litigation. For 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, their primary concern is compensation,419 and not whether the case 
is settled or litigated. For corporations and directors, with the protection of insurance, 
they have no incentive to litigate or to decrease compensation. Settlement is a good way 
                                                            
415 Market Observation Post System, http://emops.twse.com.tw/emops_all.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
416 See Aerospace Accessory Service, Inc. v. Abiseid, 943 So. 2d 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2006). 
417 See In re Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 316 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2003). 
418 See William Scott Biel, Whistling past the Waste Site: Directors' and Officers' Personal Liability for 
Environmental Decisions and the Role of Liability Insurance Coverage, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 241, 247 (1991).  
419 See John C. Coffee, supra note 14, at 1581.  
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for them to remove themselves from the situation. For insurers, they usually like to settle 
within coverage, rather than spending more time on litigation and suffering more 
uncertain outcomes.420 This also leads to the prevalence of litigation and D&O insurance. 
However, there is nothing like the business judgment rule to balance liability of directors 
and corporate management in Taiwan. This causes the liability of directors to be more 
uncertain. In Taiwan, claims against directors or the responsible person 421  of a 
corporation is based on Article 23422 of Company Law, which is one form of tort 
liability.423 In this type of litigation, it is difficult for plaintiffs to prove all elements 
including damages, causation, and breach of duty of loyalty and so on.424  
 
4.1.1.4 Collective action  
Class action425 lawsuits remain rare in Taiwan. As mentioned above, the Securities and 
Futures Investors Protection Center (SFIPC) in Taiwan was established to protect 
                                                            
420 See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1055, 1100-02 (2006). 
421 In Taiwanese Company Law, “responsible persons” denotes shareholders conducting the business or 
representing the company in case of an unlimited company or unlimited company with limited liability 
shareholders; directors of the company in case of a limited company or a company limited by shares. See 
Taiwanese Company Law art. 8, § 1 (2009). 
422 “The responsible person of a company shall have the loyalty and shall exercise the due care of a good 
administrator in conducting the business operation of the company; and if he/she has acted contrary to this 
provision, shall be liable for the damages to be sustained by the company there-from. If the responsible 
person of a company has, in the course of conducting the business operations, violated any provision of the 
applicable laws and/or regulations and thus caused damage to any other person, he/she shall be liable, 
jointly and severally, for the damage to such other person.” Taiwanese Company Law art. 23 (2009). 
423 See WALLACE WEN-YEU WANG, supra note 93, at 183. 
424 The similar situation also occurs in China. In China, if a director, supervisor or the senior officer causes 
detriment to the company while performing his duties in violation of laws, administrative regulations or the 
articles of association, he shall be liable for the loss so caused. See Company Law art. 150 (2005) (P.R.C.). 
Plaintiffs have to prove the violations, damages, causations…etc. This will cause shareholders and 
investors to have weak incentives to file suits. With low risk of losing suits, corporations and directors also 
have fewer incentives to concede or settle, either. As consequence, corporations and directors have fewer 
incentives to purchase D&O liability insurance. This not only damages the development of D&O liability 
insurance, but also decreases the possibility that insurers function as outside monitors.  
425 For more discussion about class action in Taiwan, see Kuan-Ling Shen, Class Action in Taiwan: A New 
System Created Using the Theory of “Right of Procedure Options”, 5 NAT'L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 39,66 
(2010). 
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investors and assist them in filing collective action lawsuits. The SFIPC processed about 
80 class action lawsuits from 1998 through 2010, a much smaller number than in the 
United States.426 Weak and underdeveloped class action lawsuits do not have the same 
deterrence effect on directors as do better-organized efforts. 
 
4.1.1.5 Empirical evidence  
In practice, investors in Taiwan are not used to suing directors.427 When shareholders are 
dissatisfied with directors or companies, they tend to “vote by foot”428 – they just sell 
their stocks and leave. These activities decrease the willingness of shareholders to file 
suits against companies and directors. In this way, the threat faced by directors and 
officers is actually limited.  
The weakness of litigation risk can be found in more evidence. For example, from the 
cases concerning company law and security law in Taiwan from 1993 to the present, 
some clues about litigation risks of directors and officers can be found. During these 17 
years, the numbers of the cases concerning company law and security range from 
2,000-4,000. The cases about company suing director or auditor do not increase 
significantly as well. In this period, Taiwan loosened the requirement of shareholder 
litigation, established Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center, and started to 
promoted D&O insurance, but litigation cases did not increase significantly in response. 
This implies that the litigation risks of directors and officers are similar in the past 17 
years. This information can be found in Table 4.1. 
                                                            
426 About the statistics of class action in the United States, see Stanford Law School Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.edu/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
427 In contrast to the United States, there are comparatively fewer cases in which shareholders file suits 
against directors for the breach of duties in Taiwan or China. See Taying Liaow, supra note 401, at 106. 
428 See Ning Ma, D&O Insurance and Corporate Governance, 23 J. GUANGXI ADMIN. CADRE INST. POL. & 
L. 89, 90 (2008). 
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4.1.2 Discussion about the hypothesis 
Several implications can be drawn from the analyses above. First of all, the previous 
section shows that litigation risk is limited and seems to not have increased significantly 
in recent years. However, many firms are still willing to purchase D&O insurance. 
Combining this evidence with the previous empirical findings that D&O insurance 
purchase is positively related to the qualities of corporate governance, foreign investment 
and market value of insured firms, the signal hypothesis is further suggested. Since the 
purchase of D&O insurance is a positive and efficient signal, good firms which usually 
emphasize corporate governance are more willing to purchase D&O insurance, in spite of 
the premium and low litigation risk.  
Of course, it is also possible that good firms purchase D&O insurance just out of their 
custom, instead of any anticipation of its signal effect, or they just have more financial 
resources and thus result in more insurance purchase. However, facing the evidence that 
litigation risk is still low in recent years, such arguments are less possible and do not 
complete conflict with the argument of signal hypothesis.  
If the litigation risk is low, then firms would have less demand to have insurance 
coverage. If they keep on or even increase insurance purchase, there must be some 
consideration more than substantial reimbursement. Especially for the firms with good 
qualities and high market values, they should be more cautious about controlling 
unnecessary cost and thus to improve the management. The cost for redundant insurance 
purchase should not be an exception. Hence, the signal effect of insurance is a reasonable 
and possible explanation.  
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Also, encouragement from the Taiwanese authority may provide another clue. Even 
though the history of D&O insurance in Taiwan is comparatively short429 and the 
prevalence is also less than in the United States or Canada, Taiwanese authority 
endeavors to promote D&O insurance and even regards it as an index of corporate 
governance in recent years. This provides more grounds for signal hypothesis. Firms with 
superior corporate governance and market value usually care more about risk 
management, corporate governance and their reputations. Thus, they are likely to respond 
to the government’s suggestion to purchase D&O insurance, even though their risk of 
litigation is comparatively low. 
Another possible concern would be why other firms do not also purchase D&O insurance 
to improve their reputation, attract investment and even raise their stock price? Why does 
not every firm purchase as much D&O insurance as possible? As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
there is no evidence proving that asymmetric information exists in the Taiwanese market. 
In addition, underwriting of insurers also functions diligently. Insurance applicants 
choose specific insurers to contract with and insurers also choose proper applicants to 
contract with. This implies insurance applicants cannot have unlimited choice of insurers 
and coverage. All applicants are subject to the consent of insurers. For those who have no 
coverage or sufficient coverage, the reason may be that they cannot obtain it from 
insurers. Hence, this can explain why every firm cannot purchase as much D&O 
insurance as possible to convey positive signal to the market.  
 
4.1.3 Summary  
                                                            
429 The first D&O insurance policy was issued in 1997. See Taiwan Insurance Institute, 
http://insprod.tii.org.tw/database/insurance/index.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
282 
The previous two chapters empirically test the monitoring and signal hypothesis. 
Generally, the positive association between D&O insurance and qualities of insured firms 
is supported. The signal hypothesis, which can explain the situation of the Taiwanese 
market, might be a possible explanation. This chapter offers more substantial reasons to 
support theory. This dissertation finds that both legal environment and litigation system 
play important roles in this issue. D&O insurance may be useful in conveying a positive 
signal than eliminating litigation risk. This characteristic is worthy of more notice, no 
matter in theory, in research, in practice, or in legislative consideration.  
 
4.2 Recommendations 
Based on findings and discussions above, following recommendations are presented for 
more consideration and research in the future.  
 
4.2.1 Improving D&O insurance and regulation  
The empirical result in this dissertation indicates that there is a relationship between the 
purchase of D&O insurance and the quality of corporate governance in Taiwan. If the 
monitoring function of insurers is expected to develop more in the future, in the 
long-term the litigation systems and relevant regulations should be improved first. Many 
details in the regulations and insurance policies in Taiwan are not as complete as the 
United States. For example, some inconsistencies and conflicts in insurance policies also 
cause confusion. 430  These not only influence the compensation for directors and 
corporations, but also the incentives to purchase D&O insurance. Also, the signal effect 
                                                            
430 See Shih-Ning Lu, Comments on Directors' and Officers' Insurance in Taiwan, 43 TAIWAN L. J. 157, 
180 (2003).  
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of D&O insurance implies that investors in the market may rely on such information. 
Thus, the underwriting of insurers and the relevant regulation would be more important. 
Compared with the United States, the authorities concerned in Taiwan have less 
experience in supervising the insurer due to the relatively short history of the 
development of D&O insurance. Even though the evidence proves that no adverse 
selection and asymmetric information problem exist in the current market, relevant 
regulation will be necessary if these problems occur.  
 
4.2.2 Compulsory insurance is improper in current Taiwan 
Even though D&O insurance can convey the signal about the quality of insured firms, 
this study proposes that compulsory D&O insurance is unreasonable in Taiwan. As seen 
in the previous analysis, the litigation risk to directors and officers is not that high in 
Taiwan. The main purpose of insurance is indemnifying the loss of the insured.431 If firms 
have no risk of being sued and no demand for indemnification, it is unpersuasive to 
require them to buy insurance just because of other reasons. Otherwise, that might 
conflict with the main purpose of insurance.  
In other words, underwriting information and D&O insurance details may be important to 
the market, shareholders and investors, but it is unreasonable to inversely mandate that 
firms purchase D&O insurance. If that financial information is necessary severely, it may 
be proper to ask firms disclose that information directly, rather than asking them to 
purchase insurance first and then requesting them to disclose. Hence, this research argues 
that compulsory D&O insurance rule in Taiwan is suspicious. 
 
                                                            
431 See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 2. 
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4.2.3 Limitation on insurance is unnecessary in current Taiwan 
In the United States, the D&O insurance significantly decreases the deterrence effect of 
the securities litigation,432 some people such as Janet Cooper Alexander suggest making 
penalties uninsurable, limiting insurance coverage and thus letting directors pay for 
themselves to maintain the deterrence effect.433 Similarly, Narjess Boubakri and Nabil 
Ghalleb test the Canadian market and find that the problem of asymmetric information 
and moral hazard is obvious.434 Insurer cannot distinguish opportunistic risk or charge 
higher premiums to those who have high opportunistic risk. Their evidence also shows 
that mandatory reporting is not helpful.435 Under such circumstances, regulation and 
limitation are recommended by them.436 
However, the situation in Taiwan is completely different. The maturity and popularity of 
D&O insurance are far less than in the United States and Canada. Needless to say the 
problem where D&O insurance over rampant and thus decrease the function of litigation. 
It should be unnecessary and unpersuasive to limit the coverage of D&O insurance to 
maintain deterrence in current Taiwan. Of course, deductible is helpful for mitigating 
moral hazard, but compulsory deductibles or limitations on coverage are too much for 
Taiwan. According to the previous analysis, it is found that the Taiwanese market is close 
to being homogenous and no evidence supports the existence of asymmetric information 
and moral hazard. Hence, imposing some limitations on D&O insurance transaction are 
unnecessary in current Taiwan.  
                                                            
432 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, supra note 74, at 831. 
433 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 
1515 (1996).  
434 See Narjess Boubakri & Nabil Ghalleb, supra note 150, at 30. 
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Reno/Papers/Does_Mandatory_Disclosure_Curb_Managerial_Opportunism.p
df. 
435 Id, at 30. 
436 Id. 
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4.3 Implications for future research 
4.3.1 The development of D&O insurance in corporate governance in Taiwan  
Regarding the prospect of the role of D&O insurance in corporate governance in Taiwan, 
the possible development could be divergent. For example, D&O insurance could be 
more prosperous because of the improvement of government and its signal effect. 
However, when transparency of corporate governance is improved and more mature, 
D&O insurance would be less important, especially for the purpose of singling. Also, if 
litigation risk increases, insurance premium will also increase to mitigate the loss of 
insurer. Due to the increasing premium, firms may try to find other substitutes for D&O 
insurance. Thus, the prospect of D&O insurance might be suspicious.  
A specific answer for this issue still needs for more exploration in the future, but this 
research may tentatively suggest that the future of D&O insurance might be perceived by 
the development of litigation system, like shareholder and collective litigation. As 
mentioned earlier, shareholder litigation does not function actively in Taiwan, and the 
litigation led by minority shareholder or individual investor is difficult. In this way, the 
role of Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center would be more important. 
However, such non-profit organization (NPO) has the purpose to pursue public interest, 
and maximize social welfare instead of personal welfare.437 NPO usually files lesser 
litigations than the system led by private attorney.438 Furthermore, the Securities and 
Futures Investors Protection Center is not perfect yet. Its transparency and independence 
                                                            
437 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence 
from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 169, 202 (2004). 
438 Id., at 175. Also see Yu-Hsin Lin, supra note 293, at 179-80.  
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of this protection center has been argued and revolution for this is suggested.439 For 
example, the reasons for the decisions and settlement terms should be published,440 and 
the appointment of board should be more independent from the involvement of the 
authorities.441   
Hence, observing the development of litigation system might be a breakthrough point for 
following research about D&O insurance in corporate governance. If the litigation system 
is still limited in the future, then the demand for substantial reimbursement from 
insurance would be not that necessary. Thus, the signal or addressing function might be 
an important consideration in D&O insurance purchase. In this case, if there is other 
mechanism improving the transparency of corporate governance, D&O insurance will 
lose its advantage easily. In contrast, if litigation system is indeed improved, this may 
cause more litigation risks and more demands for insurance compensation. Thus, even 
though corporate governance is even more transparent in the future, the basic function for 
reimbursement might still support the survival of D&O insurance. Conversely, high 
litigation risk might also cause rising premiums and then make D&O insurance less 
attractive. It is also possible that insurers are not willing to offer insurance for such high 
risk. Thus, evaluating the development of litigation system might provide more clues for 
the future of D&O insurance.  
 
4.3.2 Monitoring function from the plaintiff  
As noted in introduction, this research tests the monitoring and alternative hypothesis. 
For the former, this study follows major literature to focus on the mechanisms from 
                                                            
439 See Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Jian-Lin Chen, supra note 99, at 150-1. 
440 Id., at 151. 
441 Id.  
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insurer, like the offering of D&O insurance, insurance coverage, identity of insurer and so 
on. However, it is also possible for some monitoring effect which comes from plaintiff 
and its attorney. In the litigation where plaintiff sues the management of insured firm, 
D&O insurance provides incentive for the plaintiff and his attorney to monitor the 
insured firm, to collect more evidence, and then to increase the probability to win the 
case. The previous empirical works does not include the test for this effect, but some 
thoughts in this research may be helpful for the following study on this issue.  
A possible hypothesis for future research is that the monitoring function from the plaintiff 
is suspicious, or lesser than the monitoring function from the insurer. Like the analysis in 
previous section, the litigation system in Taiwan which is not identical to the United 
States might be a major concern. Litigation led by minority shareholder is still not 
prosperous, and class action is majorly led by Securities and Futures Investors Protection 
Center. Such non-profit organization has public interest purpose, which can be found in 
the criteria in choosing case and avoiding frivolous suits.442 Also, Securities and Futures 
Investors Protection Center recruits full-time attorney with salary for litigation service,443 
and contingency fee is not allowed in Taiwan. This provides less possibility for the 
monitoring effect which comes from the eagerness of attorney to win more compensation 
form D&O insurance coverage. Thus, the observation of litigation system might shed 
light on the future research about the monitoring effect from plaintiff in D&O insurance. 
 
4.3.3  General model for other jurisdictions  
                                                            
442 Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center currently focuses on four types of cases, including 
making false financial statements, producing false prospectuses, influencing share prices illegally, and 
insider trading. http://www.sfipc.org.tw/english/service/03-2.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
443 http://www.sfipc.org.tw/main.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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The finding in this paper may also provide a possible theory for other jurisdictions. Like 
Taiwan, many jurisdictions in East Asia also have the problem of concentrated owner 
structure, including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,444 South Korea, Japan,445 
and Hong Kong.446 This may affect these countries’ prevalence of shareholder litigation 
and thus litigation risk of directors. Hence, theory about D&O insurance in Taiwan, 
explaining the divergence about litigation risk and D&O insurance, may possibly apply to 
these jurisdictions. It is worth of more researches in the future to find whether the theory 
in this paper can be generalized to apply to other jurisdictions.    
  
                                                            
444 See Nisha Kanchanapoomi, Note, Accelerating Corporate Governance Reform in Thailand: The 
Benefits of Private Reform Mechanisms, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 165, 185 (2005).  
445 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence 
from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 169, 189-90 (2004). 
446 See Michael H. Lubetsky, Cultural Difference and Corporate Governance, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 200 (2008).  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
Table 4.1: Types of Civil Cases Terminated in the First Instance (District Courts) 
 
 
Year 
Company law 
Security 
law 
Withdrawal of 
shareholders 
meeting 
resolutions  
Invalidation 
of 
shareholders 
meeting 
resolutions 
Company 
suing director 
or auditor 
Exclusion 
judgment 
 
other Subtotal   
1993 24 26 4 0 2339 2393  
1994 47 23 7 0 2712 2789  
1995 68 20 7 0 3617 3712  
1996 54 14 0 0 2880 2948  
1997 50 28 0 0 4052 4130  
1998 66 33 1 0 3956 4056  
1999 41 32 2 0 2 908 2983  
2000 73 23 1 0 2349 2446  
2001 57 25 1 0 1457 1540 3 
2002 60 39 5 1380 208 1692 - 
2003 63 42 2 1414 213 1734 4 
2004 52 41 7 1813 198 2111 26 
2005 54 37 4 1662 188 1945 33 
2006 60 42 6 2011 173 2292 11 
2007 36 56 10 2495 211 2808 7 
2008 52 51 18 2039 270 2430 6 
2009 45 30 15 1182 380 1652 32 
2010      2192 19 
Source: Judicial Yuan, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/index1.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study seeks to analyze the relationship between D&O insurance and the corporate 
governance of insured companies in Taiwan, and find out the theory which can explain 
the situation in Taiwan. The monitoring hypothesis suggests that D&O insurers work as 
outside monitors who promote corporate governance. Given this purpose of monitoring, 
D&O insurance and other monitoring mechanisms all have monitoring functions. Hence, 
D&O insurance and other monitoring mechanisms are substitutes for each other. 
Companies which have better corporate governance have less demand for D&O 
insurance. This research uses empirical methods and comparative law analysis to 
examine the situation in Taiwan, and finds that the monitoring hypothesis is not fully 
supported. Actually, firms with good corporate governance tend to purchase more D&O 
insurance, while firms with poor corporate governance are less likely to do so. In contrast, 
empirical evidence shows a positive association between D&O insurance purchase and 
the qualities of corporate governance, foreign investment and market value of insured 
firms. Combined with empirical results and doctrinal analysis, the signal hypothesis may 
be implied. More complete empirical test is expected in following research, especially 
when more data will be available. This study also tests the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. No evidence for these problems is found. Based on these findings, this 
study recommends improving the regulations and policies of D&O insurance in Taiwan. 
However, the mandatory insurance or even limitation on D&O insurance has been shown 
to be unnecessary in contemporary Taiwanese market. 
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